Tdoc List

2025-04-11 16:13

Agenda Topic TDoc Title Source Type For Avail Treated Decision Wdrn Replaced-by Replaces
1 Agenda and Meeting Objectives S3‑251200 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251216  
    S3‑251216 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251200
    S3‑251202 Process for SA3#121 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251203 Detailed agenda planning SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
2 Meeting Reports                      
2.1 Previous SA3 meeting report/s and SA report S3‑251201 Report from SA3#120 MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251249 Report to SA3 from SA#107 WG Chair report Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
2.2 SA3-LI Report                      
3 Reports and Liaisons from other Groups                      
3.1 Reports and Liaisons S3‑251218 LS on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case C4-244497 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑251301 LS reply on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251782  
    S3‑251782 LS reply on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251301
    S3‑251338 Reply LS on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251782  
    S3‑251344 reply LS to CT4 on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251782  
    S3‑251345 Security aspects for Indirect Network Sharing ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251399 Reply LS to CT4 on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case China Unicom LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251782  
    S3‑251219 LS on Security related protocol-specific parameters for N6 delay measurement C4-250555 LS in   Yes
YesEricsson: there are parameters that are not security parameters in the table. No normative statement for the support of the mentioned protocols, they are shwon as examples. Huawei: the clarifications paragraph is not needed.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑251291 [draft] LS reply to LS on Security related protocol-specific parameters for N6 delay measurement Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251667  
    S3‑251667 LS reply to LS on Security related protocol-specific parameters for N6 delay measurement Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251291
    S3‑251220 LS on security verification related to NR Femtos R3-250822 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑251346 draft - Reply LS on security verification related to NR Femtos ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251668  
    S3‑251668 Reply LS on security verification related to NR Femtos ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251346
    S3‑251327 Reply LS to LS on security verification related to NR Femtos (R3-250822) Nokia LS out Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251668  
    S3‑251447 Draft Rely LS to RAN3 on CAG ID verification Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251668  
    S3‑251448 Discussion on CAG ID verification Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251221 LS Reply to Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) S2-2409441 LS in   Yes
YesNokia: let’s base on what SA3 has in their specifications, not on whatever SA2 has written. CATT didn’t want to change their position, so it was proposed to send an LS response stating the lack of consensus in SA3 about whether there was a security issue. This was taken offline.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑251320 Reply LS on Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251783  
    S3‑251415 Reply LS on Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) CATT LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251783  
    S3‑251482 LS reply on Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251783  
    S3‑251783 LS reply on Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251482
    S3‑251222 LS on User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AI/ML positioning S2-2412940 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑251269 Reply LS on User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AI/ML positioning vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251319 Reply LS on User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AI/ML positioning Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251438 LS out on user privacy aspect of LMF based AIML positioning Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251547 Discussion paper regarding User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AI/ML positioning Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251494 Discussion paper on AIML positioning Apple discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251495 Reply LS on AIML positioning Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251553 Reply LS on User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AI/ML positioning Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251788  
    S3‑251788 Reply LS on User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AI/ML positioning Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesThe Chair asked for a show of hands on the options: Option 1: Vivo, Apple, Huawei Option 2: AT&T, Lenovo, Ericsson, ORANGE,Intel,Xiaomi,OPPO,Deutsche Telekom, Thales. Ericsson: the issue is whether when LCS is checked do we need user consent or not? Nokia: TR conclusion was that the user consent is required. AT&T: we refer to the TS, no TRs. This is not content from the specification. It was commented that sending an LS stating "no consensus" wouldn’t help SA2. A working agreement on a LS would not make much sense according to Deutsche Telekom. ORANGE proposed to postpone the LS to the next meeting. Apple: SA2 has postponed discussions until May meeting. We can just tell them the status of the work here. ORANGE: write that SA3 could not reach consensus. Ericsson: SA2 will go for show of hands if there is no response from SA3.
 		approved No   S3‑251553
    S3‑251223 LS on Device Subscription Data S2-2501242 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑251419 reply LS on Device Subscription Data Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesT-Mobile: we object to the assumption of storing the credential in the AiOT device profile data. We cannot mix secure data with non-secure data. Huawei: Add that SA3 hasn’t considered any another scenario.
