3GPP TSG RAN WG2 Meeting #115-e R2-17xxxxx

**Electronic meeting, 16th-27th August 2021**

**Agenda item:** x.x.x

**Source:** Intel Corporation

**Title:** Report of email discussion [Post114-e][507][SData] Non-SDT data arrival handling

**Document for:**  Discussion and decision

# Introduction

The intention is to discuss the following topics as part of the email discussion “[Post114-e][507][SData] Non-SDT data arrival handling” taking into consideration the related proposals on RAN2#114e TDocs [1]-[22] and in preparation for responses to be received from SA3 and CT1 in relation to previous RAN2 LSs [23][24].

* [Post114-e][507][SData] Non-SDT data arrival handling (Intel)

**Scope:**

* + Phase 1 (identify the open issues/questions) – 5 days
	+ Phase 2 (collect the company views on open issues/questions)
	+ Phase 3 (collect companies view on preferred solution CCCH vs. DCCH with the aim to down-select)

**Email discussion to focus on:**

a. Develop details of both solutions (CCCH and DCCH) and identify any further impacts to other WGs (e.g. RAN3)

b. Develop details of how cell reselection could be handled (considering possible repetition of security material) and check if we could agree to support optimised handling of cell reselection

c. Can consider SA3/CT1 discussions into where appropriate.

**Intended outcome**: Report with agreeable proposals

**Email discussion deadline:** August 5th, 0900 UTC

**Note**: silent period is July 5-30 (may be updated during TSG RAN)

## 3rd Phase

### 3rd Phase: Introdution

The **deadline for the 3rd phase** of this email discussion is **Thursday August 5th, 0900 UTC.**

This 3rd phase focuses on collecting companies’ views on the preferred solution to each identified issue taking into account the solution details clarified during the 2nd phase. A new section 6 is added with the new questions for this 3rd phase.

### 3rd Phase: Report

<To be added by Rapporteur>

## 2nd Phase:

### 2nd Phase: Introdution

The **deadline for the 2nd phase** of this email discussion is **Monday July 26th, 2300 UTC.**

This 2nd phase focuses on collecting companies’ views to better understand the technical details of the proposed solutions. The discussion points addressed during the 1st phase and companies’ responses provided during the 1st phase are **greyed out** to avoid confusions. New questions (marked as Q.x and with a corresponding sub-section header) are added for companies to provide their views during this 2nd phase. Blue color is used to mark changes/inputs done during this 2nd phase.

### 2nd Phase: Report

Summary report for each question of the 2nd phase is provided in new section 5 (i.e. Summary report from 2nd Phase (including proposals)).

## 1st Phase

### 1st Phase: Introduction

The **deadline for this 1st phase** of email discussion is **Friday June 18th, 0900 UTC.**

The **1st phase** of this email discussion provides an overview of the discussion points for the above scenarios that were identified in the contributions. Companies are invited to provide inputs on any missing topics/questions that need to also be included. Issues impacting other groups (e.g., RAN3) can also be listed. These issues are to be addressed in more detail with possible solutions during the 2nd phase.

For completion of the solutions and to acknowledge companies’ inputs, observations (with their corresponding description and references) are also included to capture points that seem straight forward (i.e. the suggestion is not to include a related discussion point for them in the 2nd phase).

### 1st Phase: Report

Rapporteur has addressed companies’ responses during the 1st phase in a new column that is added to each table where companies were asked for new points to be addressed. These tables are moved to this 1.3 section aiming to minimize any confusion between the responses provided by companies in the 1st and 2nd phase.

#### New points to section 2 (identified during 1st phase)

Please indicate if there are any other topics/questions that require to be addressed as part of this **section 2** on “General topics: switch from SDT to CONNECTED”.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Companies’ views** | **Rapporteur’s response** |
| ZTE | For 2.1, for option 1.a, we think there should be a question on whether or not we will support any mechanism to prevent data loss in case UE is moved back to INACTIVE state (since in normal RRC release procedure, PDCP suspend operation will be performed and all the data buffered on UE side will be discarded) – perhaps this is also related to section 4.2 (i.e., we may apply uniform handling for all scenarios where there could be an abrupt termination of SDT procedure).  | New question Q1) is added with corresponding new proposal for option 1.a) |
| APT | Similar view with ZTE: a higher-level question like whether to support a mechanism to prevent data loss (especially for the on-going SDT RB) when UE is moved back to RRC\_INACTIVE would be helpful for section 2.1, option 1.a.  | See response to ZTE |
| Huawei, HiSilicon |  For Topic#2: Observation 1 is not really an observation – we should perhaps turn it into a proposal and attempt to agree on it.On the comment from ZTE – when the UE moves to RRC INACTIVE and PDCP is suspended the PDCP PDUs are discarded, but not PDCP SDUs. This is how the data loss is avoided (as compared to moving the UE to RRC IDLE). | For Topic #1, the discussion is indeed focusing on the questions.For Topic #2, observation 2 is moved to a new question Q.6) as requested.Added the suggested clarification on the new question Q1) raised by ZTE. |
| TCL | Agree with HW that we should focus on the questions raised and do further studies on them for now, then investigate the possible approaches based on the studies. For section 2.1, option 1.a, we share the same view with ZTE and APT, the service continuation should be considered during the procedure the UE move back to INACTIVE state. | See responses to previous related comments |
| NEC | For Topic#1, we think this should be discussed by RAN3. And we understand that RAN3 haven’t agreed to support the scenario of subsequent SDT without anchor relocation yet. So it is too early to discuss related issue in RAN2.We agree with observation 1 in Topic #2. | For Topic #1, a questionQ.4) is added with potential points to be asked/raised to RAN3 if the scenario were supported.For Topic #2, see response provided to Huawei on this. |

#### New points to section 3.1 (identified during 1st phase)

Please indicate if there are any other topics/questions that require to be addressed as part of this **section 3.1** on “General topics” for “Non-SDT data handling during ongoing SDT session”.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Companies’ views** | **Rapporteur’s response** |
| ZTE | In general, this is fine, but we would like to clarify that the discussion is \*only\* for the case where at least RACH preamble has been transmitted. i.e. we will not need to discuss any UE behaviour for the case when nothing has yet been transmitted. Further, we are not sure whether scenario 1) and 2) needs to be distinguished from RRC perspective, but this can be discussed during the questions... | Description of Topic 3 is updated to explicitly capture the 1st point on RACH preamble |
| CATT | The data arrival on non-SDT bearers could occur even when the SDT session is ongoing. This scenario is not been covered by the listed scenario 1) and 2). Hence Scenario 3: 1st UL RRC message has been sent successfully should also be considered. The scenario is applicable to both RA-SDT and CG-SDT. | The proposed scenario 3 aims to be addressed when explaining how CCCH and DCCH based approaches work in sections 3.2 and 3.3. Clarification text added before section 3.1 on this regard. |
| APT | Another scenario worth considering: Scenario 3) When non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has received the contention resolution corresponding to the 1st RA-SDT transmission, but has not received RRC message from gNB (i.e., in the middle of subsequent SDT transmissions).This scenario is particularly suitable for UE to use the DCCH approach to inform the arrival of non-SDT traffic. In addition, it appears that scenarios 1 and 2 only take RA-SDT into account. For CG-SDT, the following scenarios may need to be considered as well:Revised Scenario 1) When non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure, but 1st UL RRC message has not been sent yet. **For RA-SDT,** this could be when UE has already sent PRACH preamble when using 4-step RA-SDT. **For CG-SDT, this could be when UE has not sent the initial transmission via CG resource.**Scenario x) When non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure and has sent the 1st UL RRC message via CG resource, but the feedback has not been received by UE in CG response window. | For scenario 3), see response to CATT’s comment.For CG-SDT, it is clarified that scenarios 1) and 2) target on RA-SDT, and the new scenario x) is added targeting CG-SDT. However, it is not added “For CG-SDT, this could be when UE has not sent the initial transmission via CG resource” as the rapporteur assumes that this can be handled by UE implementation (as UE has not sent anything yet). |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | The answer to this issue will most likely be different for CCCH and for DCCH based approaches, so we suggest to discuss this issue for both approaches separately. | Since this is before SDT initialization, the rapporteur assumes it is the same for both approaches. Instead of moving this to separate sections, rapporteur suggests that companies can provide differences if they see any in phase 2. A sentence is added to the question along these lines. |
| TCL | We are generally fine with the proposal. However, we are wondering whether the subsequent SDT transmission is to be considered in this discussion as APT mentioned. For if there is subsequent SDT transmission, the subsequent SDT transmission may have impact on the handling of the non-SDT transmission. So the following scenario is suggested:Scenario x) When the non-SDT data arrival after the first SDT transmission is finished, and the subsequent SDT is to be performed. | For sub-sequent SDT (i.e. scenario 3), see response to CATT’s comment.  |
| NEC | We also think we need to consider the scenario of non-SDT data arrival during subsequent transmission phase. | For sub-sequent SDT (i.e. scenario 3), see response to CATT’s comment.  |

#### New points to section 3.2 (identified during 1st phase)

Please indicate if there are any other topics/questions that require to be addressed as part of this **section 3.2** on “CCCH-based approach” for “Non-SDT data handling during ongoing SDT session”.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Companies’ views** | **Rapporteur’s response** |
| ZTE | For section 3.2.1.1, in case the UE triggers new RRCResume procedure autonomously after releasing the current SDT session, then according to the current release procedure, the UE has to perform PDCP suspend operation and discard all buffered PDCP PDUs. It needs to be clarified whether this is the intention (in which case we need to understand how to handle data loss prevention etc). In case different operation is intended than legacy release, then it seems NW has to distinguish between the first and second RRCResume procedures and take different action accordingly and these details need to be understood too. Questions to narrow down these options and to understand how the actual procedure works will be useful. Just one other observation is that some of the questions/discussion in the above sections may be inter-related (for instance depending on which node - Anchor/new target - handles the second CCCH message, the security of the second CCCH message should be adjusted accordingly – i.e. these questions are interrelated), other than that, we think the general observations and discussion points have been captured accurately.  | For 3.2.1.1), Added a new discussion to address the open question explained is added. Note that this “new” point is somehow inter-related with the following discussion on section 3.2.4 that addresses the “PDCP COUNT and/or security key to be used”On the point that “some of the questions/discussion in the above sections may be inter-related”, this is indeed the case and companies are encouraged to provide consistent/align view on the inter-related topics. |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Discussion point 6) is relevant only in case SA3 indicates there is an issue with reusing the security material / existing key (i.e. if they conclude there is no issue, then there seems to be no reason to have option other than 6d)). Hence, we propose to clarify that 6d) is the baseline assumption and discuss only the remaining options, just in case SA3 confirms the issue. Also, we are not sure what option 6a) describes. It can either be understood as option 6b) or option 6d). We propose to remove it, especially that our paper is given as a reference, but what we propose is already captured by option 6d) and 6e). Discussion point 7) – option a) and option b) are not described properly, i.e. the legacy behavior is for the new gNB to send UE CONTEXT RELEASE message to the old anchor:After Path switch and after sending RRCRelease w/ suspend (for RNA update with anchor relocation)1. After Path Switch and after receiving RRCResumeComplete from the UE (for moving the UE to RRC Connected).

This can be seen in TS 38.300 sections 9.2.2.4.1 and 9.2.2.5. | For section 3.2.5, there is indeed some dependency to SA3 but at the same time some of the options discussed there are also related to other topics e.g. previous section 3.2.4. Note that SA3 dependencies already are indicated within section 3.2.5 and also in the new question Q.14). Irrespective of security issue, which key (the one used to derive the previous Resume MAC-I or the one used during the previous data transfer) is used to derive the Resume MAC-I for the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg needs to be discussed from RAN2 protocol point of view as there is no *RRCRelease* message for CCCH option. For DP#6, the understanding is that more than one of the options may be supported in related to how *resumeMAC-I* is generated for this 2nd RRCResumeRequest. For opt.6a), the TDoc reference will be removed. It was assumed as the explained procedure in [12] does not explain any change for this which follows legacy resume operation.For opt.6b), this is a change of legacy resume as horizontal key derivation of the NCC is not done for this kind of scenarios.To be aligned with approach taken in other DP, the aim was to add all options discussed in R2#114e TDocs for companies to provide their preference on those or other new options (if applicable).Description related to DP#7 in section 3.2.6 is updated accordingly. |
| NEC | For Discussion point 6), NCC is used to derive the KgNB key for the transmission at the new cell, not to generate resumeMAC-I. So we wonder if option 6.a), 6.b) and 6.c) is actually intended to be used to solve the issue in Discussion point 5)? In other words, to solve the key stream reuse issue by using different security keys.For Discussion point 7), we agree with Huawei that the legacy behavior is that after sending RRCRelease or receiving RRCResumeComplete, the new gNB indicates the last serving gNB to release UE AS context. So when CCCH is sent to the new gNB, the last serving gNB still have the UE AS context. Therefore there is no issue on UE AS context fetch if we following the existing behavior for CCCH solution.For Discussion point 8), this should be up to SA3 decision. | Rapporteur suggests that companies’ views on expected behaviors are welcome during 2nd phase understanding that 1st phase aimed to capture inputs on new open points to be discussed. |

#### New points to section 3.3 (identified during 1st phase)

Please indicate if there are any other topics/questions that require to be addressed as part of this section 3.3 on “DCCH-based approach” for “Non-SDT data handling during ongoing SDT session”.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Companies’ views** | **Rapporteur’s response** |
| ZTE | One issue that was raised in the past is how to deal with the case where the DCCH message is generated, but the UE is sent back to INACTIVE (i.e. the network releases the SDT session before the UE sends the DCCH message). Our understanding is that this will simply trigger a new resume (i.e. no changes needed), but in any case, should we add one question for this too?  | Proposed new topic is added in a new question Q.22) in a new section 3.3.3 |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | We need to also discuss the following for the DCCH solution:1. What are the contents of DCCH message, e.g. does the resume cause need to be included etc.2. DCCH message delivery failure handling, i.e. what happens if the UE does not receive a confirmation of reception of the message.3. What happens if there is no UL grant to send the DCCH message for non-SDT data indication.4. What the behavior of the UE is if the NW sends an RRRCRelease message before the UE sends the DCCH message. | Proposed topic 1 is covered as part of DP#11, however a new option is added for the resume cause.Added the proposed topic 2 in a new question Q.21) in the new section 3.3.2.2.Added the proposed topic 3 in a new question Q.23) in a new section 3.3.4.Proposed topic 4 is same as the one provided by ZTE, see corresponding response. |
| NEC | We agree with the question proposed by Huawei, and we also need to discuss the following additional aspects:- If a timer is needed for the DCCH message, to avoid frequent triggering of the generating of the DCCH message before receiving network response e.g. RRCResume message. | Rapporteur suggests that this view is provided as part of the response to new question Q.21) added in the new section 3.3.2.2 |

#### New points to section 4 (identified during 1st phase)

Please indicate if there are any other topics/questions that require to be addressed as part of this section 4 on “Failure handling during ongoing SDT session”.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Companies’ views** | **Rapporteur’s response** |
| ZTE | As noted above, for section 4.1, there may be also some other triggers depending on which approach we take (e.g., delayed switch to CONNECTED mode during ongoing SDT without anchor relocation etc), but perhaps the intention here is to collect any other triggers as part of the discussion – and this is fine? | Yes, your understanding is right. I.e., current list is based on RAN2#114e TDoc but companies are welcome to comment and/or add new triggers to be considered (if any) |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | We think we should discuss the preferred behavior for each of the events mentioned in section in 4.1 separately as in some cases it may be preferable to keep the UE in RRC INACTIVE while for others it may be better that UE moves to RRC IDLE. It may not be possible to apply exactly the same behavior for all cases.Another event worth discussing is downlink non-SDT data arrival (especially for the non-anchor relocation case). This is not a failure/abrupt termination case as such, but we need a procedure to handle this scenario. | The scope of this email discussion was the trigger of “cell reselection”, however some companies proposed common failure handling e.g. [4] [18]. Therefore as explained before section 4.1, sections 4.1 and 4.2 aims to understand whether the intention on having a common UE behaviour could be easily agreeable by companies. Otherwise, the suggestion is to focus on cell reselection trigger (as indicated in the scope of this email discussion). |
|  |  |  |

# General topics: switch from SDT to CONNECTED

RAN2 has agreed to support transition from SDT session to RRC\_CONNECTED where that SDT session could be ongoing with and without UE AS Context relocation as shown in related agreements below.

* RAN2#113bis: “*UE switches from SDT to non-SDT in following cases: Case 1 (27/0): UE receive indication from network to switch to non-SDT procedure. Network can send RRCResume. FFS whether network can send indication in RAR/fallbackRAR/DCI to switch to non-SDT procedure.”*
* RAN2#112: “*RAN2 confirm that RACH based SDT is supported with and without UE context relocation*”
* RAN2#111: “*Context fetch and data forwarding with anchor re-location and without anchor re-location will be considered. FFS if there are problems with the scenario “without anchor relocation*”

This section addresses general topics for discussion that are therefore applicable to any scenario where the UE with an ongoing SDT session fallbacks into RRC\_CONNECTED regardless of the trigger condition. Some of those trigger conditions may be because network wants to continue the exchange of the SDT data while having the UE in RRC\_CONNECTED or network detects DL non-SDT data or network is informed that UL non-SDT data is available in UE side.

## Topic #1: Handling to switch from SDT to CONNECTED during an ongoing SDT session without UE AS context relocation

Rel-17 SDT WID captures that “*UL small data transmissions for RACH-based schemes (i.e. 2-step and 4-step RACH)*” will be enabled with “*Context fetch and data forwarding (with and without anchor relocation) in INACTIVE state for RACH-based solutions*”. Whether and how to address the scenario when UE transitions into RRC\_CONNECTED during an ongoing SDT session where UE AS context was not relocated is discussed by [2][6][8][19].



Figure 1. Transition into RRC\_CONNECTED during subsequent SDT without anchor relocation [8]

For the scenario explained above and also shown in the Figure 1, the following approaches are suggested:

1. Network release the UE back into RRC\_INACTIVE (potentially with updated suspend and SDT configurations) [5]. This may lead to additional delay (from the release and initiation of a follow up new attempt), however it may not be an scenario that occurs frequently.
2. A new mechanism is defined by RAN2/3 to update the security keys during the ongoing SDT session (due to the relocation of the UE context during an ongoing SDT session) [6][8][19]. The new procedure would be required to support the key change involving: to provide new NCC to the UE, suspend data transfer, resetting L2, re-establish PDCP, Resume data transfer. In addition, RAN2 will need to also discuss which node triggers the anchor change and which node generates the RRC message with the NCC considering the network architecture (including how the CU DU split is done for anchoring). Open questions are also identified by [19][8]:
3. Which node decides the content of *RRCResume* message (anchor gNB vs serving gNB)?
4. Which node performs ciphering and integrity protection for *RRCResume* message?
5. Handling of the security key update e.g.
	* 1. after receiving the second RRCResumeReq from the same UE, will the anchor gNB generate another new KgNB associated with the same target gNB?
		2. how to ensure security key separation if UL/DL data and *RRCResume* message are treated by anchor gNB with updated security key and then, *RRCResumeComplete* message and subsequent UL/DL are treated by the current serving gNB.
6. Which node decodes *RRCResumeComplete* message

Moreover solution details on the questions listed above and how the new mechanism may look like are also provided by [8][19].

1. How to address the scenario when switching from SDT to RRC\_CONECTED during an ongoing SDT session where the UE context was not relocated by the network. Including questions Q1-Q4 for above option 1.b).

#### Option 1.a) Network releases the UE back into RRC\_INACTIVE when anchor relocation is required in the middle of an SDT session

##### **Q.1) for 2nd Phase**

This Q.1) is created based on previous discussion point and the responses provided during 1st phase.

It is pointed during the 1st phase that in normal RRC release procedure, PDCP suspend operation will be performed and all the data buffered on UE side will be discarded. On other hand, when PDCP is suspended, the PDCP PDUs are discarded, but not PDCP SDUs.

1. For **previous option 1.a)**, is there any mechanism needed to prevent data loss in case UE is moved back to INACTIVE state?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Yes/No** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | No | As mentioned above, PDCP SDUs are not discarded when the UE moves to RRC INACTIVE, so they can still be transmitted. This is also the whole point of a proposal to keep the UE in RRC INACTIVE after cell reselection during SDT for example. |
| ZTE | Yes with comments  | It is true that PDCP SDUs are not discarded, however, it should be noted that PDCP suspend will be performed when RRCRelease is received and PDCP suspend will result in the following actions: * Transmitter sets the TX\_NEXT to initial value and discards all the stored PDCP PDUs
* Receiver will stop reordering and deliver the PDCP SDUs to upper layers in ascending order of COUNT

Since the PDCP entity will restart with initial COUNT value at next RRCResume, there will be two issues: * redundancy cannot be avoided and
* in order delivery of PDCP PDUs cannot be ensured in this case

It should be noted that lossless delivery as agreed in RAN2, requires also the in order delivery of PDCP SDUs to upper layers. So, the question is whether we should ensure inorder delivery without redundancy in this case. So, there are two options: * **Option 1: If we want to ensure in-order delivery and avoid the redundancy**, then the PDCP suspend operation should not be performed in this case and this may require some changes (e.g. to indicate “*no PDCP suspend*” in RRCRelease and to indicate the same on the transmitter side to the transmitting UP entity – e.g. over E1 interface).
* **Option 2: If we can live with redundancy and no in-order delivery**, then nothing more needs to be done.

From our perspective, we prefer option 1 to ensure the in order delivery and avoid the redundancy. |
| InterDigital | No | If we go for option 1.a, then the existing mechanism should be reused as much as possible. Even if PDCP PDUs are thrown away, the PDCP SDUs can be retained and so lossless operation can be achieved based on the PDCP SDUs rather than PDUs. |
| CATT | No | As PDCP PDUs are discarded but PDCP SDUs are kept when the UE moves to RRC\_INACTIVE, data loss can be avoided. However, that may create some redundancy in PDCP PDUs, as some correctly receive PDUs may be re-transmitted. |
| Samsung | No | Prefer to use existing mechanism. Also agree with Huawei and interdigital, that "Even if PDCP PDUs are thrown away, the PDCP SDUs can be retained and so lossless operation can be achieved based on the PDCP SDUs rather than PDUs" |
| Fujitsu | No | As long as PDCP SDUs are retained, lossless and in-order delivery based on PDCP SDU can be achieved. NW can achieve it by careful scheduling based on PDCP SDU. For example, it can be achieved in such a way that PDCP SDUs are delivered by FIFO manner. Redundant transmission may cause resource waste, but it is not big problem. |
| LG | No | For AM DRBs, data is not lost because unacknowledged PDCP SDUs are not discarded at PDCP suspend. Only PDCP PDUs are discarded. For UM DRBs, we don’t need to care about data loss because UM DRB is anyway subject to loss. |
| Intel | May be | This option 1.a) may have challenges to prevent data loss or duplication of data: * For data loss: UL data can be kept as PDCP SDUs are not discarded as explained above. However, recovery of DL data waiting to be sent in serving cell might be more complex to handle in the anchored scenario as that DL data might be in previous serving gNB when the 2nd resume is directed to the anchor gNB. If no special mechanism is defined, some DL/UL data may be lost unless UE and network enable its own recovery mechanism.
* For data duplication: we also agree with ZTE’s comment that duplication can happen and would not be detected.

On summary, if this option 1.a) is preferable, i.e. moving the UE back into INACTIVE (via *RRCRelease* including *suspendConfig*). Two possible approaches are possible:* Approach A) Specification does not define how/whether UE or network prevents data loss or duplication. This approach A) allows to enable enhancements to minimize (or even prevent) data loss or duplication but details would be left up to good UE or network implementation
* Approach B) an additional enhancement could be defined to keep UP on UE and network side (in order to continue with SDT traffic w/o duplication). However, this new handling would bring additional complexity as two different scenarios would be possible when UE starts from INACTIVE, case 1) for normal resume (where PDCP is suspended) and case 2) for SDT when it was temporarily stopped (in order to handle the relocation of the UE Context when an SDT session was ongoing. If so, for case 1) PDCP is suspended and for case 2) without PDCP suspension. If there is sufficient support for this enhancement, we are open to consider it.

Our preference is to enable option 1.a) via approach A) i.e. leaving optimizations up to UE or network implementation to prevent data loss or duplication in DL and UL. |
| NEC | Maybe | For SDT DRB, as only PDCP PDUs are discarded, and PDCP SDUs can still be transmitted later. But for SDT SRB, both PDCP PDUs and SDUs are discarded during the PDCP re-establishment in the subsequent RRC resume procedure, which results in RAN level data loss. But such data loss may be tolerable or can be solved by implementation, for example the network release the UE to INACTIVE when the BSR shows no further data to be transmitted  |
| Apple | No | If we go for option 1.a , we should use the existing mechanism, i.e. relying on the PDCP SDU leve retransmission. There may be some duplicated transmission, but we donot assume such case will happen frequently.  |
| OPPO | No | For UL SDT-DRB, data loss is not an issue since the PDCP SDUs are retained when RRCRelease is received. After the RRC connection is resumed, UE will transmit or retransmit these PDCP SDUs while duplicated transmission may occur on some SDUs. For UL SDT-SRB, PDCP SDUs are discarded when PDCP is re-established and the data would be lost, but in our understand, this is an inherent issue and any optimization can be up to UE implementation.For DL data, it can up to network to guarantee the data loss, for example, sending RRCRelease when there is not any further DL data. |
| FGI, APT | No | Agree with the above companies that even if PDCP PDUs are discarded, as long as the PDCP SDUs are kept, lossless delivery can be guaranteed. Therefore no additional mechanism is needed for option 1.a.  |
| Lenovo | No | Since PDCP SDUs are kept, we don’t see a need for new method to prevent data loss |
| vivo | No | With the existing mechanism, retransmission can be performed for SDT DRBs with AM mode. In this sense, we don’t see any need to introduce any additional enhancement to prevent data loss for SDT procedure. If redundant transmission and out-of-order delivery are not expected, in our understanding, the NW should transit the UE directly to CONNECTED mode instead. |
| Qualcomm | No | Similar view with the comments of most companies above. PDCP SDU are kept, no need for new method to prevent data loss. And agree with rapporteur, leaving optimizations up to UE or network implementation to prevent data loss or duplication in DL and UL. |
| Xiaomi | No | Agree with other companies that as PDCP SDUs are kept, no extra mechanism is needed to ensure retransmission. |

#### Option 1.b) New mechanism that allow performing anchor relocation in the middle of an SDT session in order to switch from SDT to CONNECTED

**[07/20][Rapporteur’s input]** During 2nd phase, the details and questions added in this section 2.1.1.2 aims to clarify how option 1.b) works i.e. it does not aim to down-select (which would be discussed in 3rd phase) nor to address details related to previous option 1.a) (which are covered in previous section 2.1.1.1).

This section is updated based on the details provided above and by [2][6][8][19].

For this discussion, the term “**anchor gNB**” refers to the gNB where the UE AS Context is stored before UE initiates the SDT session and “**serving gNB**” refers to the gNB where the UE initiates the SDT session.

For **previous option 1.b)**, when switching from SDT to RRC\_CONECTED during an ongoing SDT session where the UE context was not relocated by the network, the following points are raised by companies:

* RLC PDUs are received/processed by the serving gNB [19].
* PDCP entities for SDT operation when anchor gNB is not relocated may be processed by anchor gNB [8], or by serving gNB (as anchor gNB forwards them) [19].
* For the data awareness during SDT operation, the serving gNB is the first aware of the UL data (size and arrival) [2][8], and the anchor gNB is the first aware of DL data arrival [2][8].
* The serving gNB controls SDT operations related to the radio interface, such as, performs the data transmission/reception via radio interface, or set the content of *RRCResume* message related to configurations of radio interface [8].
* Security key in used in relation to this “late” anchor relocation:
	+ During an ongoing SDT session where the UE context was not relocated by the network, the data forwarding between serving gNB and anchor gNB has already been started, and the new security key, derived based on the NCC stored, has already been used by anchor gNB [19]. Therefore UE uses the updated security key (i.e. KgNB associated with the serving gNB, referred as Kserving-gNB) which is updated upon initiation of 1st *RRCResumeRequest* message, to receive any DL data/signalling upon initiating the SDT operation (which includes *RRCResume* message) [8]. Therefore, ciphering and integrity protection for *RRCResume* message should be performed based on that same Kserving-gNB [8].
	+ Based on the SA3 requirement, re-using the same key in two nodes is not allowed. Hence the change of anchor requires a change of security keys [6]. Therefore once the security key has already been used in the anchor gNB (during SDT operation without anchor relocation), the same security key shall not be used in the serving gNB again after anchor relocation is performed [19].
	+ On summary, a new key (other than the key used in the data transmission before anchor relocation) shall be generated and used between serving gNB and UE after anchor relocation [19].
		- The materials for key generation (e.g. AS-SecurityInformation in XnAP, including KgNB\* and NCC) should be generated by anchor gNB, and be sent from anchor gNB to serving gNB (e.g. in RetrieveUEContextRequest or a later message) [19].
		- The key materials (i.e. *MasterKeyUpdate* and *SecurityConfig*) should be sent to UE through a RRC message (e.g. *RRCResume*) generated by serving gNB [19]. This RRC message should be security protected by the SRB PDCP located in anchor node (i.e. the RRC message (e.g. *RRCResume*) generated by serving gNB should be sent to anchor node for security protection operation) [19].
		- The UE shall be configured to CONNECTED mode in the RRC message and reconfiguration with sync shall be used [19].
	+ On other hand, a change of keys requires the L2 to be reset to prevent mix up of data with the old and new keys. Currently, a change of keys is done either when the user plane is suspended/not established (re-establishment, SMC, Resume) or using a RACH procedure+L2 reset as the switch over point if there is ongoing data transfer (handover). A release and add of the RLC bearer could also be used to flush the L2. Additionally, PDCP has to be re-established. However, none of the existing NR procedures support this particular behaviour. [6]
	+ On summary, the support of key change when switching from SDT to CONNECTED may involve: providing new NCC to the UE, suspend data transfer, resetting L2, re-establish PDCP, ensuring identification of data with the old key and new key on the network side, Resume data transfer [6]
	+ Therefore if this scenario is handled similarly to handover procedure [8], the UE sends *RRCResumeComplete* message and subsequent UL/DL data is handled in the current serving gNB but different security keys are used [8].
* Potential issues with RAN3 impact foreseen for this scenario where SDT operation is done without anchor relocation:
	+ Signaling exchange via Xn interface e.g. when deciding/triggering the transition from SDT to CONNECTED [8].
	+ how the CU DU split is done when switching from SDT to RRC\_CONECTED during an ongoing SDT session where the UE context was not relocated by the network [6]
* Potential issues with SA3 impact foreseen for this scenario where SDT operation is done without anchor relocation:
	+ Whether update of the security key is required or not for this scenario and how to ensure security separation between two different gNBs after transaction [8]

The following questions Q.2) to Q.5) are suggested taken into consideration the points explained and asked above:

##### **Q.2) for 2nd Phase**

1. Is the following understanding confirmed: for the scenario where anchor relocation is performed in the middle of an ongoing SDT session, the security key is updated to meet SA3 requirement that the same security key is not re-used in two nodes?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Yes/No** | **Justification (if the response is no)** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Worth checking with SA3 whether this is an issue, other approaches than updating the security key for RRCResume exist as well | This case is somewhat different from legacy case to which the SA3 requirement refers to because all the messages are anyway sent over the air interface between serving gNB and the UE (i.e. between the UE and a single gNB, not two different gNBs). It should also be noted that the lack of key separation would happen only for a single message, i.e. RRCResume message. Right after resuming the connection, the serving gNB can perform security key update based on the new NCC received from AMF during Path Switch. It might be then worth clarifying with SA3 whether this is an issue that needs to be addressed. If this is deemed an issue after all, then we would prefer avoiding developing new complicated signaling options. Instead of this, a simple solution would be for the current anchor gNB to end the SDT procedure (i.e. provide RRCRelease message to the UE) and let the UE establish a new non-SDT connection. This way all the potential security issues can be avoided. |
| ZTE | Yes | However, we agree with the views from Huawei above that a simple solution would be preferable (e.g. the anchor gNB to end the SDT procedure and let the UE establish a new connection). Handling of the pending PDCP entity will then need to be performed as per the agreement for the above question.  |
| InterDigital | Yes | The AS keys are associated with the anchor gNB and so the AS keys should be updated upon change of anchoring point. |
| CATT | Yes | We also support to further check with SA3 even though the lack of key separation may have seem to happen only for a single message. |
| Samsung | See comments | During the ongoing SDT session, new security keys corresponding to serving gNB (not anchor gNB) are used. So, if anchor re-location is decided in middle of SDT session, we do not see any security issue in continuing using the security keys corresponding to serving gNB. If companies think that there can be security issue, we are ok to ask/get confirmation from SA3.  |
| Fujitsu | Yes | We have the same understanding that the same security key is not re-used in two nodes. In addition, we also think that the starting point is to end the ongoing SDT procedure and establish new connection. |
| LG | Check with SA3 | Agree with Huawei that we first have to check with SA3 whether this is a real issue. And, even if this is an issue, terminate the current SDT procedure and initiate a new SDT procedure can work without any security issue. |
| Intel | Yes | The principle has to be maintained. Any relaxation of it will require checking with SA3 which will add more delay in terms of discussing solutions.  |
| NEC | Should be decided by SA3 | To us, although the PDCP location is changed, but the radio link is not changed, which means the security key is actually used for transmission between UE and new gNB for both the cases of before and after anchor relocation. So from that perspective, the backward security principle is not violated if the security key is not changed. Anyway, we think this issue should be discussed and decided by SA3. |
| Apple | Check with SA3 | We need to check with SA3 first. For now it’s not clear whether the security key for SDT could be used on the serving gNB when switching to CONNECTED state.  |
| OPPO | Yes | We agree with HW that the only case that may involve security key reusing issue occurs on the transmission of RRCResume message. We are fine to check this with SA3. |
| FGI, APT | Yes | Even if anchor relocation takes place during an on-going SDT session, UE continues using the same key for any communication between UE and serving gNB. The key update is provided to UE after resuming the RRC connection. We are curious why there could be an issue but support to ask SA3 for better clarification.  |
| Lenovo |  | OK to check with SA3. |
| vivo | Wait for SA3 input | RAN2 should request SA3 for further input first. |
| Qualcomm | Check with SA3 | Whether the same security key could be re-used in two network nodes is SA3 issue. should check with SA3 and let SA3 decide. |
| Xiaomi | Check with SA3 | Whether to reuse the same security key in two nodes needs to be discussed in SA3. |

｀

##### **Q.3) for 2nd Phase**

1. Assuming that RAN2 confirms in previous point in Q.2) (i.e. “the scenario where anchor relocation is performed in the middle of an ongoing SDT session, the security key is updated”), The following points summarize suggested RAN2 solutions to be confirmed for the new mechanism that updates the security key when performing anchor relocation in the middle of an ongoing SDT session. Please indicate your view on the solution points listed below and/or if you propose new ones to consider.
2. Network sends to UE a DL RRC msg (e.g. *RRCResume*) that provides the new NCC at the same time that informs of the switch from SDT to CONNECTED. The security key is used for the transfer of that DL RRC msg (e.g. *RRCResume*) should also be addressed.
3. L2 handling of data during and after the security key change (L2 reset/re-establishment and identification of data with old and new keys) can be addressed via reconfiguration with sync or by RLC bearer release and add with a new LCID.
4. Current anchor gNB terminates and ongoing SDT procedure by sending RRCRelease message to the UE (where NCC is provided). The UE triggers a new non-SDT RRC Resume procedure during which the anchor is relocated to the new serving gNB.

**[ZTE’s comment on solution point 3]** For the “new non-SDT”, “In this case we think the UE can initiate a new RRCResume procedure using the normal rules (and then the rest can be up to the network).”

**[07/20][Rapporteur’s input]** This new solution point 3) added by Huawei is already covered by previous option 1.a) which is discussed in previous Q.1). Therefore, companies are suggested to provide their corresponding view on it as part of previous Q.1)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Companies’ views on the solution point(s) and/or****additional new solution options to consider** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | As mentioned above, this scenario can be addressed by ending an ongoing SDT procedure with RRCRelease message and establishing a new connection via non-SDT RRC resume procedure during which the anchor gets relocated. We add an additional point for this approach above.  |
| ZTE |  We also support solution point 3 above (with slight modification).The UE shall trigger the next resume procedure using normal rules (i.e. the existing rules for SDT vs non-SDT will be used to trigger the next resume procedure) in this case.  |
| InterDigital | Regarding to Point 1), a new NCC should be provided in the DL RRC message and the DL RRC message should be integrity protected with the new key and + previously configured algorithm but not encrypted with the new key. It seems the RRC connection reestablishment procedure has all the toolkit required for the support of the concern scenario thus we suggest applying the RRC connection reestablishment procedure (i.e. follow 38.331 subclause 5.3.7 and 33.501 subclause 6.11) in the middle of the resume attempt and so the DL RRC message should be RRCReestablishment rather than RRCResume.Regarding to Point 2), the same procedures as RRC connection reestablishment procedure should take place. |
| CATT | We think that solution point 2 would introduce additional delays as the RRCReconfiguration with SYNC is sent to the UE after RRCResumeComplete (in response to RRCResume) is received by the NG-RAN. Solution point 3 would also introduce additional delay. |
| Samsung | We can agree to support solution point 3 if SA3 agrees that security keys needs to be updated. |
| Fujitsu | As commented in Q2, Point 3) would be the starting point. |
| LG | Solution 3 is simple and workable solution. Other solutions may have problem that the network does not know from which data a new security key is applied. |
| Intel | Option 1.b) is not our preferred approach, however if this approach were enabled, our preference is to model it as explained by solution point 1) and solution point 2).We share the understanding explained by Rappetour’s input above that the new solution point 3) added by HUW is the same as the approach proposed by previous option 1.a). |
| Apple | Solution point 3) is simple and should be the starting point.  |
| OPPO | If option1.b is adopted, we are fine to take solution point 1) + solution point 2) as baseline. |
| FGI, APT | Solution Point 3) seems to have the least specification impact, and therefore can be taken as the baseline. In Solution Point 3), there could be more than one RRCRelease sent from the anchor gNB to the serving gNB during the entire SDT procedure, which might have RAN3 impact. |
| Lenovo | We agree to support the solution 3 as it seems to be simple and sufficient. |
| vivo | We prefer solution point 3. But, we are wondering why the UE has to always trigger a non-SDT resume procedure after the reception of RRC Release message? |
| Qualcomm | Prefer to point 3 which is the simpler. The ongoing SDT procedure is ended with the RRC release message and a normal RRC resume procedure is performed in this scenario. |
| Xiaomi | We support solution 3 when security keys needs to be updated. |

##### **Q.4) for 2nd Phase**

1. The following questions/points are suggested to be asked/informed to **RAN3** in order to enable the new mechanism that allows the switching from SDT to RRC\_CONECTED during an ongoing SDT session where the UE context was not relocated by the network (as explained in **previous option 1.b**). Please indicate if you do not agree to include any of them and/or if you propose new questions to be shared with RAN3.
	1. Which node triggers/decides the switch from SDT to CONNECTED.
	2. Which node decides the content of *RRCResume* msg.
	3. Which node performs ciphering and integrity protection for *RRCResume* msg.
	4. Which node decodes *RRCResumeComplete* msg.
	5. Whether and what new signaling exchange is required between anchor gNB and serving gNB to support the switching from SDT to RRC\_CONECTED.
	6. Assuming that RAN2 confirms the following understanding in previous question Q.2) (i.e. “the scenario where anchor relocation is performed in the middle of an ongoing SDT session, the security key is updated”), to define a new mechanism that allows updating the security key when performing anchor relocation in the middle of an ongoing SDT session taken into consideration RAN2 related agreements (if any).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Questions not to send to RAN3** | **Company’s views on the questions not to send to RAN3 or** **new questions to RAN3 to consider** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Q.4.1), Q.4.2), Q.4.3), Q.4.4), Q.4.6) | For Q.4.1) RAN3 already has a working assumption, so it seems there is no need to trigger this in RAN3:* WA: The last serving gNB, i.e., anchor gNB, will be the decision maker on whether to relocate anchor or not. Assistance information provided by the receiving gNB may help on the decision. Details of assistance information are pending future discussion.

Q.4.2), Q.4.3), Q.4.4) and Q.4.6) are only relevant for RRCResume based approach and addressing all these issues may be complicated, especially if the security issue (related to Q.4.3)) would be confirmed by SA3. Therefore, we think we can focus on asking RAN3 to study point Q.4.5). We can potentially list the approaches (RRCResume based and RRCRelease based) and issues discussed in this document and RAN3 can discuss the details. |
| ZTE | Probably no need to ask anything (but TBD based on actual solution chosen) | We think we first need to discuss the solution details. Our preference is to agree a simple solution (e.g. based on RRCRelease per above) and if this is agreeable, then it is obvious that the anchor gNB (which has the security context) will perform the security protection of the RRCRelease message (this already happens today in case of RNAU without anchor relocation, so, we then expect no impact to RAN3 in this case actually from signalling perspective). So, the rest of the questions seems not really needed (i.e. we can simply inform RAN3 then of our decision)If we agree some other more complex solution, then it seems we do need some more detailed communication with RAN3 (e.g. there could be some impact to E1 interface etc per above) |
| InterDigital | Q.4.3)Q.4.4) | We think ciphering can’t be applied for the 1st DL message and the old key should be used for the integrity protection check for the 1st DL message. Thus, the anchor node shall enforce the security. i.e. it’s not RAN3 issue.RAN2 should make a working assumption that the new serving gNB decodes the RRCResumeComplete msg and should tell our WA to RAN3 instead of just asking this question to RAN3. |
| CATT | Q 4.6) | We think we need to check with SA3 first about security issue, which also needs CC RAN3. |
| Samsung | See comments | Same view as ZTE |
| Fujitsu | Q 4.1) – Q4.5) | We also think that we first need to discuss the solution details and no LS is needed for the moment.If RAN2 asked questions, Q 4.1) – Q4.5) are not needed.Given that RAN3 agreed the WA regarding Q4.1), we understand that answers to Q4.2) – Q4.3) are clear, meaning it is anchor gNB. In addition, for Q4.4), like HO procedure, complete message is better to send serving gNB.Q4.5) is anyway RAN3 working area and no need to be asked.Q4.6) can be asked as CC, in the context of security handling LS (if sent) to SA3. |
| LG | All | We can just indicate that “it is allowed to switch from SDT to RRC\_CONECTED during an ongoing SDT session where the UE context was not relocated by the network”, and leave all the related discussions to RAN3.  |
| Intel | - | If (and only if) RAN2 agrees to enable the mechanism explained by option 1.b), we support that RAN2 flags all the identified points (Q.4.1 to Q.4.6) with RAN3 impacts even though they might be related to other mechanisms that RAN3 may be already working on.RAN2 can also provide RAN2’s input on these questions where RAN2 can make a decision (as mentioned by InterDigital).  |
| NEC | Q 4.1) – Q4.5)) | Q.4.1), RAN3 already has a working assumption on this.Q.4.2), Q.4.3), Q.4.4), and Q.4.5), we think we should firstly ask RAN3 if the scenario of switching from SDT to RRC\_CONECTED during SDT without anchor relocation can be supported in this release.Q 4.6), if the scenario is confirmed by RAN3, this question should be SA3 to decided, we don’t think RAN3 can provide any help. |
| Apple | See comments | We should check with SA3 first.  |
| OPPO | Q 4.1) – Q4.5)) | 4.6 is enough, further details are up to RAN3 discussion. |
| FGI, APT | Q.4.1), Q.4.2), Q.4.3), Q.4.4), Q.4.6) | As we haven’t decided which option to go (option 1.a vs 1.b), it seems too early to ask RAN3’s opinion on one particular option. We can ask Q.4.5) as it is a common question for both options.  |
| Lenovo | See comments  | Agree with ZTE |
| vivo | Q.4.1), Q.4.2), Q.4.3), Q.4.4),Q.4.5), | For Q.4.1), Q.4.2), Q.4.3), Q.4.4), and Q.4.5), we share a similar view with ZTE.  |
| Qualcomm | All | Agree with ZTE |
| Xiaomi | See comments | We share the same view as ZTE. |

##### **Q.5) for 2nd Phase**

1. The following questions/points are suggested to be asked/informed to **SA3** in order to enable a new mechanism that allows the switching from SDT to RRC\_CONECTED during an ongoing SDT session where the UE context was not initially relocated by the network during SDT (as explained in **previous option 1.b**). Please indicate if you do not agree to include any of them and/or if you propose new questions to share with SA3.
	1. How to ensure the security key separation between two different gNBs after moving into CONNECTED needs to be resolved (taking into account views provided on Q.3))

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Questions not to send to SA3** | **Company’s views on the questions not to send to SA3 or****additional new questions to SA3 to consider** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Q.5.1) (in this form at least) | After moving the UE to RRC Connected, the new gNB can update the security keys by performing reconfiguration with sync and using a new NCC from AMF received during Path Switch procedure. We think we may rather ask the questions similar to the one in Q2), i.e.: whether it is acceptable to use current UE’s K\_RRC key for sending RRCResume message from the serving gNB to the UE for the scenario where anchor relocation is performed in the middle of an ongoing SDT session. However, as we note above, an alternative approach is to terminate an SDT procedure when the anchor needs to be relocated in the middle of SDT procedure and let the UE trigger a new connection resume. This way security issues are avoided and there is no need to involve SA3 at all.  |
| ZTE | Probably no need to contact SA3 (TBD based on actual chosen solution) | Again, we think that if we go with the approach of RRCRelease based solution, then we don’t really need to ask SA3 anything. (Since this is same as the tunneled RRCRelease message in case of RNAU without anchor change). For Rel-17 this seems sufficient.If we support a solution where the UE directly moves to RRCConnected state, then we need some new handling and this needs further discussion (details TBD) |
| InterDigital | - | We are fine to send the query to SA3 with taking into account the Q.3’s RAN2 conclusion. |
| Samsung | See comment | Ask the question similar to the one in Q2), i.e.: whether it is acceptable to use current UE’s K\_RRC key for sending RRCResume message from the serving gNB to the UE for the scenario where anchor relocation is performed in the middle of an ongoing SDT session. |
| Fujitsu | Q5.1 | We also think that we first need to discuss the solution details and no LS is needed for the moment.If RAN2 asked questions, Q5.1) could be ok but detailed contents need discussions. |
| LG | All | We don’t need to ask SA3 on security key separation between two different gNBs. As Huawei mentioned, it is enough to ask whether it is acceptable to use current security key for sending RRCResume message from the serving gNB to the UE. |
| Intel | - | If (and only if) RAN2 agrees to enable the mechanism explained by option 1.b), we support that RAN2 flags all the identified points (Q.5.1) to get SA3’s input, if any. |
| NEC | Q.5.1) | We prefer to ask SA3 in an alternative way like if there is security issue to maintain the security key in case of anchor relocation performed in the middle of an ongoing SDT session. |
| Apple |  | Our view is similar as Samsung’s, and the question to SA3 can first check whether the key can be reuse the current security key for SDT transmission.  |
| OPPO | Q.5.1) | Agree with NEC. |
| FGI, APT | - | We share the same view as ZTE. |
| Lenovo | See comment | We are fine to confirm it by SA3 if UE is agreed to trigger a new connection resume where anchor relocation is happened in the middle of the SDT procedure. |
| vivo | Q.5.1) | We agree with Samsung.  |
| Qualcomm | - | Agree with ZTE. |
| Xiaomi |  | We share the same view as ZTE. |

## Topic #2: Radio bearer handling when switching from SDT to CONNECTED

RAN2 already agreed that SDT RBs are re-established at initiation of SDT procedure and the new security keys are applied then, i.e. there is no need to perform re-establishment second time when *RRCResume* is received as it is done Rel-15 NR. Therefore, when switching from SDT to CONNECTED, the PDCP of non-SDT RBs do not need to be re-established [12]. For this switch/fallback under network control, it is also explained in [6] that it is left up to network implementation that the data exchanged before triggering the fallback to resume is not lost (i.e. UE does not need to retransmit it) and SDT related data traffic can continue after UE gets RRC\_CONNECTED.

1. When UE receives *RRCResume* message during an ongoing SDT session or in response to *RRCResumeRequest* message sent for SDT (i.e. switch from SDT to CONNECTED), the PDCP entities for only the non-SDT RBs are re-established (i.e., SDT RBs are not re-established as were already resumed for the SDT session).
2. When switching from SDT to CONNECTED, it is left up to network implementation that the data exchanged before triggering the fallback to resume is not lost (i.e. UE does not need to retransmit it) and SDT related data traffic can continue after UE gets CONNECTED.

#### Q.6) for 2nd Phase

This Q.6) is created based on previous Observation 1 and the responses provided during 1st phase.

RAN2 has agreed that the PDCP entities of only the SDT DRBs are re-established when initiating an SDT session.

* RAN2#112e: “*For both RACH and CG based solutions, upon initiating RESUME procedure for SDT initiation (i.e. for first SDT transmission), the UE shall re-establish at least the SDT PDCP entities and resume the SDT DRBs that are configured for small data transmission (along with the SRB1). FFS for non-SDT DRBs. FFS on implicit vs. explicit. FFS on whether we a new Resume cause. FFS on whether we need to deal with suppressing PDCP status report*”
1. When UE receives *RRCResume* message during an ongoing SDT session or in response to *RRCResumeRequest* message sent for SDT (i.e. switch from SDT to CONNECTED), how are the PDCP entities handled?
2. PDCP entities for only the non-SDT RBs are re-established (i.e., SDT RBs are not re-established as were already resumed for the SDT session) [6][12].
3. PDCP of non-SDT RBs do not need to be re-established
4. Other approaches

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Option** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | It depends | The answer to this question depends on the scenario and the solution applied in non-anchor relocation scenario:- For anchor relocation case or in case serving gNB is already an anchor when SDT is triggered, option 2.a) applies- For non-anchor relocation case, if new keys are going to be used, then all RBs need to be re-established. With RRCRelease basaed approach this would happen automatically as the UE would just follow legacy RRC Resume procedure.  |
| ZTE | Option 2.a, but | In general option 2.a should be the baseline. And for non-anchor relocation case, if some special handling is needed per above, we think reconfiguration with sync will be used and the network can set the PDCP reestablishment flag accordingly for this case. The existing signalling already supports this.  |
| InterDigital | 2.c) | Only the non-SDT RBs are re-established unless any new keys are derived during the switch from SDT to CONNECTED. Or, all RBs are re-established for the case that a new key is generated during the switch (e.g. for the case that UE context is transferred from anchor to a new serving gNB in the middle of switch.) |
| CATT | It depends on the solution | Share the same view with HW, it depends on the scenarios and the solution for switching from SDT to CONNECTED during SDT session in non-anchor relocation scenario. |
| Samsung | 2.c) | UE can simply follow the network configuration  |
| Fujitsu | 2.c) | As commented by Huawei, HiSilicon. |
| LG | 2.c | We think the network can indicate whether to re-establish PDCP entities or not for each RB in the RRCResume message. Thus, RAN2 does not have to discuss this issue. Moreover, we think there is no problem to re-establish PDCP entities for SDT RBs again even if they were already re-stablished at initiation of SDT procedure. |
| Intel | 2.a) | The intention of the question was to focus on the handling of non-SDT RBs when switching from SDT to CONNECTED. For the handling of SDT RBs, we share the view explained by Huawei and others that its handling may depend on the solution chosen to address previous Topic #1. |
| NEC | Option 2.a should be baseline | Option 2.a should be baseline. For the case of anchor relocation in middle of one SDT procedure, we can discuss only if such scenario is supported. |
| Apple |  | Same view as Huawei. |
| OPPO | option 2c) | As legacy, whether PDCP needs to be re-established is indicated explicitly by RRCRelease messge. |
| FGI, APT | 2.a) or 2.c) | In case a new key is generated during the switch from SDT to CONNECTED, PDCP entities for all RBs are re-established; In case no new key is generated, only the PDCP entities for non-SDT RBs are re-established. |
| Lenovo | 2.c | If no new keys are used, option 2a) should be used, i.e. only non-SDT bearers are re-established. For non-anchor relocation case, UE follows the network configuration, e.g. NW sets PDCP re-establishment flag.  |
| vivo | option 2.c) | The UE behavior is supposed to be based on network configuration within the RRC Resume message.  |
| Qualcomm | 2.c) | Same review with InterDigital |
| Xiaomi | 2.c) | We share the same view as InterDigital. |

# Non-SDT data handling during ongoing SDT session

The discussion for the “non-SDT data handling” is split in three parts:

* Section 3.1 addresses any general topics during the “start” of the SDT session. These topics seem independent on whether CCCH or DCCH based approach are used.
* Section 3.2 focuses on CCCH-based approach when the SDT session is ongoing.
* Section 3.3 focuses on DCCH-based approach when the SDT session is ongoing.

## General topics

### Topic #3: non-SDT Data available when “starting” an SDT session

Another scenario to address is the desirable behaviour is non-SDT Data is available when “starting” an SDT session, before UE sends the 1st UL RRC message or before contention resolution which is discussed by [16][18][20]. It might be important to discuss separately both scenarios, as well as, a new one suggested by the responses provided during 1st phase:

* Scenario 1) When non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure (i.e. UE sends RACH preamble), but 1st UL RRC message has not been sent yet. This could be when UE has already sent PRACH preamble when using 4-step RA-SDT. Scenario 1) only targets RA-SDT.
* Scenario 2) When non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure and has sent the 1st UL RRC message + data successfully, but contention resolution has not been received by UE in Msg.4/Msg.B. Scenario 2) only targets RA-SDT.
* Scenario x) When non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure and has sent the 1st UL RRC message + data via CG resource, but UE has not received any feedback during the CG response window. Scenario x) only targets CG-SDT.
1. The expected UE behaviour when non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure for: scenario 1) 1st UL RRC message has not been sent yet and scenario 2) contention resolution has not been done.

The following Q.7) to Q.9) are created based on previous discussion point and the responses provided during 1st phase.

#### Q.7) for 2nd Phase

1. What is the expected UE behaviour for **scenario 1)** when non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure (i.e. RACH preamble is sent) but 1st UL RRC message has not been sent yet?

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Companies’ views** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | The UE should terminate the current RACH procedure and initiate a new one, i.e. send a non-SDT RACH preamble and CCCH/RRCResumeRequest message. |
| ZTE | Firstly, we think non-SDT data arriving after RACH has been sent but before getting a network response (e.g., before RAR/contention resolution) is a real corner case and there should not be a complicated optimization to handle this situation. For CCCH solution the UE will terminate the existing RACH procedure and initiate a new RRCResume Procedure. However, this is not needed in case of DCCH solution. In case of DCCH solution, we can follow the existing procedure, i.e. today once the UE sends RACH preamble, it simply listens to DL for network response even if some new trigger happens in the meanwhile. Thus, in case of non-SDT-data arrival, we think UE simply can continue to follow the current RACH procedure. Even if a new RACH procedure is triggered, UE will need to send yet another RACH preamble and wait for network response anyway (i.e. it is in the same situation as before any way).  |
| InterDigital | We share ZTE view on the corner case and so we are not willing to optimise this case with any complicated solution.Regarding to the original question, UE should terminate the existing RACH procedure and initiate the non-SDT resume procedure from the beginning (i.e. initiating the resume from the non-SDT preamble transmission.) |
| CATT | We prefer a unified UE behaviour for all stages of SDT procedure. |
| Samsung | Same view as ZTE. We prefer a single solution for all the scenarios. |
| Fujitsu | We think that case-by-case optimization is not good. A single UE behaviour across all cases would be considered. |
| LG | The UE has to decide whether to keep the ongoing SDT procedure or not. If the UE thinks that SDT procedure is more important, the UE can keep the ongoing SDT procedure. Else, if the UE thinks that non-SDT data is more important, the UE terminates the ongoing SDT procedure and initiates a normal RRCResume procedure. |
| Intel | We understand that this scenario 1) aims to address a corner case (as the likelihood that non-SDT data arrives while UE is starting SDT procedure or is waiting for network initial response is very low). On other hand, there are still lot of open issues to enable SDT mechanism. Therefore, we suggest RAN2 spending discussion time on more critical topics than this one and its handling can be left up to UE’s implementation.  |
| NEC | It is better that one unified UE behaviour is applied for all stages of SDT procedure. And from that perspective, the CCCH solution can met this requirement. |
| Apple | It’s up to UE implmenetation to terminate the ongoing SDT RACH procedure and triggers the legacy RRC Resume procedure or keep on the current SDT RACH procedure.  |
| OPPO | For this scenario, UE can continue the RACH procedure and complete the transmission of RRC message. After the RACH is successful, CCCH or DCCH solution is used to inform the network of non-SDT data arrival. |
| FGI, APT | UE should terminate the on-going RACH procedure (and also the SDT procedure) and initiate a new RACH procedure using the RACH resources assigned for non-SDT purposes. |
| Lenovo | We agree with ZTE |
| vivo | From UE simplicity for all the potential scenarios, we think whether to continue with the ongoing SDT procedure or restart with legacy resume procedure can be left to UE implementation.  |
| Qualcomm | This is a corner case and no need over optimization on this. If the case is happened, it is up to UE implementation to keep ongoing current SDT procedure or trigger the legacy resume procedure. |
| Xiaomi | We prefer a single solution for all scenarios. |

#### Q.8) for 2nd Phase

1. What is the expected UE behaviour for **scenario 2)** when non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure and has sent the 1st UL RRC message + data successfully, but contention resolution has not been received by UE in Msg.4/Msg.B?