 		revised No S3‑251669  
    S3‑251669 reply LS on Device Subscription Data Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑251419
    S3‑251551 LS reply on Device Subscription Data Nokia LS out Approval Yes
YesORANGE preferred the Huawei LS. There was no discussion on public/private networks in SA2. Credential holders in public/private networks is an issue to be discussed in SA3, not in SA2.
 		merged No S3‑251669  
    S3‑251228 Reply LS on secure storage and processing of credentials for AIoT ETSI TC SET LS in   Yes
YesORANGE proposed to postpone and reply next meeting. It was discussed that consumption power should be queried to SA1 and RAN1, although consumption based on a security algorithm could be out of their scope. It was agreed to draft an LS in 670 on this topic.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑251226 LS on the scope attribute of the access token standard claims S5-251112 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑251323 DRAFT Reply LS to S3-251226 LS on the scope attribute of the access token standard claims Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251671  
    S3‑251671 Reply LS to S3-251226 LS on the scope attribute of the access token standard claims Nokia LS out Approval Yes
YesThis will be resubmitted to keep working during the next meeting.
 		postponed No   S3‑251323
    S3‑251380 LS reply to SA5 on scope of access token Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251671  
    S3‑251486 LSout on the scope attribute of the access token standard claims Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251671  
    S3‑251608 Reply to LS on the scope attribute of the access token standard claims Xiaomi Technology Netherlands LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251671  
    S3‑251227 LS on User Authentication for IOPS S6-250330 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑251443 Discussion about security for IOPS Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251444 Reply LS on IOPS user authentication Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251672  
    S3‑251446 LS on architecture assumption of IOPS Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesEricsson: not necessary. SA6 can communicate with SA2 about this ropic. KPN supported this LS. Qualcomm: this is an issue that needs to be discussed in SA2. Companies can take it to SA2, no need to discuss this in SA3. NTT-Docomo: in 5G we can use a certificate-based authentication for IOPS. If SA2 started this work we could figure out a solution based on the work in LTE. I don’t agree with this LS, it’s the wrong way to start the work. Nokia: let's trigger this from SA3 perspective, it’s mainly a security architecture.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251552 LS reply on User authentication for IOPS Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251672  
    S3‑251672 LS reply on User authentication for IOPS Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251552
    S3‑251229 OSAppID usage by AppToken use case GSMA LS in   Yes
YesGoogle: appIds revealed to the carrier. This is a privacy concern. Vodafone: appID is anonimised, it’s a nickname. Telefonica: the appID identifier does not provide any info on the real identity. Lenovo: no privacy issue here. Only for apps that are operator managed, anyway. Vivo: ask questions to GSMA and discuss there the threat model and have a more proper assesment so we can answer their questions. NTT-Docomo: it's not clear what privacy issue we are trying to address here. Verizon was wondering about the scope of the response from SA3. Xiaomi didn’t see the purpose of this procedure from GSMA. Huawei: reply that SA3 cannot provide feedback? The Chair commented: focus on the 3GPP identities and procedures. Look at what GSMA is using from 3GPP and comment on that. Maybe we should escalate to SA plenary and have a common answer from 3GPP. The discussion was taken offline. Google: revealing appID is our priority topic here. Telefonica: I support sending an LS about the lack of consensus, as sending this to Plenary may end up sending this back to us.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑251297 Discussion paper on OSAppID usage by AppToken use case Verizon, Telefonica, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom, KDDI, Ericsson, Nokia discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251298 Reply LS on OSAppID usage by App Token use case Verizon Sweden LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251789  
    S3‑251789 Reply LS on OSAppID usage by App Token use case Verizon Sweden LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251298
    S3‑251299 [DRAFT] Reply LS on OSAppID usage by AppToken use case Google Korea LLC LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251789  
    S3‑251300 Discussion on the GSMA AppToken based mechanism Google Korea LLC discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251496 Discussion paper on security issue of App Token Apple discussion   Yes
YesVodafone: privacy of the user is not disclosed at all in this procedure.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251497 Reply GSMA LS on App Token Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251789  
    S3‑251233 TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur InterDigital Belgium. LLC other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251225 Reply LS on AI/ML UE sided data collection S5-250828 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251670 LS on power and energy consumption budget for security features in AioT ORANGE LS out Approval Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with RAN1 deadling with security issues. GSMA: difference between AIoT and IoT is power, as understood in 3GPP. SA1 needs an answer, otherwise it is understood that there will be no difference betwee AioT and IoT. Deutsche Telekom: in favout of this LS. We cannot decide our security measures without a response on the power consumption. OPPO: feedback from RAN colleagues is that the maximum power was defined some time ago. The internal power details are based on proprietary solutions that vendors are reluctant to expose. Interdigital supported sending this LS. Huawei argued that time was wasted on this LS, which was a new document created during the meeting; dealing with documents that had'nt been treated would have been more helpful for companies. ORANGE asked to postpone this document and have Huawei justify the reason for objection. ORANGE was asked to resubmit the same document next meeting to keep the same discussion.