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Companies’ views** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | The same as in Q7, i.e. the UE should terminate the current RACH procedure and initiate a new one, i.e. send a non-SDT RACH preamble and CCCH/RRCResumeRequest message. |
| InterDigital | Same as Q7 |
| CATT | Same as Q7, a unified UE behaviour is preferred for all stages of SDT procedure. We don’t see strong motivation to differentiate different stages of SDT procedure. |
| Samsung | Same as Q7 |
| Fujitsu | As commented in Q7, we think that case-by-case optimization is not good. A single UE behaviour across all cases would be considered. |
| LG | Same as Q7 |
| Intel | Response provided in previous Q.7) is also applicable here. |
| NEC | Same as Q7, it is better that one unified UE behaviour is applied for all stages of SDT procedure. And from that perspective, the CCCH solution can met this requirement. |
| Apple | Same as Q7. |
| OPPO | Same as Q7. |
| FGI, APT | Same as Q7. |
| Lenovo | See Q7 |
| vivo | Considering that whether BSR calculation can be used for suspended DRB(s) had currently been discussed in the UP main session, we prefer to postpone the detailed solution before achieving a common understanding regarding BSR reporting for suspended DRB. If it is clarified that BSR calculation can be also used for suspended DRBs in legacy NR, it would be unreasonable to exclude the existing BSR-based solution in SDT, where the non-SDT DRB(s) are also suspended. |
| Qualcomm | Same as Q7. |
| Xiaomi | Same as Q7. |

#### Q.9) for 2nd Phase

1. What is the expected UE behaviour for **scenario x)** when non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure and has sent the 1st UL RRC message +data via CG resource, but UE has not received any feedback during the CG response window?

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Companies’ views** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Similar as in Q7, i.e. the UE should terminate the ongoing SDT procedure and initiate a RACH procedure, i.e. send a non-SDT RACH preamble and CCCH/RRCResumeRequest message. |
| ZTE |  Same as Q7. In this case, it makes even more sense to wait for network response since only contention resolution is pending.  |
| InterDigital | Same as Q7. |
| CATT | Same as Q7 and Q8, a unified UE behaviour is preferred for all stages of SDT procedure. |
| Samsung | Same as Q7 |
| Fujitsu | As commented in Q7, we think that case-by-case optimization is not good. A single UE behaviour across all cases would be considered. |
| LG | Same as Q7 |
| Intel | Response provided in previous Q.7) is also applicable here. |
| NEC | It is better that one unified UE behaviour is applied for all stages of SDT procedure. And from that perspective, the CCCH solution can met this requirement. |
| Apple | Same as Q7, up to UE implementation.  |
| OPPO | UE triggers CCCH solution or DCCH solution.  |
| FGI, APT | In addition to trigger a new RACH, the UE should also release the CG-SDT configuration/resources. |
| Lenovo | See Q7 |
| vivo | Same as our comment to Q8. |
| Qualcomm | Same as Q7. |
| Xiaomi | Same as Q7. |

## CCCH-based approach

This section aims to clarify how CCCH-based approach works to enable the switch from an ongoing SDT session to non-SDT operation considering the related inputs provided in [5][9][12][13][14][18][20]. Note that some of the topics are inter-related with the ones discussed as part of previous general sections 2 and 3.1.

### [CCCH point (1)] Detection of non-SDT data

Upon UE detects non-SDT data available during an ongoing SDT session, this section discusses initial UE’s actions associated with CCCH-based approach.

#### [CCCH point (1.1)] UE autonomous release

For CCCH-based approach, It is clarified in [5] that UE autonomously triggers the end or the release of the ongoing SDT session upon detecting the non-SDT data.

1. For CCCH-based approach, UE autonomously triggers the end or the release of ongoing SDT session upon detecting the non-SDT data.

The following details and Q.10) are created based on the responses provided during 1st phase.

During current release procedure to suspend, the UE performs PDCP suspend operation and discard all buffered PDCP PDUs as it is also discussed in next section 3.2.4. For CCCH-based approach, it needs to be clarified whether this operation is maintained or not when UE autonomously ends the ongoing SDT session and initiates the new CCCH message.

1. Legacy behaviour - PDCP is suspended, and PDUs flushed. If PDCP suspend operation is done upon UE autonomously triggers the end or the release of ongoing SDT session, UE/network may not be able to detect data duplication and prevent data loss. This is also explained by Observation 6 in next section 3.2.4. This is also related to the discussion in next section 3.2.4.
2. New behaviour - PDCP suspend operation is not done or changed upon UE autonomously triggers the end or the release of ongoing SDT session. PDCP SN is not reset and PDUs are not flushed. If so, it needs to be clarified if network needs to distinguish between the 1st and 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg. and the corresponding different actions would need to be addressed. This is related to Discussion point 3) in next section 3.2.3.
3. Legacy behaviour with horizontal key derivation using the key derived after the first RRCResume as the base key - PDCP is suspended and PDUs flushed, the UE and RAN derive new KgNB\* horizontally, which is used for new UP and CP keys calculation. This way issue mentioned in section 3.2.4 is avoided.

**[ZTE’s comment to option 1.c)]** “This will still need some means to distinguish 1st and 2nd RRCResumeReq message since the UE may abort the 1st RRCResume procedure autonomously (i.e. before contention resolution etc)… please see more details below…”

**[07/20] [Rapporteur’s input]** This new option 1.c) added by Huawei is covered by option 1.a) that assume legacy behaviour of the PDCP handling i.e. “PDCP is suspended, and PDUs flushed”. The security mechanism to be used (e.g. horizontal key derivation) is discussed in next Q.14. Therefore, companies are suggested to provide their corresponding view on it as part of next Q.14).

##### **Q.10) for 2nd Phase**

1. For CCCH-based approach, upon UE autonomously triggers the end or the release of ongoing SDT session, what is the expected “PDCP suspend operation” considering previous options 1.x or new ones? please justify your response and provide further details on the corresponding open points.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Option** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Option 1.c) | Option 1c) allows to reuse legacy behaviour when it comes to PDCP entities handling, but avoids the issue of reusing the COUNT value with the same security key by calculating new security keys horizontally. As mentioned in our answer to Q.1), since only PDCP PDUs are discarded and the PDCP SDUs are not discarded during this procedure, there is no data loss (same applies to option 1.a)) |
| ZTE | Option 1.b) | It should be noted that UE will derive a new KgNB after triggering RRCResume procedure. So, firstly, we should have a common understanding on which key is used as base key for the key derivation for second RRCResume procedure: * Is it the key in the UE INACTIVE AS context (this is how it works currently if we assume second RRCResume works exactly same as the first RRCResume) or
* Is it the key derived after first RRCResume procedure?

The figure below shows these options… It should be noted that the current RRCResumeProcedure is according to option 1 (since it uses the stored UE Inactive AS context to derive the new KgNB to be used). However, as pointed out, the problem is that if we stick with the current RRCResume procedure (i.e. option 1), then the key will not change after the second RRCResumeProcedure (i.e. KgNB2 is generated again since the input key has not changed and all other inputs to KDF are also the same). Hence, since the COUNT is reset, then we do need a new mechanism to derive the key after the second RRCResume procedure (i.e. the base key now is not anymore the key stored in the UE INACTIVE AS Context). Now, this is in option 2 above. This is also what is mentioned above as option 1.c in our understanding. It is worth being clear on this procedure to avoid any mis-understanding here:1. For the initial RRCResume procedure, the base key is the key stored in the UE INACTIVE AS context
2. For the second RRCResume procedure (i.e. upon non-SDT data arrival and if CCCH message is to be used), then the UE has to derive a new key but for this key derivation, the base key is **NOT** the key stored in UE AS context (it is the key that id derived in step a) above. This procedure needs to be updated in RRCResume.

Then, horizontal key derivation (i.e. Option 1.c) does not work in all cases. The problem is that there could be cases where the network may not have received the first RRCResume message and the keys between network and UE will go out of sync in this case. For instance, if the UE autonomously terminates the RACH procedure and derives a new set of security keys, then it could be the case that the first RRCResumeRequest message is not received at the network and hence the network will not be able to derive the same security key in this case.. So, even if we want to go through option 1.c), we need to ensure at least that the network has received the first UL message. In this case, we need two different solutions: * Before contention resolution, if the UE terminates the ongoing RACH procedure, then it is unclear which keys shall be used on the UE side. Horizontal key derivation will not work in this case because the network will not be aware of the first RRCResume. This needs to be clarified in this solution.
* After contention resolution, then, option 1.c) can work, but then it means that the UE may have to adopt different solution based on whether or not contention resolution has happened.

 Based on this we would like to note the following observation: Observation: the CCCH solution should adopt one of the following options: **Option 1**: If the horizontal key derivation based on the initial derived key is used for the second RRCResumeProcedure, then an indication is needed in the RRCResumeReq to indicate that this is the second RRCResumeReq (to enable the network to also calculate the key correctly – if not, there should be a requirement that horizontal key derivation can only be used after contention resolution and prior to contention resolution, UE has to use same key and we need to check if this is okay)**Option 2**: If the key stored in the UE Inactive AS context is used as the base key for the second key derivation, then the same key is derived in first and second RRCResume. In this case, the COUNT should not be reset (i.e. the existing RRCResume procedure is not applicable – UE has to keep continue the count to ensure no count reuse with same key). Also in this case, there is no need for the new kgNB to be included in UEContextResponse message from anchor gNB. We need to decide which option to choose for CCCH solution.  |
| InterDigital | 1.x) | If new keys are derived in the middle of the switch, then PDCP should be re-established to apply the new keys. Otherwise, PDCP is retained without any suspension/release as data transmission continues after the switch. |
| CATT | Option 1.a) | Prefer to reuse legacy behaviour as much as possible. |
| Samsung |  | Agree with ZTE's observations |
| Fujitsu | Option 1.a) | We also think that the starting point is the legacy behaviour. |
| LG | 1.a or 1.c | If there is no security issue, 1.a is enough. There is no data loss because PDCP SDUs are not discarded by PDCP Suspend.If there is security issue, 1.c may need to be considered. |
| Intel | 1.a) (including 1.c) as explained in next Q.14)) or1.b) | All options are technically feasible. The implications are as explained:* For option 1.a), UE and network may not be able to detect data duplication and to prevent data loss.
* For option 1.b), UE and network needs to be aligned/synched on not resetting the PDCP COUNT and not flushing the PDCP PDUs.

Note: we share the view explained by Rapporteur above that option 1.c) is a sub-option of option 1.a) that addresses how the security key is generated when PDCP is suspended (and PDCP COUNT is reset). |
| NEC | Option 1.b) | We think this depends on the solution to solve the key stream issue. If new keys can be obtained in the second RRC Resume procedure, the existing procedure Option 1.a) can be used; and if the keys maintained, new behaviour Option 1.b) should be used. We prefer to avoid SA3 impact as much as possible, so Option 1.b) is better. |
| Apple | 1.a) or 1.c) | Option 1.a is used when there is no security issue; otherwise, Option 1.c is considered.  |
| OPPO | Option 1.a) or Option 1.b) | It depends on whether new security key is available for the second RRC resume procedure. |
| FGI, APT | Option 1.c) | We agree with ZTE’s observations and prefer the horizontal key derivation approach together with an indication in the RRCResumeRequst differentiating the 1st and 2nd RRCResumeRequest. |
| Lenovo | Option 1.c | For option 1.b, since the PDCP SN is not reset and PDUs are not flushed for SDT DRB, what about PDCP entity for non-SDT DRB, will it be associated to the key applied by the SDT procedure? We think the SA3 should also confirm whether there is security issue here.For option 1.c, the PDCP could be re\_established by a new horizontal key, no security issue such as fake equipment may be introduced. We also agree with ZTE that an indication is needed to indicate that RRCResumeReq message is the one after the RRCResumeReq for SDT procedure to enable the network use the new key. |
| vivo | Option 1.c) | In our understanding, the existing procedure (i.e. Option 1.c)) can be re-used and it seems no technical issues are found from the RAN2 perspective point of view.  |
| Qualcomm | Option 1.a) | Reuse the legacy behavior, and option 1.c) might be a candidate solution if there is security issue. |
| Xiaomi | Option 1.a) or SA3 solution for fake gNB | We prefer to reuse the legacy procedures. As SA3 already defined a new solution to avoid the replay attack for RRCResuemeRequest message, the gNB could also use the new SA3 solution. |

### [CCCH point (2)] RACH, UAC associated with the 2nd resume proc.

It is explained that CCCH-based approach [5] may require additional signalling to the network (e.g. RACH) and applies again UAC same as any UE in RRC\_INACTIVE in order to send non-SDT data

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, AS applies UAC and initiates random access procedure same as any legacy UE in RRC\_INACTIVE.

### [CCCH point (3)] Resume cause

This point (3) discuss the proposal that this 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* message uses a new resume cause value (for the network to differentiate it) [20].

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, whether a new value of the resume case is defined to differentiate the UE that had an ongoing SDT session and is sending a 2nd *RRCResumeRequest*.

#### Q.11) for 2nd Phase

This Q.11) is created based on previous discussion point.

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, is there any needed for the network to differentiate that this UE had an SDT session ongoing and is sending a 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg., for example by including a new value of the resume cause?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Yes/No** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Yes, but no new indication is required | gNB will be able to detect that the RRCResumeRequest is coming from the same UE by reading the I-RNTI included in the message. There is no need for a new resume cause nor any other new indication when switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach. |
| ZTE | Yes | As noted above the gNB may not have received the first RRCResumeRequest (since the UE can terminate the 1st RRCResume Procedure autonomously). So, a new indication will be needed if the UE uses horizontally derived key for the 2nd RRCResume message. This means that we likely need a new CCCH message for the 2nd RRCResumeReq even in case of option 1.c |
| InterDigital | No | We share Huawei’s view.NW knows whether the same UE had any SDT session before or not for a particular UE and if the UE signals the non-SDT resumption request, then NW knows it’s switch from SDT to non-SDT operation. Thus, any additional information doesn’t need to be signalled. |
| CATT | Yes | When receiving a RRCResumeRequest msg which is sent by the UE due to non-SDT available, the gNB may:- Have received the first RRCResumeRequest msg and perform anchor relocation;- Have received the first RRCResumeRequest msg but not perform anchor relocation;- Not have received the first RRCResumeRequest msg.The gNB needs to be aware the received RRCResumeRequest msg is the second RRCResumeRequest msg even if the gNB haven’t received the first RRCResumeRequest msg, as the calculation of resumeMAC-I should be different between the two RRCResumeRequest msgs. |
| Samsung | See comments | new indication will be needed if the UE uses horizontally derived key for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest message and gNB has not received the first RRCResumeRequest |
| Fujitsu | No | We also think that the gNB’s internal counter (non-standardization counter) can count the number of RRCResumeRequest for the particular UE. |
| LG | No | The gNB can detect that the UE had an ongoing SDT session based on I-RNTI. There is no need to include an indication to indicate that the UE had an ongoing SDT session. |
| Intel | See comments | The answer depends on PDCP operation upon trigger the abrupt termination of the SDT session and immediate initiation of the 2nd resume procedure (discussed in previous Q.10)):* For option 1.a) of Q10), i.e. PDCP suspend operation follows legacy suspend/resume, gNB does not need to know that UE had an ongoing SDT session. Same as in legacy resume use, the I-RNTI is used by serving gNB to locate the anchor gNB and fetch the UE context. If serving gNB already had temporal copy of the UE context (from the previous ongoing SDT session), it can be left up to gNB implementation on how to handle it e.g. whether everything gets discarded or whether any of the stored data is re-used.
* For option 1.b) of Q10), i.e. PDCP suspend operation is not done, gNB needs to differentiate that this UE had an ongoing SDT session that was terminated abruptly by UE and UE is requesting a immediate request to resume the connection in order to continue the data transmission in RRC\_CONNECTED. This option 1.b) requires that network also knows that PDCP COUNT is not reset for this UE and that its buffered data is not discarded/flushed in order to minimize data loss and duplication as explained in previous Q10. How gNB differentiates this 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg is FFS.
 |
| NEC | No | There is no need for a new resume cause nor any other new indication when switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach. |
| Apple | See comments | If NW can identify the second RRCResumeRequest from one UE, it’s no need to introduce new cause value. In our view, NW can identify the UE when successfully receiving the first UL SDT transmission. And if the non-SDT transmission is triggered after the first SDT transmission is successful, NW can identify the non-SDT access is the second access; otherwise, if non-SDT transmission is triggered before the first SDT transmission is successful, UE can just use the same key for the non-SDT access.  |
| OPPO | See comments | If the first RRCResumeRequest message is sent successfully, there is no need to carry any indication for distinguish. Otherwise, an indication is necessary especially if a new key is autonomously derived for the second RRC resume procedure. |
| FGI, APT | Yes | Agree with ZTE and Samsung that this new indication is needed if UE use horizontally derived key and gNB did not receive the first RRC resume request message. In addition to the UE autonomous release case, the NW may also fail to receive the first RRC resume request from the UE in some other cases like bad channel condition. |
| Lenovo | Yes | NW needs to distinguish between 1st and 2nd RRCResumeRequest message, it is assumed that some new indication is necessary. |
| vivo | No | Regarding the potential ambiguity of horizontal key derivation, we think NW can resolve this by implementation without explicit UE indication. Besides, we think the existing cause value for SDT can be reused since we are not sure what obvious benefit can be brought if an additional cause value is introduced.  |
| Qualcomm | See comments | The first RRC resume request message may not be successful, and new indication is needed for the 2nd RRC resume request message. |
| Xiaomi | No | As SA3 already defined a new solution to avoid the replay attack for RRCResuemeRequest message, the gNB could also use the new SA3 solution. |

### [CCCH point (4)] PDCP COUNT and/or security key to be used

This section discusses the details of the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg or the corresponding behaviour in UE and network side to support switching to non-SDT data during an ongoing SDT session for CCCH-based approach considering the inputs provided in [4][5][8][9][12][13][14][16][18][20].

References from legacy Resume/Suspend procedure are included below to show that the PDCP COUNT for all RBs are always reset. For example, this is done when *RRCRelease* is received including *suspendConfig* as shown below on the references taken from TS 38.331 § 5.3.8.3 and TS 38.331 § 5.1.4.

**5.3.8.3** **Reception of the RRCRelease by the UE**

The UE shall:

*\*\*\*text omitted\*\*\**

1. if the *RRCRelease* includes *suspendConfig*:

*\*\*\*text omitted\*\*\**

2> suspend all SRB(s) and DRB(s), except SRB0;

2> indicate PDCP suspend to lower layers of all DRBs;

*\*\*\*text omitted\*\*\**

***5.1.4 PDCP entity suspend***

*When upper layers request a PDCP entity suspend, the transmitting PDCP entity shall:*

*- set TX\_NEXT to the initial value;*

*- discard all stored PDCP PDUs;*

*When upper layers request a PDCP entity suspend, the receiving PDCP entity shall:*

*- if t-Reordering is running:*

*- stop and reset t-Reordering;*

*- deliver all stored PDCP SDUs to the upper layers in ascending order of associated COUNT values after performing header decompression;*

*- set RX\_NEXT and RX\_DELIV to the initial value.*

Current Release with suspend and Resume Request procedure resets the PDCP COUNT for all RBs as shown above. Since the CCCH method does not involve the RRC Release message, it is not clear if the COUNT for the RBs is reset for the second RRC Resume request.

On summary, the handling of the PDCP COUNT and the security key when switching from SDT to non-SDT should be clarified for CCCH-based approach as explained by [6][8][12][15][19]. Therefore, CCCH-based approach requires some level of update to resume procedure considering the points here discussed.

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, understand whether the PDCP COUNT is (or not) reset.

#### Q.12) for 2nd Phase

This Q.12) is created based on previous discussion point.

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, is the current behavior of resetting the PDCP count for RBs during the resume procedure applicable after the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Yes/No** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | OK to reuse | We are OK to reuse this behaviour, but this would require applying either option 1c) mentioned for Q10 or requiring the network to update the security keys right after the connection is resumed, i.e. when the UE is already in RRC\_CONNECTED state, but before transmits/receives any data. |
| ZTE | Yes, but with new key only  | According to the current procedure, PDCP count will be reset but this means: * New key is derived at the UE using Horizontal key derviation for second RRCResume (note this either needs new indication in the second RRCResume per above)
* Since PDCP count is reset, we need new solution to ensure lossless data (i.e. in order delivery without redundancy).

For DCCH solution, no new key is needed and PDCP count will simply continue.  |
| InterDigital | Depend-on new key derivation | COUNT can be reset only when a new key is applied and so it’s up to the key handling during the switch. If any new keys are derived during the switch, then COUNT should be reset. Otherwise, COUNT value should be retained. |
| CATT | Yes | Reusing the existing behavior is preferred. |
| Samsung | See comments | If key is not changed, COUNT should not be reset. |
| Fujitsu | Yes | We think that the starting point is the legacy behaviour. |
| LG | No | We think current behavior is not to reset PDCP count when initiating normal RRCResume procedure. The PDCP entity resets PDCP count values when PDCP suspend is requested by RRC, and the RRC requests PDCP suspend when the RRCRelease message is received. As there is no RRCRelease message received in this case, PDCP suspend is not performed, and thus PDCP count values are not reset according to current specification.And we don’t see any problem with not resetting the PDCP count values at initiating normal RRCResume procedure. |
| Intel | See comments | Current NR operation always associates PDCP suspension with the reset of the PDCP COUNT. However currently it is considered whether this may not be the case for SDT operation.In our understanding, the 2nd resume procedure can potentially be enabled via both approaches considering the corresponding implications and/or limitations summarized in table below.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach** | **PROS** | **CONS** |
| **A) PDCP COUNT is reset** | Minimal impact (as it is similar to current suspend/resume proc.) | Data duplication of data sent during the SDT session and after getting CONNECTED cannot be detected.Security related concerns need to be addressed as discussed in next questions (SA3 dependencies) |
| **B) PDCP COUNT continues (i.e. not reset)** | Some impact (as it is a new operation)  | Data duplication of data sent during the SDT session and after getting CONNECTED can be detected |

 |
| NEC | No | Providing new keys has impact to SA3 and the current security mechanism. It would be better if RAN2 can handle the issue ourselves by retaining the COUNT value. |
| Apple | Yes | Prefer the existing mechanism.  |
| OPPO | Depends | It depends on whether a new key is horizontally derived based on the one derived used in the first RRC resume procedure. |
| FGI, APT | Yes |  |
| Lenovo | See comments | If keys are change that COUNT should be reset.  |
| vivo | No | We share a similar view with LG. Take a step back, we think the mentioned operation is not applicable to SRB1 (if it is resumed) as it seems redundant to suspend SRB1, which will be re-established before the transmission 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* message. |
| Qualcomm | See comments | It depends on whether new keys are derived or not. COUNT does not need to be reset if key is not changed. |
| Xiaomi | Yes | We prefer to reuse the legacy procedure. |

TS 38.331 § 5.3.1.2 explains that same PDCP COUNT cannot be reused with the same security key as shown below:

“*It is not allowed to use the same COUNT value more than once for a given security key.*”

Note that further related details are discussed in the following sections of this email discussion.

1. The mechanism to be defined that enables the switch from SDT to non-SDT shall meet the following NR requirement: the same PDCP COUNT value is not used more than once for a given security key.

If the PDCP COUNT is reset for the CCCH based approach and as the UE has not received a new key, how to satisfy the above requirements for the RBs should be discussed [6][8][12][15][19].

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach and if the PDCP COUNT is reset, how to prevent the reuse of the same PDCP COUNT and the same security key for the RBs.

#### Q.13) for 2nd Phase

This Q.13) is created based on previous discussion point.

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach and if the PDCP COUNT is reset, how can the reuse of the same PDCP COUNT and the same security key for the RBs be prevented?

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Explanation** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | The security keys can be either derived horizontally when the second RRCResumeRequest is triggered (option 1c) as indicated in section 3.2.1.1) or the network may be required to update the security keys right after the second resume procedure is finalized i.e. when the UE is already in RRC\_CONNECTED state, but before transmits/receives any data.  |
| ZTE | Using same COUNT value more than once for the same key is definitely not allowed and hence we have to use something similar to Horizontal key derivation but this needs new indication in the CCCH message or new procedure at the UE before and after contention resolution as noted above.  |
| InterDigital | The discussion should be other way around. If any new key derivation is required by SA3, then PDCP COUNT should be reset. Otherwise the COUNT should be retained. |
| CATT | The security keys can be derived horizontally when the 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg is initiated. |
| Samsung | If key is not changed, COUNT should not be reset. |
| Fujitsu | We understand that PDCP COUNT for the RBs needs to be reset since reuse is not permitted. Horizontal key derivation can be considered according to the 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg. |
| LG | We don’t think PDCP count values are reset. Then, there is no security issue foreseen. If RAN2 wants to reset the PDCP count values, then the solution mentioned by Huawei can be considered. |
| Intel | During the resume proc. Associated with the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg., if PDCP COUNT is reset as discussed in Q12, the usage of the same security keys should be prevented by one of the mechanisms discussed in next Q.14) e.g. horizontal key derivation. |
| NEC | RAN2 should try to solve this issue by COUNT value continuation to avoid impact to SA3. We can consider solutions of having new keys for this case only if it is not possible to solve this issue in RAN2.  |
| Apple | If NW can identify the non-SDT access is during the ongoing SDT session (i.e. after the first UL SDT transmission success), the new security key can be derived for the non-SDT access. If the non-SDT procedure is triggered before the first UL SDT transmission is successful, reusing the same key and same PDCP COUNT has no security issue.  |
| OPPO | Share same view with HW. |
| FGI, APT | We assume that a new key will be generated/used in the 2nd RRCResumeRequest, and hence reusing the same PDCP COUNT could not be an issue.  |
| Lenovo | Same view as Huawei |
| vivo | As we mentioned in Q10, we think horizontal key derivation will occur based on the existing NR procedure. |
| Qualcomm | It depends on whether the Horizontal key derivation is considered in Q10.  |
| Xiaomi | If PDCP count resets, a new key needs to be derived as requested by SA3. |

If PDCP count is reset upon detecting non-SDT data during an ongoing SDT session for CCCH-based approach, UE/network may not be able to detect data duplication and prevent data loss after transitioning into RRC\_CONNECTED.

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, if the PDCP count is reset upon detecting non-SDT data during an ongoing SDT session, the UE/network may not be able to detect data duplication and prevent data loss during the transitioning into RRC\_CONNECTED.

### [CCCH point (5)] security associated resume MAC-I (dependent on SA3 outcome)

This sub-section discuss how *resumeMAC-I* is calculated for this 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg and some of it is dependent on SA3 outcome. For reference, it is shown below related actions from TS 38.331 on this:

*1> set the* ***resumeMAC-I*** *to the 16 least significant bits of the MAC-I calculated:*

*2> over the ASN.1 encoded as per clause 8 (i.e., a multiple of 8 bits) VarResumeMAC-Input;*

*2> with the* ***KRRCint key in the UE Inactive AS Context*** *and the previously configured integrity protection*

*algorithm; and*

*2> with all input bits for COUNT, BEARER and DIRECTION set to binary ones;*

Therefore, the suggested options are in relation to the NCC and the KRRCint key in used.

Irrespective of the security issue that SA3 is addressing, RAN2 can still discuss whether the key used for generating the *ResumeMAC-I* – for example, is it the one that is currently in use for the SDT data transfer or the one used for generating the *ResumeMAC-I* of the first *RRCResumeRequest*. Proposals were also made to address the security issue related to the reuse of key for generation of the ResumeMAC-I. The proposals for key to use for generating ResumeMAC-I include:

* + 1. NCC provided in last *RRCRelease* message i.e. same as for legacy *RRCResumeRequest* which was also used when the SDT session was started (before initiating ongoing switch to non-SDT).
		2. Horizonal key derivation from current NCC [5] [14] [18].
		3. New NCC that was provided by the serving gNB in the 1st DL message after UE sends the 1st UL SDT msg (i.e. upon initiating the SDT session) [5].
		4. UE’s KRRCint key stored in UE Inactive AS Context i.e. same as for legacy *RRCResumeRequest* which was also used when the SDT session was started (before initiating ongoing switch to non-SDT) [12] (this may depend on the SA3 conclusion).
		5. UE’s new KRRCint key i.e. the one calculated when triggering SDT [12].
1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, which key is used for generating the *resumeMAC-I* for the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg.

#### Q.14) for 2nd Phase

This Q.14) is created based on previous discussion point.

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, which previous option 6.x or new option is preferable to calculate the key used for generating the *resumeMAC-I* for the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg. (understanding that some of this is dependent on SA3 outcome)?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Option(s)** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Option 6.d) if SA3 concludes security material can be reused for this.Option 6.e) or 6.c) if SA3 concludes security material should not be reused. | The answer to this question depends on the SA3 reply to RAN2 LS. We think option 6.d) is a baseline behaviour, but if SA3 concludes this would cause a security issue, then option 6.e) is the simplest. In this case the security key which is used would be the same as for DCCH message in the DCCH-based non-SDT data arrival indication. Option 6.c) is another viable option, but more complex and would require more specifications changes. |
| ZTE | Option 6.d) | If there is no security issue, then option 6.d is the baseline. Other options are complex and unnecessary and have other issues and there is no time to pursue these at this time. |
| InterDigital | 6.x | COUNT=2 is used for resumeMAC-I calculation for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest (Note: see 33.501 subclause 6.8.2.1.3, COUNT=1 is currently always used for the resumeMAC-I calculation).Alternatively, COUNT=1 is used for the CCCH message of the non-SDT data indication (and the regular resumption case) and COUNT=2 is used for the SDT operation. |
| CATT | Option 6.e) | In exiting procedure, the UE calculates resumeMAC-I with the KRRCint key in the UE Inactive AS Context and the previously configured integrity protection algorithm and with all input bits for COUNT, BEARER and DIRECTION set to binary ones. In order to avoid the same keystreams for the resumeMAC-I in the two RRCResumeRequest msgs, the KRRCint key needs to be updated. |
| Samsung | 6.d | if SA3 concludes that there is security issue in using 6.d, we can simply follow SA3's suggestion on alternative solution |
| Fujitsu | Option 6.e) | We think that the starting point is the legacy behaviour. As commented in Q13, horizontal derivation of KRRCint key can be considered according to 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg. |
| LG | Too early to discuss | We think 6.d is the current behavior, and needs to be checked with SA3 whether this behavior causes any security problem. If SA3 think there is security problem, then we can discuss solutions. |
| Intel | See comments | Firstly, we want to clarify our understanding on the proposed options above described via the following details and figures:=> **Option 6.a) and 6.e)** seems the same to us but described differently where UE uses the NCC\_1 (that was provided in last *RRCRelease* msg) to generate *resumeMAC-I* included in 2nd *RRCResumeRequest*, as shown in Figure 1 below. This would require a change to current resume procedure.=> **Option 6.d)** uses the same securityKey\_0 used for 1st RRCResumeRequest when initiating the SDT session and for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest. This would follow legacy resume procedure (as shown on the TS reference copied above Q.14) “*with the KRRCint key in the UE Inactive AS Context*”) assuming security key stored in the UE AS Inactive Context is not updated during an ongoing SDT session. => **Option 6.b)** A new securityKey\_2 generated doing horizontal key derivation of NCC\_1 is used for the data and alternatively it could also be used for the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* (or even previous security\_Key\_1). This may require a change to current resume procedure.=> **Option 6.c)** uses a new NCC\_3 provided by the gNB\_2 as soon as UE starts the SDT session. This would require a change to current resume procedure but as part of SDT operation.To determine which approach may be preferable, SA3/RAN3 input/confirmation may be required as there are many factors to consider such as PDCP COUNT is reset, whether anchoring is used, which node processes ResumeMac-I, C-RNTI used for ResumeMAC-I calculation. * If PDCP COUNT is reset (as discussed in Q.12)), the same security key cannot be used for the 2nd time. Therefore, only options 6.b), 6.c) could be used.
* If PDCP COUNT is not reset (as discussed in Q.12)), the same security key can also be used for the 2nd time. To determine if any of the options is or not feasible RAN3 and SA3 input would be required considering e.g.
	+ If anchor gNB (gNB\_1) is not relocated during the SDT session, options 6e)/6.a) and 6.d) may have problems as gNB2 would use the same securityKey\_1 for the data after 2nd RRCResumeReq is sent.
	+ If anchor gNB (gNB\_1) is fully relocated to serving gNB (gNB\_2) during the SDT session, option 6.d) would not work as gNB\_2 is not aware of securityKey\_0. This would depend on RAN3 design of the context relocation for SDT operation.
	+ After 2nd RRCResumeReq is sent, SA3 would need to confirm whether the same securityKey\_1 used during the SDT session can be used when switching to CONNECTED as it may not provide key separation between nodes (depending on which node processes the ResumeMAC-I).

In addition, SA3 input may be required to understand which *source-c-RNTI* should use when calculating the *VarResumeMAC-Input*  for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest. E.g. should this be the one used when UE was previously CONNECTED or new on in used during the SDT operation.*VarResumeMAC-Input  ::=     SEQUENCE* *{    sourcePhysCellId                        PhysCellId,*  *targetCellIdentity                      CellIdentity,*  *source-c-RNTI                           RNTI-Value }*On summary, SA3, RAN3 input/confirmation may be required on any solution that RAN2 may preferred. |
| NEC | Option 6.d, (should be confirmed by SA3) | Option 6.d is the baseline if there is no security issue confirmed by SA3. If SA3 conclude that there is security issue, it is up to their decision on what solution to be applied. |
| Apple | Option 6.d, or Option 6.b, 6.c. | Option 6.d should be the baseline. But if SA3 indicates the security issue, new key derivation for the non-SDT needs to be considered, and Option 6.b and 6.c can be considered. |
| OPPO | Option 6.d | Legacy behaviour can be baseline before the response from SA3. |
| FGI, APT | 6.d | 6.d can be the baseline considering the time remaining for this release.  |
| Lenovo | 6.d if no security issue is confirmed by SA3;6.e if SA3 confirms security should be updated. | Same view to Huawei comment. but it is preferable to option 6.e since it is more flexible and does not need a new NCC in the first DL message in SDT procedure. |
| vivo | Option 6.d) | We prefer to reuse the existing UE behavior. |
| Qualcomm | - | Should consult with SA3 before RAN2 makes decision. |
| Xiaomi | See comments | SA3 already designed a new solution of calculating the resumeMAC-I to avoid the replay attack of the RRCResumeRequest message. We prefer the new SA3 solution designed in the fake gNB work item. |

### [CCCH point (6)] Identification of UE AS context in the network

For legacy resume procedure, the release of the UE context from the anchor gNB0 is done upon completion of the path switch with the AMF and the serving gNB. However for SDT option, when to release the UE AS context from the anchor gNB may require further discussion considering inputs in [6][19][11][17]. The possible options are the following (as shown in Figure 2):

1. UE AS Context is released from anchor gNB after doing the Path Switch during the ongoing SDT session. The drawback is that the I-RNTI stored in the UE during an SDT session points to the UE context in the anchor gNB when this has already been deleted.
2. UE AS Context is released from anchor gNB after serving gNB provides a new NCC and I-RNTI to the UE (i.e. at the end of the SDT session). The drawback is that serving gNB needs to inform anchor gNB when SDT session successfully ends in order to delete the corresponding UE AS Context.



Figure 2. SDT with anchor relocation from [19] but updated to include both options as explained in [6]

Upon initiation of the corresponding SDT session, the I-RNTI stored in the UE points to the UE context in the anchor/old gNB while the UE AS Context may be released from the anchor gNB after serving gNB completes the path switch with the AMF at the beginning of the SDT session.

On summary, during an ongoing SDT session, UE only has an stored/available I-RNTI that points to the anchor gNB. Therefore, if UE had an ongoing SDT session in a serving gNB that is different than the anchor gNB, the identifier to be included in this 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* message and how it can identify the UE context should be discussed. Some possible options also discussed in the contributions were:

1. I-RNTI i.e. same as for legacy *RRCResumeRequest* message which was also used when the SDT session was started (before initiating ongoing switch to non-SDT). This option would route the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* message to the anchor/old gNB.
2. New I-RNTI that is provided by the serving gNB in the 1st DL message after UE sends the 1st UL SDT msg (i.e. upon initiating the SDT session) [6][14]. This option would route the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* message to the serving gNB where the SDT session was ongoing.
3. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach and for the scenario where the ongoing SDT session is with UE AS context relocation, how serving gNB can locate the UE AS Context in the network for the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg based on the I-RNTI available in the UE that may point to a released UE context in the anchor gNB.

#### Q.15) for 2nd Phase

This Q.15) is created based on previous discussion point.

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach and for the scenario where the ongoing SDT session is with UE AS context relocation, which previous option 7.x or new option is preferable for the serving gNB to locate/identify the UE AS Context in the network for the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg.?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Option** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Both option 7a) and option 7b) work | We think both options work. Option 7a) should be the baseline and option 7b) can be used on top of this if it is agreed to support a new DL RRC message, e.g. to handle potential security issues for other cases. |
| ZTE | Option 7a | We think we should not further discuss new solutions if there are security issues we should simply go with DCCH solution.  |
| InterDigital | 7.a) | The 2nd RRCResumeRequest message would be processed by the anchor gNB and so it makes more sense to use the I-RNTI used for the ongoing SDT session. New I-RNTI makes sense only after the context relocation and so 7.b) can’t be the option here.This applies for the DCCH solution as well. |
| CATT | Option 7.a) | With option 7.b), does it mean that the serving gNB provides new I-RNTI to the anchor gNB and the anchor gNB sends the new I-RNTI via RRC message to the UE? And what’s the UE behaviour if the UE doesn’t receive the New I-RNTI while non-SDT data is available? We cannot ensure the UE always has the new I-RNTI with scenarios in Q.8)-Q.9). |
| Samsung | Option 7a | Agree with ZTE |
| Fujitsu | Option 7a | We think that the starting point is the legacy behaviour. |
| LG | Both | 7.a is the baseline, but 7.b can also be considered. |
| Intel | 7.a)  | Both options 7.a) or 7.b) are feasible. However, option 7.b) would make more sense if a 1st DLRRC msg were sent in the SDT session by the network e.g. to provide a new NCC or if RAN1 requires any reconfiguration. Therefore, for CCCH-based approach, option 7.a) could be assumed as baseline. RAN2 should inform about this scenario to RAN3 to enable it and solve potential issues e.g. anchor gNB may need to keep a copy or reference of the UE AS context until SDT session is successfully terminated by the network. |
| NEC | Option 7a) | As the UE context is still kept at the anchor gNB, we don’t see any issue of using the same I-RNTI. |
| Apple | Option 7.a | 7.a is the baseline. And we donot see any problem. |
| OPPO | Option 7a) | Agree with ZTE. |
| FGI, APT | Option 7a | Option 7a doesn’t necessarily mean the 2nd RRCResumeRequst must be routed to the old anchor gNB. Since the serving gNB has received this I-RNTI before, it knows what happened earlier (e.g., anchor relocation), and may handle the 2nd RRCResumeRequest properly.  |
| Lenovo | Option 7.a) | Agree with ZTE |
| vivo | option 7.a) | We think option 7.1) is feasible with proper NW implementation. |
| Qulacomm | Option 7a) | Same view with ZTE. |
| Xiaomi | Option 7a) | Agree with ZTE. |

### [CCCH point(7)] Network handling of the 2nd RRCResumeRequest and the RRCResume messages.

When the anchor/old gNB has/keeps stored the UE AS Context, after receiving the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg from the same UE, it needs to be discussed whether anchor gNB generates or not another new KgNB associated with the same target gNB, as explained in Figure 3 below from [18].



Figure 3: Key generation after the second CCCH message [18]

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach with anchor gNB, after network receives the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg, whether anchor gNB generates (or not) another new KgNB associated with the same target gNB. The following were raised in [18]:
* Will the second RRCResumeReq (i.e., in step 7) be routed to the old anchor gNB regardless of anchor relocation or not?
* After receiving the second *RRCResumeRequest* msg from the same UE, will the anchor gNB generate another new KgNB associated with the same target gNB?

#### Q.16) for 2nd Phase

This Q.16) is created based on previous discussion point.

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach with anchor gNB, after network receives the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg, does the anchor gNB generate another new KgNB associated with the same serving/target gNB? Please justify your response and provide further details on any open points not addressed here or in other questions in relation to this scenario.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Yes/No** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | It depends on SA3 | This is similar issue as in question Q.2) and it is common for both CCCH and DCCH based solutions. In our opinion it can be consulted with SA3 whether new KgNB\* has to be used, but if it has to be, then with CCCH-based solution it can be derived horizontally as presented above. |
| ZTE | See Q10 | The situation is different between DCCH and CCCH solutions. In case of DCCH solution, the difference is that the DCCCH RRC message will always be routed to the node that terminates the RRC layer and hence the response message (i.e. RRCResume) can be generated by this node. Count continues in both DL and UL and there is no interruption to data and no new keys are derived during the process. In case of CCCH message, the message is always routed to the node identified by the I-RNTI (i.e. the old anchor gNB). However, the old anchor gNB does not terminate the RRC layer in case of anchor relocation. So, the old anchor gNB needs to process the received second RRCResumeReq and the generate new key and provide the new key to the new anchor gNB (although anchor relocation would have happened) and the new gNB would then have to start using the new keys. This needs a new procedure for anchor relocation case (i.e. the old anchor gNB will have to send the new key without UE context in this case and the old anchor gNB would need to retain the UE context even after the UE anchor relocation to support this case). Then, further question is which key is used as the base key for the 2nd key derivation? Is it the key in the stored UE AS security context or is it the first key (generated after the first RRCResume procedure) and this issue is then same as Q10 above. The final question is handling of COUNT. It seems the proponents want to reuse the existing RRCResume procedure, in which case count will be reset, however, when count is reset, there will be out of order packets and/or redundancy in the DL (similar to UL). Further, any packets transmitted in DL during the interaction with the old anchor gNB on Xn, will be lost and will need to be recovered at PDCP level.  |
| InterDigital | Yes | When the UE context is moved from the anchor to a new serving gNB, then new keys should be derived as the old keys are associated with an anchoring point and the anchoring point is moved to the other gNB for this case.This applies for the DCCH solution as well. |
| CATT | Yes | 1) If PDCP COUNT is reset with CCCH-based approach, the security key needs to be updated in both UE and gNB sides.2) The issue is not common for both CCCH and DCCH based solutions as PDCP COUNT is not reset with DCCH based solution. |
| Samsung |  | Depends on solution agreed for Q 10 |
| Fujitsu | Yes | We understand that the old (anchor) gNB would deal with KgNB according to 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg. |
| LG | Check with SA3 | Same comments as Q.2. We first have to check with SA3 whether this is a real issue. And, even if this is an issue, terminate the current SDT procedure and initiate a new SDT procedure can work without any security issue.Some companies commented that PDCP count is reset when switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach. However, we don’t think PDCP count is reset in this case, as explained in Q.12. |
| Intel | - | We suggest asking this question to SA3. We understand that solution details discussed in other questions (e.g. whether PDCP COUNT is or not reset, which security key is used, etc). Therefore, RAN2 agreements (if any) on those other topics would be important to flag and RAN3 would also need to be kept on the loop.In addition, we share ZTE’s view that DCCH approach does not have any issue related to this.  |
| NEC | New security key is regenerated, but it is the same as previous one used during the SDT procedure | According to TS33.501, 6.8.2.1.3, “The source gNB retrieves the stored UE context including the UE 5G AS security context from its database using the I-RNTI. The source gNB calculates KgNB\* using the target cell PCI, target ARFCN-DL and the KgNB/NH in the current UE 5G AS security context based on either a horizontal key derivation or a vertical key derivation according to whether the source gNB has an unused pair of {NCC, NH} as described in Annex A.11.” the anchor gNB generate the security based on KgNB/NH in the current AS security text, and it will results in same security key used in previous SDT procedure. |
| Apple |  | Prefer to check with SA3.  |
| OPPO | Yes with comments | If new security key is used for the second RRC resume procedure, the anchor needs to update the key in order to make the alignment with UE. Otherwise, there is problem to send further RRC message, either for RRCRelease or RRCResume. |
| FGI, APT |  | This question seems to be more valid if the anchor relocation doesn’t occur during the SDT phase. If UE’s context has been relocated to the serving gNB during the SDT phase, the serving gNB is able to derive the new key based on the given key (i.e., target\_KgNB1) and UE’s context. The 2nd RRCResumeRequest also does not have to be forwarded to the old anchor gNB in this case. |
| Lenovo | See comments | Depends on the solution agreed (if PDCP COUNT is reset, new key is required) |
| vivo | Yes | In our understanding, we think the answer is Yes according to the current spec. Anyway, we can request SA3 for input first. |
| Qualcomm |  | Prefer to check with SA3. |
| Xiaomi |  | Prefer to check with SA3. |

## DCCH-based approach

This section aims to clarify how DCCH-based approach work to enable non-SDT switching from an ongoing SDT session considering the inputs provided by companies [3][5][12][18][20][22].

### [DCCH point (1)] Detection of non-SDT data

For DCCH-approach, it is assumed that the PDCP COUNT is maintained as the SDT session fallbacks into CONNECTED upon gNB sends *RRCResume* message during the ongoing SDT session.

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT via DCCH-based approach, the PDCP COUNT is maintained for SDT DRBs (i.e. the SDT session fallbacks into CONNECTED upon gNB sends *RRCResume* message during the ongoing SDT session).

The sub-section below discusses how/what information the UE shares with the network when non-SDT data becomes available during an ongoing SDT session when using DCCH-based approach.

#### [DCCH point (1.1)] NAS/AS trigger

On new data arrival for the DCCH approach, the following options were proposed:

1. AS triggers the DCCH indication/request from UE to transition into RRC\_CONNECTED when non-SDT data becomes available during the SDT session [18].
2. NAS trigger new DCCH indication/request to AS for UE to move to RRC\_CONNECTED state when non-SDT data becomes available during the SDT session [18].
3. When detecting non-SDT data during ongoing SDT via DCCH-based approach, whether AS layer can initiate the indication/request to the network.

##### **Q.17) for 2nd Phase**

This Q.17) is created based on previous discussion point.

1. From RAN2 point of view, when detecting non-SDT data during ongoing SDT via DCCH-based approach, which previous option 9.x or new option is preferable for AS or NAS layer to trigger the DCCH indication/request to the network?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Option** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Depends on CT1 reply | In our understanding NAS will trigger another request for the UE to move to RRC CONNECTED state and based on this AS will trigger DCCH message transmission. In any case NAS behaviour is not for RAN2 to decide and we have already asked a relevant question to CT1 in R2-2104644. |
| ZTE | Option 9.b (based on latest CT1 status) | Based on latest status in CT1, our understanding is that NAS will trigger a new request this NAS request should trigger the DCCH message in AS.  |
| InterDigital | Depends on CT1 reply | We share Huawei/HiSilicon’s view. |
| CATT | Option 9.a) | DCCH message is generated in AS layer, it is AS layer to trigger or initiate the transmission of the DCCH message. But AS layer may trigger the transmission of DCCH message based on request from NAS layer which is depended on CT1 reply. |
| Samsung | Option 9.a) | Same view as CATT |
| Fujitsu | Option 9.b) | We understand that NAS will trigger a new request to AS. |
| LG | Check with CT1 | We have to check first with CT1 whether 9.b is feasible. If 9.b is not feasible by CT1, RAN2 should work on 9.a. |
| Intel | 9.a) | In our understanding, NAS is not aware whether a RB is or not configured for SDT operation although CT1 confirmation of this may be required. Therefore, detecting SDT or non-SDT data could be left up to UE implementation or if any, SDAP may be the optimum layer to handle this. Therefore, we suggest agreeing that AS can handle the trigger from RAN2 point of view and subject to CT1 input/confirmation. |
| NEC | Option 9.a) | NAS layer will indicate connection resume to AS layer, and AS layer trigger the sending of DCCH message. |
| Apple | Option 9.a) | Same view as CATT.  |
| OPPO | Option 9.a) | We think NAS is not able to determine whether there is non-SDT data since NAS is not aware of the radio bearer, while AS is where the radio bearers are handled. Final decision can be made depending on CT1 reply. |
| FGI, APT | Option 9.a) | The request is come from NAS but AS can determine to use DCCH or CCCH approach, if both approaches co-exist. |
| Lenovo | See comments | Depends on CT1 reply.  |
| vivo | Option 9.a) | In our understanding, the RRC layer plays a role in triggering this DCCH type of assistance info, which is similar to the existing UE assistance info reporting. |
| Qualcomm | Option 9.a) | AS layer generates DCCH message and initiates the transmission of DCCH message. But should base on NAS request which depends on CT1 reply.  |
| Xiaomi | See comments | Depends on CT1 reply.  |

#### [DCCH point (1.2)] non-SDT notification to network

For DCCH-based approach, how UE sends the indication/request to switch into RRC\_CONNECTED when non-SDT becomes available during an ongoing SDT session, the following options were proposed to provide the indication to the network:

1. New UL RRC message [3].
2. Re-using legacy UL RRC message e.g. *UEAssistanceInformation* message [3].
3. For DCCH-based approach, how UE sends the indication/request to switch into RRC\_CONNECTED when non-SDT becomes available during an ongoing SDT session.

##### **Q.18) for 2nd Phase**

This Q.18) is created based on previous discussion point.

1. For DCCH-based approach, which previous option 10.x or new option is preferable for UE to send the indication/request to switch into CONNECTED when non-SDT becomes available during an ongoing SDT session?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Option** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Option 10.b) | In case we proceed with this approach, we prefer to reuse an existing message and UEAssistanceInformation would fit the purpose well in our opinion. |
| ZTE | no strong view | We are fine with either. However, if NAS triggers the new request, it seems we can define a new message too (including the contents from NAS).  |
| InterDigital | 10.b) | The existing message plus a new IE, which tells gNB that UE requests the switch from SDT to non-SDT. |
| CATT | 10.a) | We can decide the preferred options after the content for the indication/request when non-SDT becomes available is concluded. From our point of view, the content for the indication/request when non-SDT becomes available is different from the existing UEAssistanceInformation message. Therefore, it is good to define a new UL RRC message. |
| Samsung | 10.a | Slightly prefer new message |
| Fujitsu | TBD | Firstly, we would clarify what contents would be sent to the gNB.It is proposed in [3] that the contents can be list of one or more RB IDs for which data is arrived or data volume per RB or cumulative. After the content is decided, we can discuss signalling design e.g. UEAssistanceInformation or new RRC message. |
| LG | 10.a | We think using a new UL RRC message would be simple and clear. |
| Intel | 10.a) | Both options are possible. We prefer not to re-use *UEAssistanceInformation* msg as to avoid complexity associated with other UE assistance information that may be configured for that UE while in RRC\_CONNECTED and would not be applicable while UE is in SDT. |
| NEC | 10.b) | We prefer reusing the existing message with new IE. |
| Apple | 10.b) | We prefer to use the existing message.  |
| OPPO | 10.b) |  |
| FGI, APT | 10.a | Prefer to use a new message for clear separation.  |
| Lenovo | No strong view | Prefer to reuse existing message. However, it depends also on the detailed content of this indication. |
| vivo | option 10.b) | We think the existing IE *preferredRRC-State-r16* can be reused for SDT. |
| Qualcomm | 10.b  | Reusing the existing message with new IE. |
| Xiaomi | No strong view | We slightly prefer a new meassage, which seems clearer from the specification. |

Additionally, it was also proposed to provide the following information to the network in the indication:

1. List of one or more RB IDs for which data is arrived [3].
2. Data volume per RB or cumulative can also be indicated [3].
3. Resume cause.
4. For DCCH-based approach, which information is provided by UE to indicate/request the switch into RRC\_CONNECTED when non-SDT becomes available during an ongoing SDT session.

##### **Q.19) for 2nd Phase**

This Q.19) is created based on previous discussion point and the responses provided during the 1st phase.

1. For DCCH-based approach, which previous option 11.x or new option is preferable for the information to be provided by UE to indicate/request about the switch into CONNECTED when non-SDT becomes available in UE during an ongoing SDT session?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Option(s)** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Option 11.c) | Since this will be based on another request from NAS layer, we understand the resume cause will also be provided (pending CT1 response). If this is confirmed by CT1, then we think resume cause needs to be included. There is no need to include 11.a) nor 11.b) – such information will be known via usual means, i.e. BSR. |
| ZTE | Mandatory: 11.cOptional others | Resume cause can be included for sure, the remaining are nice to have and can be further discussed (leave to stage-3).  |
| InterDigital | At least 11.c) | Resume cause should be provided. We are open to other options. |
| CATT | Option 11.a)/11.b)/ 11.c) | 1) The UE initiates the DCCH message due to different cause values, e.g. emergency service becomes available, or normal big data becomes available. The network needs to know the resume cause to perform different behaviours, e.g. the network switches the UE into RRC\_CONNECTED immediately if it finds emergency service is available.2) As non-SDT was not resumed, BSR cannot be triggered. We prefer to report the data volume available of non-SDT RBs and list of RB IDs to the network. The network can perform different behaviours based on the info, e.g. whether to configure DC for the UE. |
| Samsung | 11.a, 11.b, 11.c | Samsung |
| Fujitsu | Option 11.b) | We guess that 11.b) covers 11.a).The key point is that data volume would be informed to the gNB for the purpose of proper configuration and data scheduling to the UE. |
| LG | 11.c | We think non-SDT data does not arrive at AS layer. Thus, 11.a and 11.b are not suitable. |
| Intel | 11c), 11.d) | In our understanding, it is sufficient if UE indicates that there is non-SDT data waiting to be delivered for the network to decide whether to transition or not the UE to RRC\_CONNECTED. On other hand, there might be scenarios where providing resume cause information may be helpful e.g. for emergency access. |
| NEC | At least 11.c) | We are open to other options. |
| Apple | 11.c, 11.a, 11.b | 11.c is mandatory. 11.a and 11.b are optional.  |
| OPPO | 11.c) |  |
| FGI, APT | Option 11.c | The other two options are more from optimization perspective. |
| Lenovo | 11.b, 11c | Resume seems to be required. Some buffer status information will also necessary for the NW as normal BSR is not available in our understanding.  |
| vivo | none | We think the existing IE *preferredRRC-State-r16* can be reused for SDT. |
| Qualcomm | 11.a, 11.b, 11.c |  |
| Xiaomi | 11.a, 11.b, 11.c |  |

### [DCCH point (2)] switch from SDT to CONNECTED

For DCCH approach, the switch from SDT to CONNECTED is under network control, therefore after UE informs the network that non-SDT data is available, UE continues with the SDT session ongoing until network informs otherwise to UE. For example, network may respond at some point with *RRCResume* or *RRCRelease*. Upon UE receives *RRCResume* message, UE only re-establishes/resumes the non-SDT DRBs (as SDT RBs were already re-established/resumed upon initiating the SDT session) [3][5][12][18].

1. For DCCH approach, after UE informs the network that non-SDT data is available, UE continues with the SDT session ongoing until network informs otherwise to UE (i.e. by transitioning the UE into RRC\_CONNECTED or releasing the UE into legacy RRC\_INACTIVE or RRC\_IDLE). Upon UE receives *RRCResume* message, only the PDCP of non-SDT DRBs are re-established and resumed (as SDT RBs were already re-established/resumed upon initiating the SDT session).