 		postponed No    
3.2 Follow up topics from LSs S3‑251245 Discussion Paper on SA3 input to SA2 and SA for UIA Rel-20 InterDigital France R&D, SAS discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251246 LS on UIA Rel-20 InterDigital France R&D, SAS LS out Approval Yes
YesNokia supported the LS. Verizon found security issues that needed to be addressed.
 		revised No S3‑251673  
    S3‑251673 LS on UIA Rel-20 InterDigital France R&D, SAS LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251246
4 Work areas                      
4.1 Maintenance (Rel-15/16/17/18/19)                      
4.1.1 Security Assurance                      
4.1.2 Service Based Architecture S3‑251307 Token-based authorization for indirect communication scenarios when NF is selected at target PLMN Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251674  
    S3‑251674 Token-based authorization for indirect communication scenarios when NF is selected at target PLMN Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR - No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑251307
    S3‑251633 Token-based-authorization in indirect communication with NF selection in target network - focus on target network as per CT4 work item Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251635 Roaming and interconnect authorization aspects in indirect communication Nokia CR   Yes
YesHuawei: not sure that this is needed.
 		revised No S3‑251676  
    S3‑251676 Roaming and interconnect authorization aspects in indirect communication Nokia CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251635
    S3‑251308 Token-based authorization for indirect communication model without delegated discovery scenario when NF is selected at target PLMN Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, MITRE other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251675  
    S3‑251675 Token-based authorization for indirect communication model without delegated discovery scenario when NF is selected at target PLMN Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, MITRE other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251308
    S3‑251302 Discussion on the NF consumer PLMN ID check Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251303 Checking PLMNID of NF Service Consumer in interconnect scenario Ericsson, Nokia Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesMITRE: I don’t see this as a potential solution.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251304 Checking PLMNID of NF Service Consumer in interconnect scenario Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251305 Checking PLMNID of NF Service Consumer in interconnect scenario Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251306 LS on Checking PLMNID of NFc in interconnect scenario Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251342 Format adjustment and typo correction on access token request procedures Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251677  
    S3‑251677 Format adjustment and typo correction on access token request procedures Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251342
    S3‑251343 Clarification on verification of NFc in roaming scenario Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251678  
    S3‑251678 Clarification on verification of NFc in roaming scenario Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑251343
4.1.3 Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe                      
4.1.4 Mission Critical                      
4.1.5 Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G S3‑251427 Term alignment in AKMA disabling service Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251683  
    S3‑251683 Term alignment in AKMA disabling service Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251427
    S3‑251601 Editorial correction for AKMA service disabling LG Electronics CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑251602 Editorial correction for AKMA service operation LG Electronics CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251644 Editorial correction for AKMA service disabling LG Electronics CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.1.6 Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS                      
4.1.7 Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services                      
4.1.8 Security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT                      
4.1.9 Security Aspects of eNPN                      
4.1.10 Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC                      
4.1.11 Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems                      
4.1.12 Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning                      
4.1.13 Security Aspects of eNA. S3‑251429 Revision for X.10 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251684  
    S3‑251684 Revision for X.10 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251429
    S3‑251430 Revision for X.10 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251685  
    S3‑251685 Revision for X.10 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251430
4.1.14 Modified PRINS for roaming service providers in 5G S3‑251630 Roaming intermediary requirements introduction in previous release - alignment Nokia CR   Yes
YesMCC: "from Rel-18 onward" doesn’t need to be written. Just stop in "shall be supported". Huawei needed more time to discuss the CR and it was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑251686  
    S3‑251686 Roaming intermediary requirements introduction in previous release - alignment Nokia CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251630
4.1.15 All other maintenance topics (not listed above or below) S3‑251292 Clarification of the intended applicabilty and requirements for Annex V Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesAT&T didn’t agree with this change.This was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑251790  
    S3‑251790 Clarification of the intended applicabilty and requirements for Annex V Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
YesNokia: let's discuss this during next meeting.