For DCCH-based approach, the topic addressed in Discussion point 1) on how to handle the scenario when switching from SDT to CONNECTED during an ongoing SDT session where the UE context was not relocated by the network at the beginning of the SDT session is also applicable.

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT (i.e. CONNECTED) via DCCH-based approach and for the scenario where the ongoing SDT session is without UE AS context relocation, previous Discussion point 1) is applicable (and would also need to be addressed).

#### Q.20) for 2nd Phase

This **Q.20)** is created based on previous discussion point.

1. When switching from SDT to non-SDT (i.e. CONNECTED) via DCCH-based approach and for the scenario where the ongoing SDT session is without UE AS context relocation, previous Q.1) to Q.5) and the responses are expected to be applicable. Please indicate if your responses provided for previous Q.1) to Q.5) are not applicable when using DCCH-based approach and if so, please explain the different behaviour/operation.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Q.1) to Q.6) with responses not applicable to DCCH**  | **Justification on the different behaviour/operation for the specific question with DCCH-based approach** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon |  | Our replies to Q.1-Q.6 may apply for this approach.  |
| ZTE |  | yes, our replies Q 1-6 apply here too.  |
| InterDigital | - | Our replies for Q.1-6 apply for the DCCH-based approach too. |
| CATT |  | How to switch from SDT to CONNECTED during an ongoing SDT session without UE AS context relocation is a common issue for both CCH and DCCH approaches.Even with CCCH-based approach, if DL non-SDT RBs are available, the network needs to initiate the switching from SDT to CONNECTED during on-going SDT session without UE AS context relocation too. |
| Fujitsu |  | Our replies to Q.1-Q.6 apply for this approach. |
| LG | We are not sure what this question really asks. Specific issue should be discussed case-by-case. |  |
| Intel |  | Yes, we also understand that Q.1-Q.6 seems applicable when switching from SDT to non-SDT (i.e. CONNECTED) via DCCH-based approach |
| NEC |  | Our replies Q 1-6 apply here too. |
| Apple |  | Yes, our replies to Q1-Q6 are applicable on the DCCH-based approach. |
| OPPO |  | Our replies Q 1-6 apply here too. |
| FGI, APT | - | Our previous replies are also applicable here. |
| vivo |  | We share similar views with the above companies. |
| Qualcomm |  | Our replies Q1-Q6 apply here. |
| Xiaomi |  | Our replies to Q.1-Q.6 apply for this approach. |

#### Q.21) for 2nd Phase

This Q.21) is created based on the responses provided during the 1st phase.

1. What is the expected UE behaviour after UE sends DCCH message during an ongoing SDT session? Consider the following options.
2. UE continues with the SDT session ongoing until network informs otherwise to UE by transitioning the UE into RRC\_CONNECTED or releasing the UE into legacy RRC\_INACTIVE or RRC\_IDLE. UE does not expect receiving an explicit confirmation for the reception of the DCCH message.
3. UE expects receiving a confirmation of reception of the DCCH message. If so, clarify the details of this confirmation and the expected UE behaviour when not received.
4. Other options.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Option** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Option 16.2 | Option 16.1 is not acceptable in our opinion. The newly arrived data can be related to latency sensitive applications, e.g. emergency call, and the UE cannot just wait for the SDT procedure to end in case DCCH message was not received by the network. The safest approach would be for the UE to fallback to legacy RRC Resume procedure in case the network does not reply with RRCResume within a certain time (this is why we believe CCCH-based solution makes more sense from the beginning). Alternative could be to move the UE to RRC IDLE, but this would further delay the connection establishment. |
| ZTE | 16.1 or 16.2 | We are not sure if 16.1 and 16.2 are mutually exclusive. Our understanding is also that a network response is needed, but the response will be RRCResume message in DL.With regards to latency of DCCH approach, we don’t think this is any worse than CCCH. There are two cases: * Case1: If there is UL grant available, DCCH message eliminates the need for RACH and RAR (due the unnecessary RACH procedure needed in case of CCCH). Thus it is quicker than CCCH in this case.
* Case 2: If there is no UL grant, both DCCH and CCCH approach will trigger RACH procedure and the MSG3 includes the request to move to RRC\_CONNECTED state

So, in fact, the DCCH approach is at least as good as the CCCH based approach and is better in case there is UL grant to include the DCCH message.  |
| InterDigital | 16.3 | UE should terminate the SDT operation upon data arrival from the non-SDT DRBs. If that’s agreeable, then we don’t need to worry about the UE behaviour of SDT session while in non-SDT session initiation. |
| CATT | 16.1 | Compared with MAC CE solution, DCCH message has more reliability with AM mode. If the UE cannot send the DCCH message to the network successfully, the RRC layer in the UE will receive a failure indicator from RLC. |
| Samsung | 16.1, 16.2 | Same view as ZTE |
| Fujitsu | 16.1) | There seems no problem with carrying on the continuation of SDT after sending DCCH message. If the gNB doesn’t permit to receive SDT data, the gNB would just discard those SDT data. |
| LG | 16.3 | It has to be discussed first whether the UE can send DCCH message while SDT procedure is ongoing. Our view is that the UE should terminate the ongoing SDT procedure and initiate a normal RRCResume procedure, as replied to Q7.If it is assumed that the UE can send DCCH message while SDT procedure is ongoing, the UE then follows legacy behavior. That is, the DCCH uses RLC AM, and we can rely on RLC status report for DCCH reception confirmation. Until the network provides RRCResume, the UE can keep the ongoing SDT procedure. |
| Intel | 16.1) | We agree that network should react to UE’s request of transitioning to RRC\_CONNECTED due to non-SDT data, however final decision should be left up to network implementation as explained by option 16.2. Therefore, UE should continue with SDT while it waits for network instructions. |
| NEC | 16.2 | If the UE sends DCCH to the network to indicate the arriving of non-SDT data, the network need to give a response to the UE in a timely manner. We should align with existing principle as much as possible. |
| Apple | 16.1, 16.2 | Same view as ZTE |
| OPPO | 16.1) |  |
| FGI, APT | 16.1 | It’s simpler (and has less specification impact) if the DCCH approach aims to “inform” but not “request” the network, with regard to the arrival of non-SDT traffic. |
| Lenovo | 16.1, 16.2 | Same view as ZTE, but we think a timer as mentioned by Huawei may be needed after UE sending the DCCH message to avoid the UE waiting the response message all the time. |
| vivo | option 16.1) | In our understanding, the subsequent UL grant or RRC Resume message can be implicitly regarded as a confirmation. This is no strong motivation to introduce a new feedback mechanism.  |
| Qualcomm | 16.1, 16.2 | Same view as ZTE. |
| Xiaomi | 16.1, 16.2 | Same view as ZTE |

### [DCCH point (3)] release from SDT to INACTIVE

#### Q.22) for 2nd Phase

This Q.22) is created based on the responses provided during the 1st phase.

1. When UE generates DCCH message to inform that non-SDT data is available during an ongoing SDT session, what is the expected UE behaviour if the network releases the SDT session before the UE can send the generated DCCH message considering the following options?
2. UE triggers a new RRC Resume procedure (i.e. no changes needed)
3. Other approaches

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Option** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Option 16.1) with comments | We are not sure if we can assume no changes are needed. In our understanding (pending confirmation from CT1), NAS will trigger another resume request to AS layers when non-SDT data arrives. This request will trigger the UE to generate the DCCH message. Then the question arises whether another RRC Resume procedure can be triggered based on the same NAS request or we need to indicate a failure to NAS and wait for another request? In both of these cases, some changes to the current specifications will be most likely needed. |
| ZTE | Option 16.1) | When RRCRelease is received and there is pending data at NAS, then NAS will trigger a new RRCResumeRequest (this is same as today and needs no further discussion). Since new NCC will be there in the RRCRelease message, the next RRCResume can be done normally.  |
| InterDigital | 16.2 | We share Huawei/HiSilicon’s view. |
| CATT | Option 16.1) | When the UE receives RRC release message and enters RRC\_INACTIVE, the AS layer indicates the suspension of the RRC connection to upper layers. According to the current descriptions in TS24.501 below, the NAS layer will trigger a new request to AS layer to transition to RRC\_CONNECTED. Then the AS layer of the UE triggers a new RRC Resume procedure. No change is needed.

|  |
| --- |
| The UE shall transition from 5GMM-CONNECTED mode over 3GPP access to 5GMM-CONNECTED mode with RRC inactive indication upon receiving an indication from the lower layers that the RRC connection has been suspended.NOTE 0: Any pending procedure or uplink data packet when receiving an indication from the lower layers that the RRC connection has been suspended, triggers a request to the lower layers to transition to RRC\_CONNECTED state. This is also the case when the pending procedure or uplink data packet triggered a previous request to the lower layers to transition to RRC\_CONNECTED state. |

 |
| Samsung | 16.1 | Same view as ZTE |
| Fujitsu | 16.1) | We also think that the starting point is the legacy behaviour. |
| LG | 16.1 with comments | We also think some changes are needed in any case. As Huawei mentioned, we have to discuss first whether another RRC Resume procedure can be triggered based on the same NAS request or we need to indicate a failure to NAS and wait for another request. In both cases, some changes are needed.In addition, some changes are also needed for triggering of DCCH message. If there is no ongoing SDT procedure, the UE shall trigger CCCH message according to current specification. If DCCH-based solution is introduced, upon NAS request for non-SDT RB, the UE has to check whether there is ongoing SDT procedure or not to decide which message (CCCH or DCCH) to generate. |
| Intel | 16.1) | Currently network can release/suspend UE’s RRC connection at any time (even when UE’s data is still available in the buffer). If so, UE’s corresponding actions are not defined (unless barring time is provided in release msg). Therefore, we understand that similar behaviour would also apply for SDT. On summary, UE’s actions if SDT session is terminated by the network when non-SDT data is available in UE are left up to UE implementation and no special handling needs to be defined in TS for this scenario. Note that the expected behaviour of a good UE would be triggering a new RRCResumeReq msg (as there is data still on buffers waiting to be sent) as explained in option 16.1. |
| NEC | Option 16.1) with comments | Agree with Huawei’s comments. |
| Apple | 16.1 | Agree with Huawei that some changes may be needed.  |
| OPPO | 16.1) | Agree with ZTE. |
| FGI, APT | Option 16.1) | Same view as ZTE. |
| Lenovo | 16.1 | Same view as ZTE |
| vivo | option 16.1) | We also agree with ZTE. |
| Qualcomm | 16.1 |  |
| Xiaomi | 16.1 | Agree with ZTE. |

### [DCCH point (4)] UL grant availability

#### Q.23) for 2nd Phase

This Q.23) is created based on the responses provided during the 1st phase.

1. What is the expected UE behaviour if there is no UL grant for a UE to send the DCCH message for non-SDT data indication during an ongoing SDT session?

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Companies’ views** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | In this case the UE needs to trigger SR via RACH procedure. This again makes the whole procedure similar to CCCH-based solution and it would be more straightforward to apply it from the beginning in our opinion. |
| ZTE | Yes, in this case RACH procedure will be triggered. * So, if there is no UL grant, then DCCH message will incur an extra RACH procedure (same as CCCH)
* If there is UL grant DCCH approach will avoid the unnecessary RACH procedure, but CCCH approach always requires a RACH procedure and hence the extra latency associated with the RACH procedure to move to connected state.
 |
| InterDigital | UE should trigger a SR (which will end up in RACH procedure initiation) if UE doesn’t have any valid grant for the DCCH message of non-SDT data indication. It needs to be discussed how to uniquely identify the UE from a DCCH message included in Msg3 or MsgA. |
| CATT | In this case the UE would trigger SR via RACH procedure. Compared to CCCH based approach, the UE triggered SR via RACH is not an always-required behaviour with DCCH-based approach. |
| Samsung | RACH will be triggered |
| Fujitsu | We also think that the starting point is the legacy behaviour. It means that SR RACH procedure would be initiated. |
| LG | RACH shall be triggered. Moreover, even if UL grant is enough to send DCCH message, we think RACH shall be triggered, as replied to Q7. The UE terminates the ongoing SDT procedure and initiates a normal RRCResume procedure |
| Intel | RAN2 agreed that “*SR resource is not configured for SDT. When the BSR is triggered by SDT data, the UE will trigger RA because SR resource is not available, same as legacy*”. Therefore, similar operation is assumed for current scenario i.e. UE triggers RA to indicate that non-SDT data is available during the SDT session. We also share ZTE’s view on the related details provided for CCCH vs DCCH based solution. |
| NEC | During the subsequent transmission, if there is no valid UL grant for CCCH, RACH procedure can be triggered. However, during the initial transmission phase, the RACH solution doesn’t work, as we cannot have two parallel RACH procedure, and the UE has to wait until msg4/B reception. And if RRCRelease is received in msg4/B, the DCCH is not able to be transmitted at all, and UE has to start over one RRC Resume procedure as in Q22. To avoid this kinds of situation, we think CCCH based solution which can terminate the SDT procedure immediately is better. |
| Apple | UE shoul trigger RACH to request the UL grant.  |
| OPPO | Trigger RACH. |
| FGI, APT | We prefer UE can choose the CCCH approach when this case happens. If the DCCH approach anyway needs to be performed, UE should trigger RACH (same as CCCH).  |
| Lenovo | SR via RACH as usual |
| vivo | When the BSR is triggered by SDT data, the UE will trigger RA because SR resource is not available, same as legacy. |
| Qualcomm | UE needs to trigger RACH procedure |
| Xiaomi | The UE would trigger RACH. |

# Failure handling during ongoing SDT session

This section aims to understand how failure of an SDT connection could be handled. The main focus of this email discussion is in a failure due to cell reselection during a given SDT session, however companies are invited to provide their inputs in first sections aiming to understand whether a common UE behaviour could be defined regardless of the kind of trigger of the abrupt SDT failure.

## Triggers to an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session

The following triggers were identified by companies as potential triggers that lead to an abrupt termination or failure of an ongoing SDT session:

1. Cell reselection [4][7][8][9][14][18]
2. Expiry of failure detection timer [4][8][18][20]
3. Lower layers indication [4][9]
4. Maximum number of retransmissions is reached in RLC [15][18]
5. Reject reception during SDT [9]
6. Abortion of connection establishment by upper layers (need FFS) [9]
7. Other events
8. Identify the trigger events that leads to an abrupt termination or failure of an ongoing SDT session.

#### Q.24) for 2nd Phase

This Q.24) is created based on previous discussion point.

1. Which previous trigger events or new ones can lead to an abrupt termination or failure of an ongoing SDT session?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Events(s)** | **Comments, if any** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | 1, 2, 3, 4 | Cell reselection is not a failure as such, but we need to specify some UE behaviour for this case. Events 2 and 4 can be treated as SDT failure and also require some UE behaviour to be specified. Event 3 would require to specify some form of RS monitoring in lower layers, e.g. to detect beam failure and we think RAN1 should investigate this. Event 5 can be handled as per legacy behaviour and we do not see it as an “SDT failure”. For RRC Resume abortion it was concluded during the last meeting that it should not be captured in specifications, so we can keep it the same way for SDT. |
| ZTE | 1, 2, 3, 4 | Same view as Huawei on Event 6). Then for Event 5), we have some comments: Considering the data packet may be included in the first UL message (and this is different from legacy reject case), this may lead to some issues with key reuse and hence we propose to not support RRC Reject for SDT. We can discuss this further at next meeting. Events 1-4 seems to be agreeable.  |
| InterDigital | See comment | We think each event has different expected behaviour.1. Cell reselection [4][7][8][9][14][18] [IDC] For cell reselection during ongoing SDT procedure, UE should remain in INACTIVE and transmits an RRC Resume Request at the new cell (still subject to SA3 confirmation)
2. Expiry of failure detection timer [4][8][18][20][IDC] Upon SDT failure detection timer expiry, the UE follows the same procedure as T319 expiry (e.g. UE transitions to IDLE as in the case of expiry of the T319 timer and attempts RRC connection setup).
3. Lower layers indication [4][9][IDC] Upon Lower layer’s failure indication, the UE follows the same procedure as T319 expiry (e.g. UE transitions to IDLE as in the case of expiry of the T319 timer and attempts RRC connection setup).
4. Maximum number of retransmissions is reached in RLC [15][18] [IDC] It should be handled similar way as RLF. So UE should iniate a cell search and is camped on the suitable cell and then initiate the SDT operation at a new serving cell.
5. Reject reception during SDT [9][IDC] UE aborts the SDT operation and performs the legacy procedure for the case of RRCReject reception  (clear keys and stays in INACTIVE)
6. Abortion of connection establishment by upper layers (need FFS) [9][IDC] ditto
7. Other events[IDC] DL data arrival event at gNB also needs to be addressed.
 |
| CATT | Depends on the conclusion on FFS | It is not clear how the failure detection timer works and what lower layer indication is. But we prefer to have a unified UE behaviour if we have concluded an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session due to some events. |
| Samsung | 1, 2 | 3 and 4 are not required to be handled in RRC\_INACTIVE, similar to connection resume procedure. We can simply rely on failure detection timer expiry.5 and 6 can be handled as in legacy |
| Fujitsu | TBD | The failure detection mechanism is not decided yet. Firstly, it should be decided. |
| LG | 1, 2, 3, 4 | We are ok not to consider Event 4 because it is very rare case. |
| Intel | 1, 2, 3, 4 | We understand that event 5) is a termination under network control and therefore should not be categorized/handled as a failure of the SDT session. For event 6), it is not clear when this may be triggered. |
| NEC | 2, 3, 4, 5 | For Event 1), go to IDLE state can be a better option, as SDT procedure is performed above RSRP threshold, cell re-selection during SDT procedure can be a corner case, no strong need for optimization.For Event 6), during last meeting, it ([Post114-e][051]) was agree that if upper layers abort the RRC connection resume procedure after the UE sent  RRCResumeRequest/RRCResumeRequest1 message but not yet entered RRC Connected state, it is up to UE implementation whether to move to RRC\_IDLE state or continue RRC connection resume procedure. So SDT abortion shall not performed.For Event 5), if RRCReject is received, the current SDT procedure should be terminated (e.g. suspend SDT RBs, reset MAC etc), which is not performed in legacy RRC Reject procedure, and then perform the legacy RRC reject procedure. And this is also can be seen as an “abnormal termination” of SDT. |
| Apple | 1,2,3,4 | For event 5 and 6, the UE operation is same as legacy. |
| OPPO | 1, 2 | We are open to include 3 and 4 when more progress is made. |
| FGI, APT | 1,2,3,4 | We have similar view as Huawei that cell reselection isn’t really a failure case (more like abrupt termination) and may need a separate treatment. 2, 3, and 4 are indeed failure cases, with only the difference that 3/4 aims to detects/declares failure earlier than 2. |
| Lenovo | 1,2,4 | Not clear about 3.  |
| vivo | 1,2 | For 3, 4, it seems optimizations since we already have the SDT failure detection timer. As long as this timer is running, the UE should be allowed to keep SDT attempts, this is similar to the case where UE can keep RA attempts even though the transmission counter has reached the threshold.For 5, we can reuse the legacy rule.For 6, we think some input from CT1 might be needed (e.g. whether this case will occur or not). |
| Qualcomm | 1,2,3,4 |  |
| Xiaomi | 1,2,3,4 |  |

## UE’s action upon detecting an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session

It is also discussed by [4][18][8] whether a common UE behaviour when any of the applicable trigger events from previous Discussion point 13) that lead to an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session.

1. Having a common UE behaviour when any of the applicable trigger events from previous Discussion point 13) lead to an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session.

### Q.25) for 2nd Phase

This Q.25) is created based on previous discussion point.

1. Do you support aiming to have a common UE behaviour when any of the applicable trigger events from previous Q.24) lead to an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session?

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Yes/No** | **Justification** |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Yes | CCCH-based approach can easily be reused to handle at least cases 1, 2 and 4. This is not possible with DCCH-based approach as DCCH message needs to be sent over a dedicated grant and requires having a stable radio connection. How to handle event 3 depends on the details of lower layers indication, e.g. how much it resembles the current beam failure indications etc. (which should be decided by RAN1). |
| ZTE | Yes | The common UE behaviour should be either:1. UE moves to IDLE mode and informs NAS (e.g. NAS recovery is performed) or
2. UE stays in RRC\_INACTIVE state and initiates PDCP reestablishment based approach.

We prefer option 2). However, we are now a bit concerned that the time remaining in Rel-17 may not be enough for us to solve all the open issues associated with option 2. If we cannot reach a quick consensus on how to handle this, we may have to live with option 1 in Rel-17 |
| InterDigital | No | See our comment for Q.24). |
| CATT | Yes | We prefer to have a unified UE behaviour for all applicable trigger events. |
| Samsung | yes | State transition and data loss recovery mechanism can be same |
| Fujitsu | Yes | We think that the starting point is the common behaviour rather than optimizing behaviour case by case. |
| LG | No | Events 1~4 can be handled in a common way. However, we are not sure other events can be handled in the common way. |
| Intel | Yes | We support handling the same handling for any of the abrupt termination/failures of an SDT session.  |
| NEC | Yes | We prefer to have unified solution for all the events, and CCCH-like mechanism can be reused. |
| Apple | Yes | The unified UE behavior is prefered, and UE can go back to the INACTIVE state.  |
| OPPO | Yes |  |
| FGI, APT | No | Cell reselection can be treated separately (allow UE to remain in RRC\_INACTIVE), while the rest can have a common solution (UE goes to RRC\_IDLE). |
| Lenovo | Yes | A common UE behaviour for all cases. |
| vivo | Yes | It helps to reduce UE complexity. |
| Qualcomm | Yes | UE goes to IDLE as a common UE behavior, in which the legacy can be largely reused. |
| Xiaomi | Yes |  |

The following approaches are proposed when having to handle abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session:

1. UE transitions autonomously into RRC\_IDLE.
2. UE remains in RRC\_INACTIVE.

For example, for cell reselection trigger event, approach 1) is proposed by [16][14] and approach 2) by [7][12][13][18][20][21][4][10]. The following sub-sections aims to clarify how each approach may work taken into consideration the inputs from proposing companies. The following sub-sections aims to clarify how the approach 2) may work taken into consideration the inputs from proposing companies.

### Approach 2) UE remains in RRC\_INACTIVE

This section aims to clarify how approach 2) would work like, i.e. UE remains in RRC\_INACTIVE upon detecting an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session. The motivation to enable this mechanism is to guarantee data continuity, and minimize/prevent data loss and duplication of the ongoing SDT session. Upon detecting this failure, the UE shall immediately initiate a sub-sequent access. It is important to keep in mind that the feasibility of this approach 2) depends on the inputs to be provided by SA3 in relation to the security related LS [23] sent by RAN2.

1. Upon UE detects an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session and remains into legacy RRC\_INACTIVE, the UE shall immediately initiate a request to resume the suspended RRC connection or to (re)start the SDT session

This sub-sequent access after the failure (referred for this discussion as “recovery solution”) is explained by supporting companies from different angles and levels of details. For example:

* **Recovery solution 0)** UE suspends SDT DRBs and PDCP entities upon failure and performs SDT/RRC Resume procedure in the reselected new cell [12][20][7][13].
* **Recovery solution 1)** serving gNB provides a new NCC and I-RNTI upon initiating any SDT mechanism (i.e. 1st DL SDT msg) for future use after current SDT session ends or terminates [4][14].
* **Recovery solution 2)** gNB provides new NCC/RNTI immediately after an abrupt termination of the SDT session with UE’s behaviour aligned with RRC Reestablishment message operation continuing the SDT session in RRC\_INACTIVE [4].
* **Recovery solution 3)** UE uses horizonal key derivation for the recovery mechanism after an abrupt termination of an SDT session (where data uses this new key but short MAC-I may still be calculated based on the stored key) [4].
* **Recovery solution 4)** Assuming that SA3 informs that NCC and I-RNTI can be reused in a different cell, the recovery solution for cell reselection case works as follows [14][18]:
	+ The *RRCResumeRequest* is routed to the old anchor gNB and the old anchor gNB shall be able to verify the UE and generate new keys irrespective of whether anchor relocation and path switch happens before in the SDT session – needs to be checked with RAN3
	+ The new key is derived for the new cell (using the same NCC and the KgNB in the stored UE inactive context, but using new PCI/ARFCN)
	+ PDCP based recovery mechanism is used to recover the lost/unacknowledged data whilst the UE Stays in RRC\_INACTIVE state

On summary, the recovery solutions 1)-4) explained above aim to define a mechanism that address the following concerns:

* Security concerns, such as, b.1) if new NCC is not provided after the failure of the SDT session, b.2) the NCC to be used for the follow up *RRCResumeRequest* in the recovery, and b.3) if the Data PDCP COUNT reset as the same key cannot be used with same count.
* Concerns of additional delay or even confusion when looking for the gNB where UE’s context was previously stored. I.e. I-RNTI stored in UE points to the anchor gNB when the new serving gNB has a copy of the UE AS context or is actually already relocated.

These concerns are common to some of the ones discussed in previous section sections, therefore the suggestion is to discuss them for the failure handling scenario keeping in mind the details/options provided in the corresponding previous points.

1. When a UE detects a failure of an ongoing SDT session and remains in RRC\_INACTIVE, UE shall initiate immediately a recovery mechanism (e.g. via SDT or resume) and the following sub-topics needs to also be addressed for this specific scenario (in relation to the 2nd resume procedure):
	1. Previous Discussion point 3) Resume Cause value for the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg.
	2. Previous Discussion point 4) and Discussion point 5) on the PDCP COUNT and/or security key to be used.
	3. Previous Discussion point 6) on which key is used for the generation of the *resumeMAC-I*.
	4. Previous Discussion point 7) on the identification of UE AS context in the network when the ongoing SDT session is with UE AS context relocation.
	5. Previous Discussion point 8) on the network handling of the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* and the *RRCResume* messages.

#### Q.26) for 2nd Phase

This Q.26) is created based on previous discussion point.

1. When a UE detects a failure of an ongoing SDT session and remains in RRC\_INACTIVE, UE shall initiate immediately a recovery mechanism (e.g. via SDT or resume). Please indicate if your responses provided for previous Q.11) to Q.16) are not applicable for this specific scenario (in relation to the 2nd resume procedure) and if so, please explain the different behaviour/operation.
	1. Previous Q.11) Resume Cause value for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg.
	2. Previous Q.12) and Q.13) on the PDCP COUNT and/or security key to be used.
	3. Previous Q.14) on which key is used for the generation of the resumeMAC-I.
	4. Previous Q.15) on the identification of UE AS context in the network when the ongoing SDT session is with UE AS context relocation.
	5. Previous Q.16) on the network handling of the 2nd RRCResumeRequest and the RRCResume messages.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Q.11) to Q.16) with responses not applicable here** | **Justification on the different behaviour/operation for the specific question**  |
| Huawei, HiSilicon |  | All our replies are applicable to this case as well and the common approach can be used for both non-SDT data indication, cell reselection and potentially other “failure” cases in case CCCH-based solution is used. |
| ZTE |  | Our answers are also applicable here. Then, if we go with a solution to support for all these Events, then we need to discuss whether the UE needs to send an UL message to indicate the failure case and we need to agree on the contents of this UL message (e.g. indicating the event that caused the error – e.g. event 1), 2), 3) 4)), other information included in this message etc. Then we can decide which message to use.  |
| InterDigital |  | Our replies are applicable for the scenario. |
| CATT |  | The UE may perform cell reselection again after the first cell reselection. We wonder how to handle the case when the UE remains in RRC\_INACTIVE and initiates a recovery mechanism after detection of a failure of an on-going SDT session. Would a 3rd RRCResumeRequest msg be initiated? |
| Samsung |  | Replies are applicable for this scenario |
| Fujitsu |  | Our replies to Q.11-Q.16 apply for this specific scenario.Failure indication can be considered, but existing failure indication would be the starting point.Cell reselection can also be considered, but existing cell reselection mechanism would also be the starting point. |
| LG | We are not sure what this question really asks. Specific issue should be discussed case-by-case. |  |
| Intel | Q.14) may require further discussion as the recovery mechanism may be done with a new gNB. If so, the options 6.e and 6.d may not work (as the security key used during SDT session with gNB\_2 should not be reused with the new gNB\_3). Therefore options 6.b) and 6.c) may be more suitable.However as discussed in previous Q.14), to determine which approach may be preferable for this, SA3/RAN3 input/confirmation may be required as there are many factors to consider such as PDCP COUNT is reset, whether anchoring is used, which node processes ResumeMac-I, C-RNTI used for ResumeMAC-I calculation. | We understand that our responses to Q.11) to Q.16) are applicable for the new recovery mechanism to handle an abrupt termination of an SDT session (considering the comments provided on the other column). However, it is important to understand why CCCH based approach may be suitable for a failure scenario (discussed here) but not for a normal handling (discussed in previous section 3.2) to enable the switch from SDT to RRC\_CONNECTED. * The switch from an ongoing (SDT to RRC\_CONNECTED is a normal scenario that could happen frequently. For non-SDT data scenario, UE has an ongoing communication with gNB, therefore it seems preferable keeping the control in the network side on when to initiate the switch (as allowed by DCCH based operation), instead of allowing the UE to autonomously break/stop and ongoing SDT session in order to resume the connection.
* The recovery mechanism after an abrupt termination of an SDT session may not be as frequent scenario. When this happens the communication between UE and gNB is already broken. Therefore, CCCH like approach should be used which allows the UE autonomously to initiate the recovery mechanism (w/o network control).