 		not pursued No   S3‑251292
    S3‑251431 Clarification for OAM signature as initial trust Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251687  
    S3‑251687 Clarification for OAM signature as initial trust Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251431
    S3‑251433 Discussion paper for OAM signature as initial trust clarification Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251434 Clarification for OAM signature as initial trust Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251688  
    S3‑251688 Clarification for OAM signature as initial trust Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251434
    S3‑251435 Making NF type as included parameter to OAM signature Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251791  
    S3‑251791 Making NF type as included parameter to OAM signature Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251435
    S3‑251481 Fixing API invoker onboarding – Rel18 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: better to make the changes in Rel-19. I don’t agree with changing the figure. Ericsson: this is because of SA5 progress on the use of CAPIF in Rel-18.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251689 Fixing API invoker onboarding – Rel18 Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑251507 discussion paper on SEAL security framework Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251508 Fix issues on SEAL security framework Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.2 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR).                      
4.3 SCAS for Rel-18 features on existing functions.                      
4.4 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF).                      
4.5 Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms.                      
4.6 Mission critical security enhancements for release 19 S3‑251230 [MCXSec4] 33180 R19 MC Recording Server Introduction Airbus CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: implementation aspects are usually written in a note. Airbus: we don’t want to emphasize one implementation over another. Huawei: the options are now totally different. In any case they both should go to the note instead of the normative text. Ericsson: the language is not normative. We don’t have a strong opinion.
 		revised No S3‑251792  
    S3‑251792 [MCXSec4] 33180 R19 MC Recording Server Introduction Airbus CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251230
4.7 Addition of Milenage-256 algorithm                      
4.8 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols                      
4.9 Security aspects of the 5GMSG Service phase 3                      
4.10 R19 SCAS WID S3‑251259 NF discovery authorization based on expected NF profile BSI (DE), Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251690  
    S3‑251690 NF discovery authorization based on expected NF profile BSI (DE), Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251259
    S3‑251260 Correction in requirement description for HTTP input validation Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: what is form data? Add e.g. to this change. T-Mobile: there is a shall at the beginning of the sentence, what is the etc that you are trying to validate? This part cannot be under shall.
 		revised No S3‑251691  
    S3‑251691 Correction in requirement description for HTTP input validation Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval No
YesHuawei preferred to see this in Rel-20. This is modifying executing tests and the labs will take it as compulsory, not examples.
 		not pursued No   S3‑251260
    S3‑251261 Correction on preconditions for Packet Filtering test case Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251262 Correction in test case content for Webserver Logging Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251692  
    S3‑251692 Correction in test case content for Webserver Logging Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval No
YesHuawei preferred to see this in Rel-20.
 		not pursued No   S3‑251262
    S3‑251263 Correction on unnecessary or insecure services Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei preferred to see this in Rel-20.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251264 Correction in execution steps for test related to predefined accounts Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: No revision marks, just red font. Huawei preferred to see this in Rel-20.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251265 Correction of missing Test Case Names Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: No revision marks, just red font. Overlaps with 1646.
 		revised No S3‑251693  
    S3‑251693 Correction of missing Test Case Names Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251265
    S3‑251267 Correction on unnecessary or insecure services Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251694  
    S3‑251694 Correction on remote login restrictions Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251267
    S3‑251268 Correction on unnecessary or insecure services Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
YesBSI_ replace active with running. T-Mobile: maybe use available. Huawei: this test has been used for many years, any change in wording should be clearly justified. Qualcomm: please make the title of 267 and 268 different.