The following flow for failure recovery involving gNB3 figure also highlights the difference to CCCH:  |
| NEC |  | Our replies are applicable for the scenario. |
| OPPO |  | Our replies are applicable for the scenario. |
| FGI, APT |  | Our previous replies are also applicable here. |
| vivo |  | We share similar views with above companies. |
| Qualcomm | - | We prefer to Approach 1) UE transitions autonomously into RRC\_IDLE. |
| Xiaomi |  | Our replies are applicable for the scenario. |

# Summary report from 2nd Phase (including proposals)

This report summarizes the views of 16 companies provide their views to the 2nd phase of this email discussion (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, InterDigital, CATT, Samsung, Fujitsu, LG, Intel, NEC, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)

Aiming to help with the review of the report, **hyperlinks** to the different questions of the 2nd phase are added in the “Q.#” added in each section header of the report below. In addition, to help with the meeting discussion/progress, the proposals are categorized starting with: **[To agree]** when there is large support and hence proposed for easy agreement, and **[To discuss]** when there is substantial level of support and agreement may be possible.

The proposals also start with a number: for the format [x], ‘x’ represents the number of supportive companies (i.e. these solutions are marked as FFS as the proposed solutions were not discussed by all companies) and, for the format [x/y], ‘x’ represents the number of supportive companies, and (y-x) the number of companies with different view.

## Topic #1: Handling to switch from SDT to CONNECTED during an ongoing SDT session without UE AS context relocation

### Option 1.a) Network releases the UE back into RRC\_INACTIVE when anchor relocation is required in the middle of an SDT session

#### Q.1) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *”Q.1) For previous option 1.a), is there any mechanism needed to* ***prevent data loss*** *in case UE is moved back to INACTIVE state”*

* No: 14 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, InterDigital, CATT, Samsung, Fujitsu, LG, Intel, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi). It is explained:
	+ PDCP SDUs are not discarded when the UE moves to RRC INACTIVE, i.e. data loss can be prevented.
	+ Some companies acknowledged that redundancy of PDCP PDUs may happen.
	+ Optimizations, if any, are up to UE or network implementation to prevent data loss or duplication in DL and UL.
* Yes: 1 company (ZTE).
	+ [ZTE] Option (1.a) does not resolve the issues of avoiding redundancy or ensuring the delivery in order of PDCP PDUs. Moreover it is clarified that RAN2 agreed to a lossless delivery.
* Maybe: 2 companies (Intel, NEC). It is explained:
	+ [NEC] For SDT SRB, both PDCP PDUs and SDUs are discarded during the PDCP re-establishment in the subsequent RRC resume procedure
1. **[To agree] [14/16]** No new solution is defined to address the scenario where the anchor relocation is required in the middle of an SDT session, i.e. network relies on releasing the UE back into RRC\_INACTIVE. For this approach, data loss can be minimized by network and UE implementation, but data duplication may happen.

### Option 1.b) New mechanism that allow performing anchor relocation in the middle of an SDT session in order to switch from SDT to CONNECTED

#### Q.2) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *” Q.2) Is the following understanding confirmed:* *for the scenario where anchor relocation is performed in the middle of an ongoing SDT session, the security key is updated to meet SA3 requirement that the* ***same security key is not re-used in two nodes****?”*

* Check with SA3 on whether this is an issue: 13 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, CATT, Samsung, LG, Intel, NEC, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon] Scenario might be different than legacy because all the messages are anyway sent over the air interface between serving gNB and the UE (i.e. between the UE and a single gNB, not two different gNBs).
		- [Huawei-HiSilicon] The security issue may only be with *RRCResume* msg as right after resuming the connection, the serving gNB can perform security key update based on the new NCC received from AMF during Path Switch.

**[Rapporteur’s input]** How the security is updated in UE after resume might require clarification (e.g. does network trigger HO procedure immediately after Resume proc. or adding NCC to Resume message).

* + [NEC] PDCP location is changed, but the radio link is not changed
* Yes: 7 companies (ZTE, InterDigital, CATT, Fujitsu, Intel, OPPO, FGI-APT,)
	+ [ZTE] Handling of the pending PDCP entity will then need to be performed
	+ [InterDigital] AS keys should be updated upon change of anchoring point
1. **[To agree] [14/16]** If a new mechanism is defined to enable the scenario where anchor relocation is performed in the middle of an ongoing SDT session to move UE to CONNECTED, RAN2 needs to check with SA3 if the security key needs to be updated in order to meet SA3 requirement that the same security key is not re-used in two nodes or not.

#### Q.3) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.3) Assuming that RAN2 confirms in previous point in Q.2) (i.e. “the scenario where anchor relocation is performed in the middle of an ongoing SDT session, the security key is updated”), The following points summarize suggested RAN2 solutions to be confirmed for the* ***new mechanism that updates the security key*** *when performing anchor relocation in the middle of an ongoing SDT session. Please indicate your view on the solution points listed below and/or if you propose new ones to consider.”*

* Solution Point 3) (which seems the same as option 1.a) discussed in Q.1)): 12 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, Samsung, Fujitsu, LG, Intel, Apple, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ [ZTE] UE shall trigger the next resume procedure using normal rules.
	+ [CATT] Points that solution point 2) introduces additional delay
	+ [Samsung] Assuming that SA3 confirms that security key needs to be updated.
* Solution Point 1) & Solution Point 2): 2 companies (Intel, OPPO)
* Solution Point 2) (which seems same as RRC Conn. Reestablishment): 1 company (InterDigital)
	+ [CATT] Points that solution point 3) introduces additional delay

**[Rapporteur’s input]** Majority of companies supports solution point 3) which is the same as option 1.a) of Q.1), therefore corresponding proposal is already addressed in related summary report section 5.1.1.1.

#### Q.4) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.4) The following questions/points are suggested to be asked/informed to RAN3 in order to enable the new mechanism that allows the switching from SDT to RRC\_CONECTED during an ongoing SDT session where the UE context was not relocated by the network (as explained in previous option 1.b). Please indicate if you do not agree to include any of them and/or if you propose new questions to be shared with RAN3”*

* Not to send any question: 7 companies (ZTE, Samsung, LG, Apple, Lenovo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ [ZTE] Wait until solution details are discussed for Topic #1.
	+ [Apple] Check with SA3 first before asking RAN3.
* Not to include Q4.1): 6 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, Fujitsu, NEC, OPPO, FGI-APT, vivo)
* Not to include Q4.2): 6 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, Fujitsu, NEC, OPPO, FGI-APT, vivo)
* Not to include Q4.3): 7 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, InterDigital, Fujitsu, NEC, OPPO, FGI-APT, vivo)
* Not to include Q4.4): 7 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, InterDigital, Fujitsu, NEC, OPPO, FGI-APT, vivo)
* Not to include Q4.5): 4 companies (Fujitsu, NEC, OPPO, vivo)
* Not to include Q4.6): 3 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, CATT, FGI-APT)
* Include all Q4.1) to Q4.6): companies (Intel)
	+ [Intel] If (and only if) RAN2 agrees to enable the mechanism explained by option 1.b).

**[Rapporteur’s input]** No proposal is suggested as there is larger support not to ask any question to RAN3 yet until solution details are progressed or SA3’s input is gotten.

#### Q.5) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.5) The following questions/points are suggested to be asked/informed to SA3 in order to enable a new mechanism that allows the switching from SDT to RRC\_CONECTED during an ongoing SDT session where the UE context was not initially relocated by the network during SDT (as explained in* ***previous option 1.b).*** *Please indicate if you do not agree to include any of them and/or if you propose new questions to share with SA3.”*

* Not to include Q5.1): 10 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, Fujitsu, LG, NEC, OPPO, FGI-APT, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
* Include Q5.1): 5 companies (InterDigital, Samsung, Intel, Apple, Lenovo,)
	+ [Samsung, vivo] Refers to the question/description ask in Q.2) better than the wording in Q5.1)

**[Rapporteur’s input]** No proposal is suggested as there is larger support not to send Q5.1) to SA3 if a simple solution of moving UE back to INACTIVE (option 1.a)) is adopted. Although some companies are open to consider this topic as part of previous Q.2. Proposal in summary report of Q2 (section 5.1.2.1) addresses related topic.

## Topic #2: Radio bearer handling when switching from SDT to CONNECTED

**Observation 2. (from 1st phase)** When switching from SDT to CONNECTED, it is left up to network implementation that the data exchanged before triggering the fallback to resume is not lost (i.e. UE does not need to retransmit it) and SDT related data traffic can continue after UE gets CONNECTED.

### Q.6) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.6) When UE receives RRCResume message during an ongoing SDT session or in response to RRCResumeRequest message sent for SDT (i.e. switch from SDT to CONNECTED), how are the* ***PDCP entities handled****?*

* Option 2.a): 12 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, InterDigital, CATT, Fujitsu, Intel, NEC, Apple, FGI-APT, Lenovo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ Option 2.a) is “*PDCP entities for only the non-SDT RBs are re-established (i.e., SDT RBs are not re-established as were already resumed for the SDT session)”*
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon, Interdigital, CATT, Fujitsu, Intel, NEC, Apple, FGI-APT, Lenovo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi] Option 2.a) applies if same security key is used e.g. for anchor relocation case or in case serving gNB is already an anchor when SDT is triggered.
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon, InterDigital, CATT, Intel] Option 2.a) only applies if security key is not updated
	+ [ZTE] Option 2.a) should be baseline one.
* Option 2.c) : 13 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, InterDigital, CATT, Samsung, Fujitsu, LG, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon, InterDigital, CATT, Fujitsu, Intel, NEC, Apple, FGI-APT, Lenovo] (new) option 2.c.1) all RBs need to be re-established if new keys are going to be used e.g. for non-anchor relocation case
	+ [ZTE, Samsung, LG, OPPO, vivo] UE follows network configuration
		- [ZTE] (new) network indicates the RBs to re-establish when performing reconfiguration with sync but existing signaling already supports this.
		- [LG, vivo] Network can indicate whether PDCP entities are or not re-established via RRCResume msg. (applicable even for SDT RBs)
		- [OPPO] Network indicates whether PDCP entities are reestablished in *RRCRelease* msg.

**[Rapporteur’s input]** No proposal is added for non-anchor relocation case as there was not a large support to provide new keys when relocating the context in the middle of the SDT session (as summarized in section 5.1.2)

1. **[To agree] [13/16] [option 2.c)]** The PDCP entities of only the non-SDT RBs are re-established (i.e. not for the SDT RBs) unless any new security keys are derived during the switch from SDT to CONNECTED (i.e. when UE receives *RRCResume* message during an SDT session). Current signalling (e.g. resume) can be used by the network to re-establish these PDCP entities as required.

## Non-SDT data handling during ongoing SDT session

### Topic #3: non-SDT Data available when “starting” an SDT session

#### Q.7) - report of 2nd Phase

“*Scenario 1) When non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure (i.e. UE sends RACH preamble), but 1st UL RRC message has not been sent yet. This could be when UE has already sent PRACH preamble when using 4-step RA-SDT. Scenario 1) only targets RA-SDT.”*

The summary report to *“Q.7) What is the expected UE behaviour for* ***scenario 1)*** *when non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure (i.e. RACH preamble is sent) but 1st UL RRC message has not been sent yet?”*

* This scenario is a corner case one: 5 companies (ZTE, InterDigital, Samsung, Intel, Qualcomm)
* Handling for this scenario is left up to UE implementation: 5 companies (LG, Intel, Apple, vivo, Qualcomm)
* For CCCH-based solution, UE terminates RACH proc. and initiate a new non-SDT RACH proc.: 8 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, InterDigital, Samsung, NEC, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo)
* For DCCH-based solution, UE continues current RACH proc.: 5 companies (ZTE, InterDigital, Samsung, OPPO, Lenovo)
* An unified UE behaviour is preferable: 6 companies (CATT, Samsung, Fujitsu, NEC, Lenovo, Xiaomi)

**[Rapporteur’s input]** No proposal is suggested as majority of companies’ prefers following option (1) the same mechanism as when non-SDT data is detect (which is discussed in detailed in separate sections for CCCH-based and DCCH-based solution), or option (2) the handling is left up to UE implementation. However for either option no specification change seems required to support this scenario beyond the behaviour specified for CCCH/DCCH solution (1).

#### Q.8) - report of 2nd Phase

*“Scenario 2) When non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure and has sent the 1st UL RRC message + data successfully, but contention resolution has not been received by UE in Msg.4/Msg.B. Scenario 2) only targets RA-SDT.”*

The summary report to *“Q.8) What is the expected UE behaviour for* ***scenario 2)*** *when non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure and has sent the 1st UL RRC message + data successfully, but contention resolution has not been received by UE in Msg.4/Msg.B?”*

* Majority of companies shares the views provided to Q7.
* [vivo] Suggest postponing the discussion until RAN2 addresses whether BSR reporting for suspended DRB is allowed.

**[Rapporteur’s input]** No need to address this scenario here – see report of related Q.7) in section 5.3.1.1.

#### Q.9) - report of 2nd Phase

“*Scenario x) When non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure and has sent the 1st UL RRC message + data via CG resource, but UE has not received any feedback during the CG response window. Scenario x) only targets CG-SDT.”*

The summary report to *“Q.9) What is the expected UE behaviour for* ***scenario x)*** *when non-SDT Data becomes available after UE has initiated an SDT procedure and has sent the 1st UL RRC message +data via CG resource, but UE has not received any feedback during the CG response window?”*

* Majority of companies shares the views provided to Q7 and/or Q8.

**[Rapporteur’s input]** No need to address this scenario here – see report of related Q.7) in section 5.3.1.1.

### [CCCH point (1)] Detection of non-SDT data

**Observation 3. (from 1st phase)** For CCCH-based approach, UE autonomously triggers the end or the release of ongoing SDT session upon detecting the non-SDT data.

#### Q.10) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.10) For CCCH-based approach, upon UE autonomously triggers the end or the release of ongoing SDT session, what is the expected “****PDCP suspend operation****” considering previous options 1.x or new ones?”*

* Option 1.a): 7 companies (CATT, LG, Intel, Apple, OPPO, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)

Option 1.c): 8 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, Fujitsu, LG, Intel, Apple, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo)

* + Option 1.a) is “*Legacy behaviour - PDCP is suspended, and PDUs flushed. If PDCP suspend operation is done upon UE autonomously triggers the end or the release of ongoing SDT session, UE/network may not be able to detect data duplication and prevent data loss. This is also explained by Observation 6 in next section 3.2.4. This is also related to the discussion in next section 3.2.4.* ”
	+ Option 1.c) is “*Legacy behaviour with horizontal key derivation using the key derived after the first RRCResume as the base key - PDCP is suspended and PDUs flushed, the UE and RAN derive new KgNB\* horizontally, which is used for new UP and CP keys calculation. This way issue mentioned in section 3.2.4 is avoided*”. However Rapporteur clarified that this new option 1.c) is already covered by option 1.a) that assume legacy behaviour of the PDCP handling i.e. “PDCP is suspended, and PDUs flushed” (understanding that the security mechanism to be used (e.g. horizontal key derivation) is discussed in next Q.14)).
		- [ZTE, Samsung, FGI-APT] Horizontal key derivation may not always work as the keys between network and UE will go out of sync in this case e.g. when the network may not have received the first RRCResume message.
		- [ZTE, Samsung, FGI-APT, Lenovo] If the horizontal key derivation based on the initial derived key is used for the 2nd RRCResume procedure, an indication is needed in the RRCResumeReq to indicate that this is the 2nd RRCResumeReq
	+ [Intel] UE and network may not be able to detect data duplication and to prevent data loss.
	+ [NEC, OPPO] Option 1.a) requires that new keys can be obtained in the second RRC Resume procedure
	+ [Qualcomm] Option 1.c) if there is any security issue.
	+ [Xiaomi] SA3 new solution defined to avoid the replay attack for RRCResuemeRequest message could be re-used here.
* Option 1.b): 5 companies (ZTE, Samsung, Intel, NEC, OPPO)
	+ Option 1.b) is *“New behaviour - PDCP suspend operation is not done or changed upon UE autonomously triggers the end or the release of ongoing SDT session. PDCP SN is not reset and PDUs are not flushed. If so, it needs to be clarified if network needs to distinguish between the 1st and 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg. and the corresponding different actions would need to be addressed. This is related to Discussion point 3) in next section 3.2.3.”*
	+ [Intel] UE and network needs to be aligned/synched on not resetting the PDCP COUNT and not flushing the PDCP PDUs.
	+ [NEC, OPPO] Option 1.b) requires that the keys are maintained
	+ [Lenovo] what about PDCP entity for non-SDT DRB, will it be associated to the key applied by the SDT procedure?
* [Interdigital] Option 1.x) New keys are derived in the middle of the switch (which leads to a re-establishment of the PDCP).
* [ZTE, Samsung, FGI-APT] which key is used for 2nd RRCResume procedure needs to be clarified: option 1) key stored in the UE INACTIVE AS context (which would follow legacy resume proc.) vs option 2) new key derived after 1st RRCResume procedure. Option 2) should be used for CCCH-based approach.

**[Rapporteur’s input]** Understanding that option 1.c) is a subpoint of option 1.a), a total of 12 companies supported the approach explained for the expected “PDCP suspend operation”. Note that the security key handling is summarized in the report of Q.14 in next section 5.3.6.1.

1. **[To agree] [12/16] [Option 1.a) & 1.c)]** For CCCH-based approach, upon UE autonomously triggers the end or the release of ongoing SDT session, PDCP is suspended and PDUs flushed.

### [CCCH point (2)] RACH, UAC associated with the 2nd resume proc.

**Observation 4. (from 1st phase)** When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, AS applies UAC and initiates random access procedure same as any legacy UE in RRC\_INACTIVE.

### [CCCH point (3)] Resume cause

#### Q.11) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.11)* *When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, is there any needed for the network to differentiate that this UE had an SDT session ongoing and is sending a 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg., for example by including a new value of the resume cause?”*

* Yes: 14 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, InterDigital, CATT, Samsung, Fujitsu, LG, Intel, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm)
	+ [Intel] For option 1.b) of Q10), i.e. PDCP suspend operation is not done, gNB needs to differentiate that this UE had an ongoing SDT session that was terminated abruptly by UE and UE is requesting a immediate request to resume the connection in order to continue the data transmission in RRC\_CONNECTED
	+ New indication send to differentiate the 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg.
		- Not needed [Huawei-HiSilicon, InterDigital, Fujitsu, LG, NEC, Apple, OPPO, vivo]
			* gNB differentiates the 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg implicitly via the I-RNTI [Huawei-HiSilicon, InterDigital]
			* gNB internal counter (not-standardized) can be used for this [Fujitsu]
			* when gNB can identify the UE as first SDT transmission is successful [Apple, OPPO]
		- Needed [ZTE, CATT, Samsung, FGI-APT, Lenovo, Qualcomm]
			* When UE uses horizontal key derivation for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest [ZTE, Samsung, FGI-APT]
			* when gNB cannot identify the UE e.g. if first SDT transmission is not successful [Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT]
		- FFS [Intel]
* No: companies (Intel, NEC, Xiaomi)
	+ [Intel] For option 1.a) of Q10), i.e. PDCP suspend operation follows legacy suspend/resume, gNB does not need to know that UE had an ongoing SDT session
	+ [Xiaomi] SA3 new solution defined to avoid the replay attack for RRCResuemeRequest message could be re-used here.
1. **[To agree] [14/16]** ForCCCH-based approach, when switching from SDT to non-SDT, network should be able to differentiate that this UE had an SDT session ongoing and is sending a 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg, **[8/16]** If horizonal key derivation is not done, network can differentiate the 2nd access implicitly (e.g. via I-RNTI and gNB’s implementation) and a new indication is not needed. **[6/16]** If horizonal key derivation is done, network can differentiate the 2nd access with a new indication sent in that 2nd RRCResumeRequest. Note: whether horizontal key derivation is done is discussed in next Proposal 8.

### [CCCH point (4)] PDCP COUNT and/or security key to be used

**Observation 5. (from 1st phase)** The mechanism to be defined that enables the switch from SDT to non-SDT shall meet the following NR requirement: the same PDCP COUNT value is not used more than once for a given security key.

**Observation 6. (from 1st phase)** When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, if the PDCP count is reset upon detecting non-SDT data during an ongoing SDT session, the UE/network may not be able to detect data duplication and prevent data loss during the transitioning into RRC\_CONNECTED.

#### Q.12) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.12) When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, is the current behavior of* ***resetting the PDCP count for RBs*** *during the resume procedure applicable after the 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg?”*

* Yes: 13 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, InterDigital, CATT, Samsung, Fujitsu, Intel, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, InterDigital, Samsung, Intel, Apple, OPPO, Lenovo, Qualcomm] Yes but only when the new key is derived at the UE e.g. using Horizontal key derivation for second *RRCResumeRequest* msg
	+ [ZTE, Intel] Lossless data (i.e. in order delivery without redundancy) might not be guarantee when PDCP COUNT is reset
	+ [Intel] Security related concerns need to be addressed as discussed in next questions (SA3 dependencies)
* No: 10 companies (InterDigital, Samsung, LG, Intel, NEC, Apple, OPPO, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm)
	+ [InterDigital, Samsung, Intel, Apple, Lenovo, Qualcomm] When key is not updated during the switch.
	+ [LG, vivo] PDCP count values are set only when PDCP suspend is requested by RRC, and the RRC requests PDCP suspend when the RRCRelease message is received
	+ [NEC] It is preferable to handle the issue in RAN2 (i.e. retain COUNT value) instead of impacting SA3 (if new keys were provided)
1. **[To agree]** ForCCCH-based approach, when switching from SDT to non-SDT, RAN2 needs to choose between options 1 and 2 not to use the same PDCP COUNT and security key. **[13/16] [Option 1)]** PDCP COUNT is reset, when the security key is updated. **[10/16] [Option 2)]** PDCP COUNT is maintained (i.e. not reset), when the security key is not updated. Note: whether security key needs to be updated is discussed in next Proposal 7 and Proposal 8.

#### Q.13) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.13) When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach and* ***if the PDCP COUNT is reset****, how can the reuse of the same PDCP COUNT and the same security key for the RBs be prevented?”*

* Security key is updated (when PDCP COUNT is reset): 13 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, InterDigital, CATT, Fujitsu, Intel, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ Horizontal derivation is used to update the security key for the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest*: 9 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, Fujitsu, LG, Intel, OPPO, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm)
	+ Network provides updated security key right after getting RRC\_CONNECTED: 5 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, LG, Apple, OPPO, Lenovo)
		- [Apple] Network provides new security key for non-SDT access that follows a previous SDT session (i.e. after 1st UL SDT transmission success)
	+ New procedure at UE before and after contention resolution (ZTE).
	+ [InterDigital] Whether security key is or not updated depends on SA3 input.
	+ [Intel] The usage of the same security keys should be prevented by one of the mechanisms discussed in next Q.14).
* If key is not updated, COUNT is not reset: 4 companies (Samsung, LG, NEC, Apple)
	+ [Apple] Reuse of same key and PDCP COUNT is ok when non-SDT access is before the 1st UL SDT transmission is successfully received by the network.

**[Rapporteur’s input]** Inputs here are included in the report of next Q.14) are companies’ responses are addressing similar details (mainly in the support of horizontal derivation to update the security key for the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg and whether network provides updated security key right after getting RRC\_CONNECTED).

### [CCCH point (5)] security associated resume MAC-I (dependent on SA3 outcome)

#### Q.14) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.14) When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, which previous option 6.x or new option is preferable* ***to calculate the key used for generating the resumeMAC-I for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg****. (understanding that some of this is dependent on SA3 outcome)?”*

* Preference dependent on SA3’s input: 9 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, Intel, Samsung, LG, NEC, Apple, Lenovo, Qualcom)
* Option 6.d): 11 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, Intel, Samsung, LG, NEC, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Xiaomi)
	+ option 6.d) is “*UE’s KRRCint key stored in UE Inactive AS Context i.e. same as for legacy RRCResumeRequest which was also used when the SDT session was started (before initiating ongoing switch to non-SDT) (this may depend on the SA3 conclusion)*.”
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, Samsung, LG, NEC, Apple, Lenovo] Baseline solution if SA3 indicates that security key can be re-used.
		- [Intel] If the security is re-used, the PDCP COUNT is not reset (as discussed in Q.12)).
	+ [LG] If SA3 has concerns with option 6.d), other options can be discussed
	+ [Intel] Clarifies that Option 6.d) uses the same securityKey\_0 used for 1st RRCResumeRequest when initiating the SDT session and for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest (as shown in a Figure)
	+ [Intel] Potential issue #1 (for options 6.e)/6.a) and 6.d)): if anchor gNB (gNB\_1) is not relocated during the SDT session, gNB2 would use the same securityKey\_1 for the data after 2nd RRCResumeReq is sent
	+ [Intel] Potential issue #2 (for options 6.d)): If anchor gNB (gNB\_1) is fully relocated to serving gNB (gNB\_2) during the SDT session, gNB\_2 is not aware of securityKey\_0. This would depend on RAN3 design of the context relocation for SDT operation.
	+ [Intel] Potential issue #3 (for options 6.d)): After 2nd RRCResumeReq is sent, SA3 would need to confirm whether the same securityKey\_1 used during the SDT session can be used when switching to CONNECTED as it may not provide key separation between nodes (depending on which node processes the ResumeMAC-I).
	+ In Q.13) report of 2nd phased (captured in section 5.3.5.2), the following 5 companies supported that network provides updated security key right after getting RRC\_CONNECTED (Huawei-HiSilicon, LG, Apple, OPPO, Lenovo)
* Option 6.e): 4 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, Intel, CATT, Fujitsu, Lenovo)
	+ option 6.e) is “*UE’s new KRRCint key i.e. the one calculated when triggering SDT”.*
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon] If SA3 has a security concern with re-using the same security key.
	+ [Intel] option 6.a) and 6.e) seems the same, and clarifies that UE uses the NCC\_1 (that was provided in last *RRCRelease* msg) to generate *resumeMAC-I* included in 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* (as shown in a Figure).
	+ [Intel] Potential issue #1 (for options 6e)/6.a) and 6.d)): if anchor gNB (gNB\_1) is not relocated during the SDT session, gNB2 would use the same securityKey\_1 for the data after 2nd RRCResumeReq is sent.
	+ [Lenovo] Option e) is more flexible and does not need new NCC in the 1st DL msg of the SDT proc.
* Option 6.a): 1 company (Intel)
	+ option 6.a) is “*NCC provided in last RRCRelease message i.e. same as for legacy RRCResumeRequest which was also used when the SDT session was started (before initiating ongoing switch to non-SDT)*”.
	+ [Intel] option 6.a) and 6.e) seems the same
* Option 6.b): companies (Fujitsu, Intel, Apple)
	+ option 6.b) is “*Horizonal key derivation from current NCC*”.
	+ [Intel] Clarifies that Option 6.b) uses a new securityKey\_2 generated doing horizontal key derivation of NCC\_1 is used for the data and alternatively it could also be used for the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* (or even previous security\_Key\_1), as shown in a Figure.
	+ [Intel] This option is applicable if the security is updated and the PDCP COUNT is reset (as discussed in Q.12)).
	+ In Q.13) report of 2nd phased (captured in section 5.3.5.2), the following 9 companies support option 6.b) of doing “*Horizonal key derivation”* (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, Fujitsu, LG, Intel, OPPO, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm).
* Option 6.c): companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, Intel, Apple)
	+ option 6.c) is “*New NCC that was provided by the serving gNB in the 1st DL message after UE sends the 1st UL SDT msg (i.e. upon initiating the SDT session)”*.
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon, Apple] If SA3 has a security concern with re-using the same security key.
	+ [Intel] Clarifies that Option 6.c) uses a new NCC\_3 provided by the gNB\_2 as soon as UE starts the SDT session (as shown in a Figure).
	+ [Intel] This option is applicable if the security is updated and the PDCP COUNT is reset (as discussed in Q.12)).
* Option 6.x) TS 33.501 is updated to use COUNT=2 for resumeMAC-I calculation of the 2nd RRCResumeRequest for SDt operation (instead than COUNT=1): company (InterDigital)
* [Intel] SA3 input may be required to understand which *source-c-RNTI* should use when calculating the *VarResumeMAC-Input* for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest.
* [Xiaomi] SA3 new solution defined to avoid the replay attack for RRCResuemeRequest message could be re-used here.
1. **[To agree]** **[9/16]** For CCCH-based approach, when switching from SDT to non-SDT, RAN2 requires SA3 input to conclude on which key is used for generating the resumeMAC-I for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg.
	1. **[To agree]** **[12/16] [option 6.d)]** If SA3 has no security concern, the security key in the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg is the same than in the 1st *RRCResumeRequest* msg (i.e. UE’s KRRCint key stored in UE Inactive AS Context). Note: further details may need to be discussed, such as, security concerns (e.g. for data after the 2nd RRCResumeRequest or *source-c-RNTI* used for calculating the VarResumeMAC-Input) or network handling of the 2nd RRCResumeRequest.
2. **[To agree]** **[12/16]** If SA3 has some security concern with Proposal 7.1 or agreement in Proposal 6 requires an update of the security key, to continue discussion on how to update the security key for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest, considering at least the following proposed options:
	1. **[To discuss] [5/16] [option 6.e)/6.a)]** UE’s new KRRCint key i.e. the one calculated when triggering SDT (which is calculated based on the NCC provided in last RRCRelease msg).
	2. **[To discuss] [10/16] [option 6.b)]** Horizonal key derivation.
	3. **[To discuss] [3/16] [option 6.c)]** New NCC that was provided by the serving gNB in the 1st DL message after UE sends the 1st UL SDT msg (i.e. upon initiating the SDT session)
	4. **[To discuss] [1] [option 6.x)]** TS 33.501 is updated to use COUNT=2 for resumeMAC-I calculation of the 2nd RRCResumeRequest for SDT operation (instead than COUNT=1)

### [CCCH point (6)] Identification of UE AS context in the network

#### Q.15) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.15) When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach and for the scenario where the ongoing SDT session is with UE AS context relocation, which previous option 7.x or new option is preferable* ***for the serving gNB to locate/identify the UE AS Context in the network*** *for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg.?”*

* Option 7.a): 16 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, InterDigital, CATT, Samsung, Fujitsu, LG, Intel, NEC, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ Option 7.a) is “*I-RNTI i.e. same as for legacy RRCResumeRequest message which was also used when the SDT session was started (before initiating ongoing switch to non-SDT). This option would route the 2nd RRCResumeRequest message to the anchor/old gNB*.”
	+ [InterDigital] Anchor gNB is the node to process the 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg.
	+ [Intel] Inform about this scenario to RAN3 to enable it and solve potential issues e.g. anchor gNB may need to keep a copy or reference of the UE AS context until SDT session is successfully terminated by the network
* Option 7.b): companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, LG)
	+ Option 7.b) is “*New I-RNTI that is provided by the serving gNB in the 1st DL message after UE sends the 1st UL SDT msg (i.e. upon initiating the SDT session). This option would route the 2nd RRCResumeRequest message to the serving gNB where the SDT session was ongoing.*”
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon] Option 7.b) could be used if a new DL RRC message is agreed, e.g. to handle potential security issues for other cases
	+ [InterDigital] This only makes sense after relocation.
	+ [Intel] Option 7.b) makes sense if a 1st DL RRC msg were sent in the SDT session by the network e.g. to provide a new NCC or if RAN1 requires any reconfiguration
* Both options 7.a) and 7.b): companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, LG)
* [InterDigital] This topic is also applicable to DCCH.
1. **[To agree] [16/16] [option 7.a)]** For CCCH-based approach, when switching from SDT to non-SDT and for the scenario where the ongoing SDT session is with UE AS context relocation, I-RNTI provided in last *RRCRelease* msg is used for the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg (which would locate/identify the UE AS Context in the network). Note: if agreed, RAN3 might need to be informed (e.g. anchor gNB may need to keep a copy or reference of the UE AS context until SDT session is successfully terminated by the network).

### [CCCH point(7)] Network handling of the 2nd RRCResumeRequest and the RRCResume messages.

#### Q.16) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.16) When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach with anchor gNB, after network receives the 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg, does the* ***anchor gNB generate another new KgNB associated with the same serving/target gNB****?”*

* Yes: companies (ZTE, InterDigital, CATT, Fujitsu, NEC, OPPO, vivo)
	+ [NEC] New security key is regenerated, but it is the same as previous one used during the SDT procedure considering the reference captured in TS 33.501, section 6.8.2.1.3, “*The source gNB retrieves the stored UE context including the UE 5G AS security context from its database using the I-RNTI. The source gNB calculates KgNB\* using the target cell PCI, target ARFCN-DL and the KgNB/NH in the current UE 5G AS security context based on either a horizontal key derivation or a vertical key derivation according to whether the source gNB has an unused pair of {NCC, NH} as described in Annex A.11*.”
	+ [OPPO] If new security key is used for the second RRC resume procedure, the anchor needs to update the key in order to make the alignment with UE
* [Huawei-HiSilicon, LG, Intel, Apple, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi] Depends on SA3: companies.
* [ZTE, Samsung, LG, Intel, Lenovo] Some responses are overlap and dependencies with topics discussed in previous Q.10) to Q.14) (e.g. whether PDCP COUNT is or not reset, which security key is used, etc).
* [ZTE] For CCCH-based approach, the message is always routed to the node identified by the I-RNTI (i.e. the old anchor gNB). However, the old anchor gNB does not terminate the RRC layer in case of anchor relocation. So, the old anchor gNB needs to process the received second RRCResumeReq and the generate new key and provide the new key to the new anchor gNB (although anchor relocation would have happened) and the new gNB would then have to start using the new keys. This needs a new procedure for anchor relocation case (i.e. the old anchor gNB will have to send the new key without UE context in this case and the old anchor gNB would need to retain the UE context even after the UE anchor relocation to support this case).
* [FGI-APT] The 2nd RRCResumeRequest also does not have to be forwarded to the old anchor gNB in this case.
* Relation of this questions with DCCH-based approach:
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon, Interdigital] Topic common to DCCH-based approach.
	+ [ZTE, CATT, Intel] Topic is not applicable to DCCH-based approach.
		- [ZTE] difference is that the DCCCH RRC message will always be routed to the node that terminates the RRC layer and hence the response message (i.e. RRCResume) can be generated by this node. Count continues in both DL and UL and there is no interruption to data and no new keys are derived during the process.
1. **[To agree] [7/16]** For CCCH-based approach, ask SA3 on whether anchor gNB generate another new KgNB associated with the same serving/target gNB when switching from SDT to non-SDT after network receives the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg.

### [DCCH point (1)] Detection of non-SDT data

**Observation 7. (from 1st phase)** When switching from SDT to non-SDT via DCCH-based approach, the PDCP COUNT is maintained for SDT DRBs (i.e. the SDT session fallbacks into CONNECTED upon gNB sends RRCResume message during the ongoing SDT session).

#### Q.17) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.17) From RAN2 point of view, when detecting non-SDT data during ongoing SDT via DCCH-based approach, which previous option 9.x or new option is preferable* ***for AS or NAS layer to trigger the DCCH indication/request to the network****?”*

* Depends on CT1’s response: 12 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, InterDigital, CATT, Samsung, LG, Intel, Apple, OPPO, Lenovo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
* Option 9.a): 9 companies (CATT, Samsung, Intel, NEC, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, vivo, Qualcomm)
	+ Option 9.a) is “*AS triggers the DCCH indication/request from UE to transition into RRC\_CONNECTED when non-SDT data becomes available during the SDT session”*.
	+ [CATT, Samsung, NEC, Apple, FGI-APT, Qualcomm] DCCH msg is generated/initiated by AS layer although based on CT1’s input, NAS may send a corresponding request to AS.
	+ [Intel, OPPO] NAS is not aware whether a RB is or not configured for SDT operation although CT1 confirmation of this may be required.
	+ [Intel] Detecting SDT or non-SDT data could be left up to UE implementation or if any, SDAP may be the optimum layer to handle this.
* Option 9.b): 2 companies (ZTE, Fujitsu)
	+ Optoin 9.b) is “*NAS trigger new DCCH indication/request to AS for UE to move to RRC\_CONNECTED state when non-SDT data becomes available during the SDT session”*.
	+ [ZTE] CT1 latest status seems that NAS will trigger a new request this NAS request should trigger the DCCH message in AS.
1. **[To agree] [9/16] [option 9.a)]** AS layer generates DCCH message and initiates the transmission of DCCH message. **[12/16]** FFS if NAS needs to send a request for this scenario (inter-related with previous LS sent to CT1).

#### Q.18) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.18) For DCCH-based approach, which previous option 10.x or new option is preferable for* ***UE to send the indication/request*** *to switch into CONNECTED when non-SDT becomes available during an ongoing SDT session?”*

* Option 10.a): 7 companies (ZTE, CATT, Samsung, LG, Intel, FGI-APT, Lenovo)
	+ Option 10.a) is “*new UL RRC msg*”.
* Option 10.b): 10 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, InterDigital, NEC, Apple, OPPO, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ Option 10.b is “*re-using legacy UL RRC message e.g. UEAssistanceInformation message”*
* No strong view or FFS: companies (ZTE, Fujitsu, Lenovo)
1. **[To discuss]** For DCCH-based approach, whether UE’s indication/request to switch into CONNECTED when non-SDT becomes available during an ongoing SDT session is sent via **[7/16] [option a)]** new UL RRC msg, or **[10/16] [option b)]** reuse legacy UL RRC msg e.g. *UEAssistanceInformation* message

#### Q.19) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.19) For DCCH-based approach, which previous option 11.x or new option is preferable for the* ***information to be provided*** *by UE to indicate/request about the switch into CONNECTED when non-SDT becomes available in UE during an ongoing SDT session?”*

* Option 11.a): 6 companies (CATT, Samsung, Intel, Apple, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ Option 11.a) is “*List of one or more RB IDs for which data is arrived*”.
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon] Not needed as this information can be known via legacy BSR
	+ [CATT] Needed as legacy BRS cannot be used while non-SDT is not resumed.
	+ [Apple] Defined as optional
* Option 11.b): 7 companies (CATT, Samsung, Fujitsu, Apple, Lenovo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ Option 11.b) is “*Data volume per RB or cumulative can also be indicated*”
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon] Not needed as this information can be known via legacy BSR
	+ [CATT] Needed as legacy BRS cannot be used while non-SDT is not resumed.
	+ [Fujitsu] Option 11.b) covers option 11.a)
	+ [Apple] Defined as optional
* Option 11.c): 14 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, InterDigital, CATT, Samsung, LG, Intel, NEC, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ Option 11.c) is “*Resume cause*”
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon] Option 11.c) would be pending on CT1’s input
	+ [ZTE, Apple] Defined as mandatory to be provided in this scenario
	+ [CATT, Intel] Beneficial for network handling differentiation e.g. for emergency access.
* Option 11.d): flag indication when non-SDT data is waiting to be delivered (Intel)
* Option 11.e) none (vivo)
* [ZTE, NEC] Other information can be defined and/or optional to be discussed during stage-3.
1. **[To agree] [14/16] [option 11.c)]** For DCCH-based approach, resume cause is provided by UE to indicate/request the switch into CONNECTED when non-SDT becomes available in UE during an ongoing SDT session. Agreement dependent on CT1’s input.
	1. **[To discuss]** whether other information can be provided, e.g. **[6/16] [option 11.a)]** List of one or more RB IDs for which data is arrived, or **[7/16] [option 11.b)]** Data volume per RB or cumulative can also be indicated.

### [DCCH point (2)] switch from SDT to CONNECTED

**Observation 8. (from 1st phase)** For DCCH approach, after UE informs the network that non-SDT data is available, UE continues with the SDT session ongoing until network informs otherwise to UE (i.e. by transitioning the UE into RRC\_CONNECTED or releasing the UE into legacy RRC\_INACTIVE or RRC\_IDLE). Upon UE receives RRCResume message, only the PDCP of non-SDT DRBs are re-established and resumed (as SDT RBs were already re-established/resumed upon initiating the SDT session).

#### Q.20) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.20) When switching from SDT to non-SDT (i.e. CONNECTED) via DCCH-based approach and for the scenario where the ongoing SDT session is without UE AS context relocation,* ***previous Q.1) to Q.5) and the responses are expected to be applicable.*** *Please indicate if your responses provided for previous Q.1) to Q.5) are not applicable when using DCCH-based approach and if so, please explain the different behaviour/operation.”*

* Responses Q1- Q6 are all applicable: companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, InterDigital, CATT, Samsung, Fujitsu, Intel, NEC, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
* [LG] Issues should be discussed case by case

**[Rapporteur’s input]** No proposal is added as responses to Q1-Q6 are equally applicable here and therefore no special/different proposal is required for DCCH-based approach.

#### Q.21) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.21) What is the* ***expected UE behaviour*** ***after UE sends DCCH message*** *during an ongoing SDT session? Consider the following options.”*

* Option 16.1): 13 companies (ZTE, CATT, Samsung, Fujitsu, Intel, NEC, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ option 16.1) is “*UE continues with the SDT session ongoing until network informs otherwise to UE by transitioning the UE into RRC\_CONNECTED or releasing the UE into legacy RRC\_INACTIVE or RRC\_IDLE. UE does not expect receiving an explicit confirmation for the reception of the DCCH message*.”
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon] Option 16.1) is not acceptable e.g. for latency sensitive data.
	+ [ZTE, Samsung, Apple, Lenovo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi] If there is UL grant available, DCCH msg is sent (which is faster than CCCH as there is no RACH or RAR); otherwise (i.e. if there is no UL grant available), RACH is trigger to send DCCH msg (in which case DCCH takes same time as CCCH)
	+ [CATT] DCCH msg is more reliable with AM than MAC CE solution.
	+ [Intel] Network should react to UE’s request of transitioning to RRC\_CONNECTED due to non-SDT data, however final decision should be left up to network implementation
	+ [Lenovo] Timer might be needed not to wait for network response for long time.
* Option 16.2): 7 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, Samsung, Apple, Lenovo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ Option 16.2) is “*UE expects receiving a confirmation of reception of the DCCH message. If so, clarify the details of this confirmation and the expected UE behaviour when not received”*.
* Option 16.3): UE should terminate the SDT operation upon data arrival from the non-SDT DRBs (i.e. no need to define UE behaviour of SDT session while in non-SDT session initiation) (InterDigital, LG)
* [ZTE, Samsung, Apple, Lenovo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi] Options 16.1 and 16.2 are not mutually exclusive.
* [LG] It should be discuss if DCCH msg can be sent while SDT proc. is ongoing.
	+ If SDT proc. is ongoing, DCCH uses RLC AM, UE can use RLC status report for DCCH reception for confirmation and can also continue with the ongoing SDT session.
1. **[To agree] [13/16] [option 16.1)]** For DCCH-based approach, after UE sends DCCH message during an ongoing SDT session, UE continues with the SDT session ongoing until network informs otherwise to UE by transitioning the UE into RRC\_CONNECTED or releasing the UE into legacy RRC\_INACTIVE or RRC\_IDLE.
	1. **[To discuss] [7/16] [option 16.2)]** Whether UE should expect a confirmation of reception of the DCCH message; and if so, clarify the details of this confirmation and the expected UE behaviour when not received (e.g. after certain time controlled by a timer)

### [DCCH point (4)] UL grant availability

#### Q.23) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.23) What is the expected UE behaviour* ***if*** ***there is no UL grant for a UE to send the DCCH message*** *for non-SDT data indication during an ongoing SDT session?”*

* UE initiates SR via RACH procedure: 4 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, InterDigital, CATT, Lenovo)
* UE initiates RACH procedure (as SR resources are not available in SDT): 14 companies (ZTE, CATT, Samsung, Fujitsu, LG, Intel, NEC, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ [InterDigital] It needs to be discussed how to uniquely identify the UE from a DCCH message included in Msg3 or MsgA
	+ [NEC] Applicable for subsequent SDT transmission.
* [NEC] During initial transmission phase, UE needs to wait for mgs.4/MsgA reception.
1. **[To agree] [14/16]** For DCCH-based approach, UE initiates RACH procedure when there is no UL grant for a UE to send the DCCH message for non-SDT data indication during an ongoing SDT session.

## Failure handling during ongoing SDT session

### Triggers to an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session

#### Q.24) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.24) Which previous trigger events or new ones can lead to an abrupt termination or failure of an ongoing SDT session?”*

* Event 1) Cell reselection - supported by 12 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, Samsung, LG, Intel, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ [NEC] UE can go to IDLE w/o any enhancement as it is a corner case
* Event 2) Expiry of failure detection timer - supported by 12 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, Samsung, LG, Intel, NEC, Apple, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
* Event 3) Lower layers indication - supported by 9 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, LG, Intel, NEC, Apple, FGI-APT, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ [Samsung] Event 3 is not required as UE is in RRC\_INACTIVE and UE can rely on failure detection timer expiry.
	+ [OPPO] Neutral to consider event 3.
* Event 4) Maximum number of retransmissions is reached in RLC - supported by 10 companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, LG, Intel, NEC, Apple, FGI-APT, Lenovo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ [Samsung] Event 4 is not required as UE is in RRC\_INACTIVE and UE can rely on failure detection timer expiry.
	+ [LG] Event 4 is ok not to consider it as it is a corner case.
	+ [OPPO] Neutral to consider event 4.
* Event 5) Reject reception during SDT - supported by 1 company (NEC)
	+ [Samsung] Event 6 is not required as it can be handled like legacy.
	+ [Intel] Event 6 is not an abrupt failure as it is under network control.
	+ [NEC] When RRCReject is received, the current SDT procedure should be terminated (e.g. suspend SDT RBs, reset MAC etc), which is not performed in legacy RRC Reject procedure, and then perform the legacy RRC reject procedure
* Event 6) Abortion of connection establishment by upper layers (need FFS)
	+ [Samsung] Event 6 is not required as it can be handled like legacy.
	+ [NEC] Event 6 is not needed as RAN2 agreed that that if upper layers abort the RRC connection resume procedure after the UE sent  RRCResumeRequest/RRCResumeRequest1 message but not yet entered RRC Connected state, it is up to UE implementation whether to move to RRC\_IDLE state or continue RRC connection resume procedure.
* [InterDigital] Different behaviour expected and explained for each event that they support.
* [CATT] Unified behaviour is desirable
* [CATT, Fujitsu] Details of the trigger events are still FFS e.g. failure detection timer operation or what lower layer indication means.
1. **[To agree]** Events that trigger an abrupt termination or failure of an ongoing SDT session: **[12/16] [event 1)]** cell reselection, **[12/16] [event 2)]** expiry of the failure detection timer and **[10/16] [event 4)]** Maximum number of retransmissions is reached in RLC
	1. **[To discuss]** whether to also consider **[9/16] [event 4)]** Lower layer indication

### UE’s action upon detecting an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session

#### Q.25) - report of 2nd Phase

The summary report to *“Q.25) Do you support aiming to have a* ***common UE behaviour*** *when any of the applicable trigger events from previous Q.24) lead to an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session?”*

* Yes: companies 13 (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, CATT, Samsung, Fujitsu, Intel, NEC, Apple, OPPO, Lenovo, vivo, Qualcomm, Xiaomi)
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon, NEC] CCCH-based approach can be reused at least for events 1), 2), and 4).
	+ [Huawei-HiSilicon] Handling of event 3) may depend on details of the lower layers, e.g. how much it resembles the current beam failure indications etc. (which should be decided by RAN1).
	+ [ZTE] Possible options are: a) UE moves to IDLE and inform NAS (to trigger this NAS recovery), or b) UE stays in INACTIVE and initiates PDCP reestablishment based approach. Option b) is preferable if there is time to enable it.
	+ [Samsung] At least same for state transition and data loss recovery mechanism can be same.
	+ [Qualcomm] At least same for UE going into IDLE (in which case legacy can be reused)
* No: 3 companies (InterDigital, LG, FGI-APT)
	+ [InterDigital] Different behaviors explained in previous question.
	+ [LG] Events 1-4 might be ok for a common behaviour but not other events
	+ [FGI-APT] Event 1 might require different handling than other ones.
1. **[To agree] [13/16]** The aim is to define a common UE behaviour, if possible, when any of the agreed trigger events from Proposal 16 lead to an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session.

#### Approach 2) UE remains in RRC\_INACTIVE

**Observation 9. (from 1st phase)** Upon UE detects an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session and remains into legacy RRC\_INACTIVE, the UE shall immediately initiate a request to resume the suspended RRC connection or to (re)start the SDT session

##### **Q.26) - report of 2nd Phase**

The summary report to *“Q.26) When a UE detects a failure of an ongoing SDT session and remains in RRC\_INACTIVE, UE shall initiate immediately a* ***recovery mechanism*** *(e.g. via SDT or resume). Please indicate if your responses provided for* ***previous Q.11) to Q.16)*** *are not applicable for this specific scenario (in relation to the 2nd resume procedure) and if so, please explain the different behaviour/operation”*

* Responses Q11- Q16 are all applicable: companies: companies (Huawei-HiSilicon, ZTE, InterDigital, Samsung, Fujitsu, Intel, NEC, Apple, OPPO, FGI-APT, Lenovo, vivo, Xiaomi)
	+ [ZTE] Discuss whether to send an UL message to indicate the failure case
* [CATT] How would UE handle the recovery after sub-sequent failures e.g. would a 3rd RRCResumeRequest msg be initiated?
* [LG] Specific issues should be discussed case by case.
* [Intel] Q.14) requires further discussion as the recovery mechanism may be done with a new gNB.
	+ If so, the options 6.e and 6.d may not work (as the security key used during SDT session with gNB\_2 should not be reused with the new gNB\_3 (as shown in figure)). Therefore options 6.b) and 6.c) may be more suitable. SA3/RAN3 inputs/confirmation would be required in this topic as explained in Q.14) e.g. for PDCP COUNT is reset, whether anchoring is used, which node processes ResumeMac-I, C-RNTI used for ResumeMAC-I calculation.
* [Intel] Clarification is provided on why CCCH based approach may be suitable for a failure scenario (discussed here) but not for a normal handling (discussed in previous section 3.2) to enable the switch from SDT to RRC\_CONNECTED.
* [Qualcomm] Approach 1) is preferred over this approach 2).

**[Rapporteur’s input]** From the views provided in Q.11) to Q.16) during the 2nd phase, Proposal 5 to Proposal 10 are suggested as part of the summary report.

1. **[To agree] [13/16] [Approach 2)]** When a UE detects a failure of an ongoing SDT session and if UE remains in RRC\_INACTIVE, details addressed Proposal 5 to Proposal 10 are applicable to this approach. Note: handling in a new third gNB (i.e., previous/anchor gNB, serving gNB, and new gNB after cell reselection) might require further discussion.

# 3rd Phase: new questions

This section aims to down-scope between the proposed mechanisms considering the technical details explained during the 2nd phase.

## Topic #1: Handling to switch from SDT to CONNECTED during an ongoing SDT session without UE AS context relocation

The report of this topic is in section 5.1 (which is related to the discussion on Q1) to Q.5) during the 2nd phase). Large majority of companies seem to support resolving this issue via option 1.a) (moving UE back to INACTIVE) instead that the new mechanism explained in option 1.b). Proposal 1 covers this topic and has good majority. Therefore this topic does not need to be discuss again in the 3rd phase (as companies already did the down-selection implicitly when providing their views during the 2nd phase.

## Non-SDT data handling during ongoing SDT session

The report of this topic is in section 5.3 (which is related to the discussion on Q.10) to Q.16) for CCCH-based approach and Q.17) to Q.23) for DCCH-based approach).

Based on the majority comments received, the two options can be summarized as (hyperlink to the inter-related proposals are also added for easier reference):

### Summary of CCCH-based approach:

1. If anchor relocation is required, UE is pushed back to INACTIVE (Proposal 1); if a new solution is to be developed instead, liaise with SA3 on issue of key update during node change (Proposal 2)
2. PDCP entities of non-SDT DRBs are re-established using existing mechanisms (Proposal 3)
3. PDCP is suspended and PDUs flushed. (Proposal 4)
4. UE performs UAC and initiates RACH. (Observation 4)
5. Same I-RNTI is used in the 2nd RRCResumeRequest and network needs to differentiate that 2nd RRCResumeRequest for that UE (e.g. implicit detection via I-RNTI). (Proposal 5)
6. Discussion needed on whether PDCP count is reset or not. And if reset, discussion about a new security mechanism with SA3 needed to prevent the re-use of the same security key for data after PDCP COUNT is reset. (Proposal 6 and Proposal 8)
7. Liaise with SA3 on whether there is an issue with the re-use of ResumeMac-I in the 2nd Resume request; if considered an security issue, discussion of a new security mechanism with SA3 needed. (Proposal 7, Proposal 8)
8. Liaise RAN3 to enable a mechanism to identify the UE context in the new gNB if the UE context was relocated, as I-RNTI in second ResumeRequest points to the context in the old gNB. (Proposal 9).
9. Liaise with SA3 on whether a new KgNB is needed in serving gNB (different from anchor gNB) for the 2nd gNB after 2nd ResumeRequest if context was previously anchored. (Proposal 10)
10. Liaise with CT1 to complete the discussion on whether NAS will trigger a new ResumeRequest for non-SDT data. (Proposal 11)

### Summary of DCCH-based approach:

1. If anchor relocation is required, UE is pushed back to INACTIVE (Proposal 1); if a new solution is to be developed instead, liaise with SA3 on issue of key update during node change (Proposal 2)
2. PDCP entities of non-SDT DRBs are re-established using existing mechanisms (Proposal 3)
3. AS to initiate the DCCH message. (Proposal 11)
	1. Discuss whether NAS will trigger the DCCH message message and if so, liaise with CT1 to complete the discussion on whether NAS will trigger it. (Proposal 11)
4. Discuss which DCCH message to use (new or UE assistance information). (Proposal 12)
5. New Resume cause to be provided in DCCH message. (Proposal 13)
6. Discuss what additional information is needed in the DCCH message (list of RB IDs/data volume per RB). (Proposal 13)
7. UE waits for network response after sending DCCH message; discuss whether a confirmation of reception of DCCH message is needed (Proposal 14)
8. UE initiates RACH procedure if there is no UL grant to send DCCH message (Proposal 15)

### Q.A) for 3rd Phase

1. Please indicate whether you prefer **CCCH-based approach** and/or **DCCH-based approach** to handle non-SDT data that becomes available during an ongoing SDT procedure considering the clarifications done for each approach during the 2nd phase of this email discussion.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Approach(s)** | **Justification** |
| vivo | **DCCH-based approach** if BSR reporting for suspended DRB is not allowed | Generally, we still suggest postponing the down-selection until RAN2 resolves whether BSR reporting for DRB which is suspended can be supported in NR since it might be the simplest and most effective solution for the handling of non-SDT RBs. Frankly, parallel discussion on a similar topic is not expected in our view.Anyway, take a step back, we prefer the DCCH-based approach (which also works well and is simpler) over the CCCH-based approach. This is because we have identified the CCCH-based approach largely involves security issues, and has potential essential impacts on PDCP count handling and even the RAN3 context fetch procedure (as discussed in Q.15)). What’s worse, it seems no extra performance gain can be brought by the CCCH-based solution.  |
| Samsung | DCCH based approach | There are several issues for CCCH based solution (f, g, h, i in section 6.2.1). |
| xiaomi | DCCH-based approach | The CCCH-based approach causes more security issues, which may require more discussion in SA3. However we would also accept that if SA3 already defined some solutions to resolve the security issues for RRCResumeRequest message, e.g. via the fake gNB work item or based on the LS provided by RAN2. RAN2 could also simply reuse the solutions provided by SA3. Given that SA3 may require some security enhancements for the RRCResumeRequest message regardless of the SDT procedure, according to the discussion in the the fake gNB work item in SA3. |
| ZTE | DCCH-based approach | Unfortunately, even after this extensive discussion, CCCH approach seems to require more correspondence with other WGs and given the time available we would recommend that RAN2 takes a decision on this with DCCH as the way forward. For CCCH solution, further work is needed in RAN2 to converge on the details, impacts to PDCP suspend operation need to be finalised, and then SA3 input needs to be requested for the security framework including horizontal key derivation and finally RAN3 needs to also design a solution that works when there is anchor relocation. Given the lack of reply from SA3 even for our earlier (simple) question, we are concerned that relying on design work from SA3 or other WGs is impractical for the timeline. The DCCH solution is all contained within RAN2 and has no such issues or dependencies with other WGs. The latency of the DCCH approach is at least as good as CCCH approach (in case of RACH) and is better in case there is an UL grant available. |
| Intel | DCCH-based approach | DCCH-based is simpler and with less number of potential issues to be addressed as summarized in previous sections. In addition, this approach keeps the control on when to trigger the switch from SDT to CONNECTED in the network side. We understand that letting a UE to trigger a termination of the SDT session autonomously should not be done for normal case scenarios that could be handled via network control.  |
| Sharp | DCCH-based approach | Consering the security issue in CCCH-based approach, we prefer a simple solution with less impact. |
| LG | CCCH-based approach | We think CCCH-based approach is simple and well aligned with legacy behavior. Some companies think that there may be security issue, but, as PDCP count is not reset according to current specification, we don’t think there is security issue.Though rapporteur listed smaller number of issues for DCCH-based approach, we think they have more impacts in RAN2 than CCCH-based approach. For DCCH-based approach, a new message should be defined, and it is easily understood that lots of works are expected.ZTE: Thanks! Indeed, we agree that a new messge needs to be defined. We don’t think that defining a new message in RAN2 should be the show stopper for either solution though (note this might be needed even in case of CCCH – see below). Further interaction with other groups might on the otherhand be a different question from timeline perspective. This is what we are concerned about. In addition to the issues listed above, following issue should also be discussed.- If there is no ongoing SDT procedure, the UE shall trigger CCCH message according to current specification. If DCCH-based solution is introduced, upon NAS request for non-SDT RB, the UE has to check whether there is ongoing SDT procedure or not to decide which message (CCCH or DCCH) to generate.ZTE: Again, we also agree with this observation. i.e. if there is an ongoing SDT procedure (needs one “if” clause in RRC), RRC can generate DCCH message and submit the same to the lower layers. - If there is no UL grant, the UE has to initiate RACH. But, it is not clear what kind of RACH procedure is initiated. Is it legacy RACH procedure for RRCResume (i.e. CCCH message)? or SDT-RACH procedure for DCCH message?ZTE: The RA-SDT resources are only used for initial UL message (to indicate to the network that the RA procedure is for SDT). For any other RACH procedure we have never agreed to use RA-SDT resources. So, of course the RA for SR would need to use normal RA resources (similar to any RA based SR) and not the RA-SDT resources. There may be many other reasons for sending RACH (and none of these would apply for RA-SDT RACH resources). There are still many aspects not clear in DCCH-based approach. |
| CATT | DCCH-based approach | As summarized in 6.2.1, CCCH-based approach has many issues to be discussed/resolved, and requires further enhancements which involve SA3/RAN3 in. While DCCH-based approach is simpler. |
| ASUSTeK | CCCH-based approach | We prefer to use CCCH-based approach for non-SDT data arrival. We think CCCH-based approach is more aligned with the legacy RRC resume procedure upon data arrival in RRC\_INACTIVE state. |
| OPPO | DCCH-based solution | Considering that CCCH-based solution needs to involve other WGs and introduce more spec impacts, we prefer DCCH-based solution. |
| Ericsson | CCCH based approach | We think that the security issues for a CCCH based solution is not nec essarily that complex. For example, there would not be a need for a “new key” if only a new MAC-I is defined to prevent replay attacks of RRCResumeRequest message. PDCP SN should not be reset to avoid reusing same key and PDCP SN in same cell. New MAC-I can be obtained by changing MAC-I generation by not putting “all input bits for **COUNT, BEARER and DIRECTION** set to binary ones”. We would agree with some of the issues listed by LG, for instance that the amount of work would be much more than companies indicate when defining a DCCH based solution. We further think that in any case correspondence with other groups will be necessary to complete the work.In addition, reusing legacy comes with known procedures and behaviour across layers and procedures not only defined in RAN2.ZTE: Thanks! This is useful input in our view. Infact if we go this way, then the security issues can be solved. However, we would like to observe that this needs a new CCCH message. Since the MAC-I generation uses a new mechanism. So, this needs something like UL-CCCH2 message. In the end, the CCCH approach is not the legacy CCCH procedure anymore. Then, we would also like to make the following observations for this new CCCH approach: a) The PDCP COUNT is not reset with this approach (exactly similar to how it works in case of DCCH)b) No new keys are derived with this approach and UE continues to use the old keys generated after first RRCResumeReq (again exactly same as how it works in case of DCCH)c) The only difference is that instead of sending a DCCH message (which uses the existing PDCP based encryption and integrity protection), we would define a new CCCH message (which would use new resumeMAC-I presumably with different COUNT/BEARER etc as mentioned above – which would need to be designed by SA3??). So, this is the only difference between DCCH and CCCH approaches then. For the progress, it seems good to acknowledge that at least a) and b) should be agreeable in this case. Then, the only question is about step c) and here we can decide between DCCH vs CCCH then. This will be a small step forward to conclude this discussion and would help the progress in our opinion.  |
| NEC | CCCH-based approach | DCCH message cannot be sent to network during the initial transmission phase, however, CCCH approach can be applied to all phases of SDT transmission as it terminates the SDT procedure immediately. And we also agree with LG and Ericsson’s comment on DCCH.For the resumeMAC-I replay issue of CCCH, we don’t really need to address this issue in SDT, as it already exists in legacy RRCResume procedure if RRCReject is received as a response, and SA3 is now working on this already. See TR 33.809, issue #1, which includes the resumeMAC-I issue caused by replay and MiTM.For the key stream reuse issue, we can find some solution which can avoid having impact to the SA3, e.g. by continuing PDCP COUNT value in the second RRC Resume procedure after SDT abortion. |
| Qualcomm | DCCH-based approach | The DCCH based solution is obviously simpler and has less technical issues to be resolved compared to the CCCH based solution. The CCCH based solution needs many potential works not only for RAN2 but also other WGs. At least the security issues need SA3 for further study. And we don’t observe CCCH based solution providing additional benefit than DCCH solution. |

## Failure handling during ongoing SDT session

An abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session can be handled via **approach (1)** UE transitions autonomously into RRC\_IDLE or **approach (2)** UE remains in RRC\_INACTIVE. The report of this topic is in section 5.4 (which is related to the discussion on Q.24) to Q.26)).

Based on the majority comments received, the following details can be summarized for the solitions (hyperlink to the inter-related proposals are also added for easier reference).

### Common for both solutions, approach 1) and approach 2):

1. Triggered events of the failure are: cell reselection, expiry of the failure detection timer and Maximum number of retransmissions is reached in RLC. (Proposal 16)
2. Common recovery mechanism. (Proposal 17)

### For approach 2 (staying in INACTIVE):

1. (Same solutions re-used if CCCH approach is chosen for non-SDT data) (Proposal 18):
	1. Discussion needed on whether PDCP count is reset or not. And if reset, discuss a new security mechanism with SA3 needed to prevent the re-use of the same security key for data after PDCP COUNT reset. (Proposal 6)
	2. Liaise with SA3 on whether there is an issue with re-use of ResumeMac-I in the 2nd Resume request; if considered an security issue, discussion of a new security mechanism with SA3 needed. (Proposal 7 and Proposal 8)
	3. Liaise RAN3 to enable a mechanism to identify the UE context in the new gNB if the UE context was relocated, as I-RNTI in second ResumeRequest points to the context in the old gNB. (Proposal 9)
	4. Liaise with SA3 on whether a new KgNB is needed in serving gNB (different from anchor gNB) for the 2nd gNB after 2nd ResumeRequest if context was previously anchored. (Proposal 10)

### Q.B) for 3rd Phase

1. Please indicate your preference to handle abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session: **approach (1)** UE transitions autonomously into RRC\_IDLE or **approach (2)** UE remains in RRC\_INACTIVE considering the clarifications done for each approach during the 2nd phase of this email discussion.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Approach(s)** | **Justification** |
| vivo | **approach (1)** | If we remembered correctly, both approaches had been warmly discussed in Rel-15 for the NR RRC resumption. To get rid of any security issues, approach (1) is adopted finally. For Rel-17 NR SDT, it seems a spontaneous logic that we should simply follow the legacy mechanism (i.e. entering into RRC\_IDLE). |
| Samsung | Approach 1 | Seems simple and there are no security issues. |
| Xiaomi | Approach (1) | Approach (1) would be simpler from the specification. However we woud also consider that the UE may need to report the failure information to the network for the SON purpose. |
| ZTE | Approach 1 is acceptable (if there is no majority for approach 2).  | Although we prefer to have an optimised solution for the error handling (i.e. prefer approach 2), we are concerned with the lack of consensus on this and the fact that the time available in this release would make it highly difficult for such optimisations unless we achieve a quick consensus on this. So, we can live with the approach that for Rel-17 UE simply moves to RRC\_IDLE. Optimisations can be considered in future releases in this case.  |
| Intel | See comment | Our preference is to enable approach (2) for the failure handling scenario, as it keeps UE in INACTIVE and provides better performance in terms of data loss and interruption time. However we are ok enabling approach (1) as the baseline in case there is no enough time to enable approach (2) in Rel-17. If CCCH is chosen for non-SDT data handling, we can reuse the solution for this Approach (2) as they require similar solution.  |
| Sharp | approach (1) | Legacy mechanism is preferred. |
| LG | Both | We are ok with both solutions. |
| CATT | Approach 1 | Prefer approach 1 as Approach 2 has security issues and is complex. High layer recovery mechanism is sufficient. |
| ASUSTeK | Approach 1 | Approach 1 is simple and should be the baseline. |
| OPPO | Approach 1 |  |
| Ericsson | Approach 1 | Good baseline. We are open to enhancements in future releases. |
| NEC | Both | We are ok with both solutions. |
| Qualcomm | Approach 1 |  |

## “Editorial” inputs to the drafted proposals from 2nd phase

### Q.C) for 3rd Phase

1. Please indicate if you have any suggested update on the wording/editorial of the drafted proposals from the 2nd phase. If so, please add different rows for each proposal that you provide inputs to and provide actual new wording with its justification/motivation to help with the report process. *Note: Companies are* ***not*** *invited to re-open discussions already addressed/explained in 2nd phase.*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company’s name** | **Proposal #** | **Justification** |
| vivo | Proposal 1 | The outcome of adopting this approach can be omitted. Besides, to make it clearer and simpler, we propose:**[To agree] [14/16]** No new solution is defined to address the scenario where the anchor relocation is required in the middle of an SDT s No new solution is defined for data redundancy and out-of-order delivery in the scenario where the anchor relocation is required in the middle of an SDT session to move UE to INACTIVE, i.e. network relies on releasing the UE back into RRC\_INACTIVE. |
| vivo | Proposal 2 | This proposal looks more like an observation as no further action is needed even though it is agreed. We think we should discuss whether a new mechanism is needed first. Thus, we propose **[To discuss] [14/16]** If a new mechanism is needed to enable the scenario where anchor relocation is performed in the middle of an ongoing SDT session to move UE to CONNECTED. If yes, RAN2 needs to check with SA3 if the security key needs to be updated in order to meet SA3 requirement that the same security key is not re-used in two nodes or not. |
| vivo | Proposals 3-7/9/10 | These proposals are instructive only if the CCCH-based solution is down-selected. Thus we suggest replacing the tag **[To agree]** as **[To agree if CCCH-based solution is selected]**. |
| vivo | Proposal 15 | We suggest removing this proposal since we think this proposal has been agreed in RAN2#113bis-e meeting:Agreements:SR resource is not configured for SDT. When the BSR is triggered by SDT data, the UE will trigger RA because SR resource is not available, same as legacy. |
| ZTE | Section 6.2.1 Proposal a)  | a) If anchor relocation is required, UE is pushed back to INACTIVE (Proposal 1); Question for clarification (in case CCCH approach is used): For the CCCH based solution, for the above, in case there is a DL SRB message during the SDT session, will the RRCRelease message be sent with the same key/COUNT pair with the other SRB message sent during the SDT session before the second CCCH message? Or will the key be updated before sending the RRCRelease in this case?  |
| ZTE | Section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 | PDCP entities of non-SDT ~~D~~RBs are re-established using existing mechanisms (Proposal 3)Comment: In the above proposals, the DRB should be changed to RB (since the same can be applicable to SRBs too).  |
| ZTE | Section 6.2.1 | PDCP is suspended and PDUs flushedComment: For CCCH solution, the suspend operation may or may not be the legacy PDCP suspend operation since the COUNT may or may not be reset (depending on the solution chosen – i.e. proposal f)). Can this be clarified for this proposal (i.e. the PDCP suspend operation may not be the same depending on other agreements below etc).  |
| ZTE | Section 6.2.1 proposal g) | g) Liaise with SA3 on whether there is an issue with the re-use of ResumeMac-I in the 2nd Resume requestComment: Didn’t we already ask this question?  |
| ZTE | Section 6.2.1 proposal j) | j) Liaise with CT1 to complete the discussion on whether NAS will trigger a new ResumeRequest for non-SDT data. (Proposal 11)Comment: same as above, we already asked the relavent questions to CT1.  |
| LG | 6.2.2 | Add the following issue:If there is no ongoing SDT procedure, the UE shall trigger CCCH message according to current specification. If DCCH-based solution is introduced, upon NAS request for non-SDT RB, the UE has to check whether there is ongoing SDT procedure or not to decide which message (CCCH or DCCH) to generate |
| LG | 6.2.2 h) | It is not clear what kind of RACH procedure is initiated. Is it legacy RACH procedure for RRCResume (i.e. CCCH message)? or SDT-RACH procedure for DCCH message? |
| CATT | Proposal 1 | The question on proposal 1 is:*”Q.1) For previous option 1.a), is there any mechanism needed to* ***prevent data loss*** *in case UE is moved back to INACTIVE state”*It is more clear if we can capture the question in proposal 1, as follows:1. **[To agree] [14/16]** No new solution is defined to ~~address the scenario where the anchor relocation is required in the middle of an SDT session, i.e. network relies on releasing the UE back into RRC\_INACTIVE~~ prevent data loss in case UE is moved back to INACTIVE state. For this approach, data loss can be minimized by network and UE implementation, but data duplication may happen.
 |
| CATT | Proposal 16 | During discussion on SDT, we have some agreements on SDT failure detection timer. It will be more clear if ‘SDT failure detection timer’ is used in proposal 16.**Proposal 16.** **[To agree]** Events that trigger an abrupt termination or failure of an ongoing SDT session: **[12/16] [event 1)]** cell reselection, **[12/16] [event 2)]** expiry of ~~the~~SDT failure detection timer and **[10/16] [event 4)]** Maximum number of retransmissions is reached in RLC |

# Conclusion

The observations captured are the following:

**Observation 1.** When UE receives *RRCResume* message during an ongoing SDT session or in response to *RRCResumeRequest* message sent for SDT (i.e. switch from SDT to CONNECTED), the PDCP entities for only the non-SDT RBs are re-established (i.e., SDT RBs are not re-established as were already resumed for the SDT session).

**Observation 2.** When switching from SDT to CONNECTED, it is left up to network implementation that the data exchanged before triggering the fallback to resume is not lost (i.e. UE does not need to retransmit it) and SDT related data traffic can continue after UE gets CONNECTED.

**Observation 3.** For CCCH-based approach, UE autonomously triggers the end or the release of ongoing SDT session upon detecting the non-SDT data.

**Observation 4.** When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, AS applies UAC and initiates random access procedure same as any legacy UE in RRC\_INACTIVE.

**Observation 5.** The mechanism to be defined that enables the switch from SDT to non-SDT shall meet the following NR requirement: the same PDCP COUNT value is not used more than once for a given security key.

**Observation 6.** When switching from SDT to non-SDT via CCCH-based approach, if the PDCP count is reset upon detecting non-SDT data during an ongoing SDT session, the UE/network may not be able to detect data duplication and prevent data loss during the transitioning into RRC\_CONNECTED.

**Observation 7.** When switching from SDT to non-SDT via DCCH-based approach, the PDCP COUNT is maintained for SDT DRBs (i.e. the SDT session fallbacks into CONNECTED upon gNB sends *RRCResume* message during the ongoing SDT session).

**Observation 8.** For DCCH approach, after UE informs the network that non-SDT data is available, UE continues with the SDT session ongoing until network informs otherwise to UE (i.e. by transitioning the UE into RRC\_CONNECTED or releasing the UE into legacy RRC\_INACTIVE or RRC\_IDLE). Upon UE receives *RRCResume* message, only the PDCP of non-SDT DRBs are re-established and resumed (as SDT RBs were already re-established/resumed upon initiating the SDT session).

**Observation 9.** Upon UE detects an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session and remains into legacy RRC\_INACTIVE, the UE shall immediately initiate a request to resume the suspended RRC connection or to (re)start the SDT session

The proposals captured are the following:

**Proposal 1.** **[To agree] [14/16]** No new solution is defined to address the scenario where the anchor relocation is required in the middle of an SDT session, i.e. network relies on releasing the UE back into RRC\_INACTIVE. For this approach, data loss can be minimized by network and UE implementation, but data duplication may happen.

**Proposal 2.** **[To agree] [14/16]** If a new mechanism is defined to enable the scenario where anchor relocation is performed in the middle of an ongoing SDT session to move UE to CONNECTED, RAN2 needs to check with SA3 if the security key needs to be updated in order to meet SA3 requirement that the same security key is not re-used in two nodes or not.

**Proposal 3.** **[To agree] [13/16] [option 2.c)]** The PDCP entities of only the non-SDT RBs are re-established (i.e. not for the SDT RBs) unless any new security keys are derived during the switch from SDT to CONNECTED (i.e. when UE receives *RRCResume* message during an SDT session). Current signalling (e.g. resume) can be used by the network to re-establish these PDCP entities as required.

**Proposal 4.** **[To agree] [12/16] [Option 1.a) & 1.c)]** For CCCH-based approach, upon UE autonomously triggers the end or the release of ongoing SDT session, PDCP is suspended and PDUs flushed.

**Proposal 5.** **[To agree] [14/16]** ForCCCH-based approach, when switching from SDT to non-SDT, network should be able to differentiate that this UE had an SDT session ongoing and is sending a 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg, **[8/16]** If horizonal key derivation is not done, network can differentiate the 2nd access implicitly (e.g. via I-RNTI and gNB’s implementation) and a new indication is not needed. **[6/16]** If horizonal key derivation is done, network can differentiate the 2nd access with a new indication sent in that 2nd RRCResumeRequest. Note: whether horizontal key derivation is done is discussed in next Proposal 8.

**Proposal 6.** **[To agree]** ForCCCH-based approach, when switching from SDT to non-SDT, RAN2 needs to choose between options 1 and 2 not to use the same PDCP COUNT and security key. **[13/16] [Option 1)]** PDCP COUNT is reset, when the security key is updated. **[10/16] [Option 2)]** PDCP COUNT is maintained (i.e. not reset), when the security key is not updated. Note: whether security key needs to be updated is discussed in next Proposal 7 and Proposal 8.

**Proposal 7.** **[To agree]** **[9/16]** For CCCH-based approach, when switching from SDT to non-SDT, RAN2 requires SA3 input to conclude on which key is used for generating the resumeMAC-I for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest msg.

**Proposal 7.1.** **[To agree]** **[12/16] [option 6.d)]** If SA3 has no security concern, the security key in the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg is the same than in the 1st *RRCResumeRequest* msg (i.e. UE’s KRRCint key stored in UE Inactive AS Context). Note: further details may need to be discussed, such as, security concerns (e.g. for data after the 2nd RRCResumeRequest or *source-c-RNTI* used for calculating the VarResumeMAC-Input) or network handling of the 2nd RRCResumeRequest.

**Proposal 8.** **[To agree]** **[12/16]** If SA3 has some security concern with Proposal 7.1 or agreement in Proposal 6 requires an update of the security key, to continue discussion on how to update the security key for the 2nd RRCResumeRequest, considering at least the following proposed options:

**Proposal 8.1.** **[To discuss] [5/16] [option 6.e)/6.a)]** UE’s new KRRCint key i.e. the one calculated when triggering SDT (which is calculated based on the NCC provided in last RRCRelease msg).

**Proposal 8.2.** **[To discuss] [10/16] [option 6.b)]** Horizonal key derivation.

**Proposal 8.3.** **[To discuss] [3/16] [option 6.c)]** New NCC that was provided by the serving gNB in the 1st DL message after UE sends the 1st UL SDT msg (i.e. upon initiating the SDT session)

**Proposal 8.4.** **[To discuss] [1] [option 6.x)]** TS 33.501 is updated to use COUNT=2 for resumeMAC-I calculation of the 2nd RRCResumeRequest for SDT operation (instead than COUNT=1)

**Proposal 9.** **[To agree] [16/16] [option 7.a)]** For CCCH-based approach, when switching from SDT to non-SDT and for the scenario where the ongoing SDT session is with UE AS context relocation, I-RNTI provided in last *RRCRelease* msg is used for the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg (which would locate/identify the UE AS Context in the network). Note: if agreed, RAN3 might need to be informed (e.g. anchor gNB may need to keep a copy or reference of the UE AS context until SDT session is successfully terminated by the network).

**Proposal 10.** **[To agree] [7/16]** For CCCH-based approach, ask SA3 on whether anchor gNB generate another new KgNB associated with the same serving/target gNB when switching from SDT to non-SDT after network receives the 2nd *RRCResumeRequest* msg.

**Proposal 11.** **[To agree] [9/16] [option 9.a)]** AS layer generates DCCH message and initiates the transmission of DCCH message. **[12/16]** FFS if NAS needs to send a request for this scenario (inter-related with previous LS sent to CT1).

**Proposal 12.** **[To discuss]** For DCCH-based approach, whether UE’s indication/request to switch into CONNECTED when non-SDT becomes available during an ongoing SDT session is sent via **[7/16] [option a)]** new UL RRC msg, or **[10/16] [option b)]** reuse legacy UL RRC msg e.g. *UEAssistanceInformation* message

**Proposal 13.** **[To agree] [14/16] [option 11.c)]** For DCCH-based approach, resume cause is provided by UE to indicate/request the switch into CONNECTED when non-SDT becomes available in UE during an ongoing SDT session. Agreement dependent on CT1’s input.

**Proposal 13.1.** **[To discuss]** whether other information can be provided, e.g. **[6/16] [option 11.a)]** List of one or more RB IDs for which data is arrived, or **[7/16] [option 11.b)]** Data volume per RB or cumulative can also be indicated.

**Proposal 14.** **[To agree] [13/16] [option 16.1)]** For DCCH-based approach, after UE sends DCCH message during an ongoing SDT session, UE continues with the SDT session ongoing until network informs otherwise to UE by transitioning the UE into RRC\_CONNECTED or releasing the UE into legacy RRC\_INACTIVE or RRC\_IDLE.

**Proposal 14.1.** **[To discuss] [7/16] [option 16.2)]** Whether UE should expect a confirmation of reception of the DCCH message; and if so, clarify the details of this confirmation and the expected UE behaviour when not received (e.g. after certain time controlled by a timer)

**Proposal 15.** **[To agree] [14/16]** For DCCH-based approach, UE initiates RACH procedure when there is no UL grant for a UE to send the DCCH message for non-SDT data indication during an ongoing SDT session.

**Proposal 16.** **[To agree]** Events that trigger an abrupt termination or failure of an ongoing SDT session: **[12/16] [event 1)]** cell reselection, **[12/16] [event 2)]** expiry of the failure detection timer and **[10/16] [event 4)]** Maximum number of retransmissions is reached in RLC

**Proposal 16.1.** **[To discuss]** whether to also consider **[9/16] [event 4)]** Lower layer indication

**Proposal 17.** **[To agree] [13/16]** The aim is to define a common UE behaviour, if possible, when any of the agreed trigger events from Proposal 16 lead to an abrupt termination/failure of an SDT session.

**Proposal 18.** **[To agree] [13/16] [Approach 2)]** When a UE detects a failure of an ongoing SDT session and if UE remains in RRC\_INACTIVE, details addressed Proposal 5 to Proposal 10 are applicable to this approach. Note: handling in a new third gNB (i.e., previous/anchor gNB, serving gNB, and new gNB after cell reselection) might require further discussion.

The following list shows the proposals above organized based on the suggested priority aiming to help during its meeting discussion:

**Proposals for easy agreement**

<To be added by Rapporteur>

**Proposals for discussion (1st priority) or to be captured as FFS**

<To be added by Rapporteur>

# Annex: companies’ point of contact

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company** | **Point of contact** | **Email address** |
| Intel Corporation | Marta Martinez Tarradell | marta.m.tarradell@intel.com |
| ZTE Corporation | Eswar Vutukuri | eswar.vutukuri@zte.com.cn |
| FGI, APT | Ming-Hung Tao | MingHungTao@fginnov.com |
| Huawei | Dawid Koziol | dawid.koziol@huawei.com |
| TCL | Hejun Wang | hejun.wang@tcl.com |
| NEC | Wangda | wang\_da@nec.cn/wangda@labs.nec.cn |
| Fujitsu | Ohta | ohta.yoshiaki@fujitsu.com |
| LG Electronics | SeungJune Yi | seungjune.yi@lge.com |
| OPPO | Xue Lin | linxue@oppo.com |
| Lenovo | Jie Shi | Shijie4@lenovo.com |
| vivo | Yitao Mo (Stephen) | yitao.mo@vivo.com |
| Qualcomm | Ruiming Zheng | rzheng@qti.qualcomm.com |
| Xiaomi | Yumin Wu | wuyumin@xiaomi.com |
| Sharp | Chongming Zhang | chongming.zhang@cn.sharp-world.com |
| CATT | Chandrika Worrall | chandrika@catt.cn |

# Reference

1. R2-2104771, Discussion on common control plane issues of SDT, OPPO
2. R2-2104772, on RACH-based SDT, OPPO
3. R2-2104785, Control Plane Common Aspects of RACH and CG based SDT, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd
4. R2-2104881, Failure and successful handling for an SDT session, Intel Corporation
5. R2-2104882, CP-SDT remaining open issues, Intel Corporation
6. R2-2104883, RA-SDT remaining open issues, Intel Corporation
7. R2-2105101, Control plane aspects on the SDT procedure, Apple
8. R2-2105281, Consideration on CP issues, CATT
9. R2-2105448, Control plane aspects of SDT, NEC
10. R2-2105549 on RACH-based SDT, Spreadtrum Communications
11. R2-2105574, Small data transmission with RA-based schemes, Huawei, HiSilicon
12. R2-2105575, Control plane common aspects for SDT, Huawei, HiSilicon
13. R2-2105691, Discussion on subsequent SDT in NR, timer handling, and support for SRB1/2, Sony
14. R2-2105760, Common aspects for SDT, Ericsson
15. R2-2105810, Consideration on CP issues for small data transmission, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility
16. R2-2105885, Discussion on open issues of SDT, Qualcomm Incorporated
17. R2-2105886 on open issues for RACH based SDT, Qualcomm Incorporated, R2-2103433
18. R2-2105928, Control plane common aspects of SDT, ZTE Corporation, Sanechips
19. R2-2105929, Open issues for RACH based SDT, ZTE Corporation, Sanechips, Rel-17
20. R2-2106050, SDT CP and configuration aspects, InterDigital
21. R2-2106132, Discussion on CP aspects of SDT, China Telecomunication Corp.
22. R2-2106256, Anchor relocation and context fetch, CMCC
23. R2-2104401, LS to SA3 on Small data transmissions, Interdigital, April 2021.
24. R2-2104644, LS to CT1 on Small data transmissions (Ccing SA2), Intel Corporation, April 2021.