 		revised No S3‑251695  
    S3‑251695 Correction on unnecessary or insecure services Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251268
    S3‑251286 Correction of TC UP replay protection Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: we agreed that SCAS will not touch older releases. This is not needed.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251288 Correction of TC RRC replay protection Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251289 Correction of TC UP replay protection Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251290 Correction of TC RRC replay protection Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251646 Addition and correction of test names in 33.117 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: postpone to the next meeting, these were submitted late and we didn’t have time to check this.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251647 Clean up of 33.117 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251648 Clean up of 33.216 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251649 Addition and correction of test names in 33.216 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251650 Clean up of 33.511 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251651 Addition of a test name in 33.511 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251652 R17 mirror: Correction of TC UP integrity check failure BSI (DE), Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251653 R18 mirror: Correction of TC UP integrity check failure BSI (DE), Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251654 Clean up of 33.512 BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251655 Correction of test case TC_NAS_ALG_AMF_CHANGE_AMF in 33.512 BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251656 Clean up of 33.513 BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251657 Correction of a test name in 33.513 BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251658 Clean up of 33.514 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251659 Clean up of 33.515 BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251660 Correction of a test name in 33.515 BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251661 Clean up of 33.517 BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251662 Addition of a test name in 33.517 BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251663 Clean up of 33.523 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251664 Clean up of 33.527 BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251665 Correction of test names in 33.527 BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251666 Clean up of 33.529 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.11 TEI19 topics (restricted to agreed topics only) S3‑251540 DRAFT CR Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, NCSC draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251799  
    S3‑251799 DRAFT CR Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, NCSC draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑251540
    S3‑251243 Certificate validation procedure for OAuth NCSC, Ericsson other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251679  
    S3‑251679 Certificate validation procedure for OAuth NCSC, Ericsson other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251243
    S3‑251636 pCR to DraftCR Addressing symmetric key and public key provisioning Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251680  
    S3‑251310 Resolve ENs on authorized NRF in draft CR on Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson, NCSC other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251680  
    S3‑251680 Resolve ENs on authorized NRF in draft CR on Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson, NCSC, Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251310
    S3‑251311 Public key distribution service support both raw key and certificate Ericsson, NCSC other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251682  
    S3‑251682 Public key distribution service support both raw key and certificate Ericsson, NCSC other Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑251311
    S3‑251312 Public key distribution service update Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251313 Add x5t#S256 and clarify the usage of the key identifier, kid in the JWS profile Ericsson, NCSC CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: create a draft CR so we send all changes together.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251638 Service versus service operation Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251637 Limiting which NRFs can issue access tokens Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251242 OAuth Tokens for NF Type level access NCSC, Ericsson other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251401 Security enhancement for indirect network sharing China Unicom CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251309 DRAFT CR Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑251632 Token-based-authorization_indirect_communication_with_NF_selection_in_target_network - focus on target network as per CT4 work item Nokia other   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑251634 Alignment by intro of clause on roaming and interconnect authorization aspects in indirect communication Nokia CR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4.12 Security aspects of NR mobility enhancement Phase 4                      
4.13 Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication                      
4.14 Security for MonStra                      
4.15 Security Aspects of Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 S3‑251440 Adress Editor's Note about multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251793  
    S3‑251441 Discussion paper about security material provisioning for multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251442 Adress Editor's Note about multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery - PLMN restrictions Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251793  
    S3‑251510 Adressing the EN in multi-hop U2N Model A China Telecom CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251793  
    S3‑251511 Adressing the EN in multi-hop U2N Model B China Telecom CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251793  
    S3‑251591 Addressing the Editor’s Notes in multi-hop U2N relay discovery security Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No S3‑251793  
    S3‑251793 Addressing the Editor’s Notes in multi-hop U2N relay discovery security Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑251591
    S3‑251593 Adding support of intermediate UE-to-network relays from different HPLMNs in 5G ProSe Multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay Discovery Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251623 Clarification on the discovery security materials provisioning for inter-PLMN scenario Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251793  
    S3‑251509 discussion paper on security of ProSe in SNPN Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
YesIt was agreed to bring a single CR next meeting provided by Nokia.
 		noted No    
4.16 Security aspects of 5G NR Femto S3‑251329 Some terminology corrections in TS 33.545 clause 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes452 and 499 overlap with this one.
 		revised No S3‑251696  
    S3‑251696 Some terminology corrections in TS 33.545 clause 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251329
    S3‑251451 Aligning terms in clause 3.1 to specifications Huawei, Hisilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251452 Move content from clause 3.2 to clause 3.3 Huawei, Hisilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251696  
    S3‑251454 Minor corrections to clause 5.2.2 Huawei, Hisilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251499 Femto clean up ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251696  
    S3‑251566 Rel-19_CR_Editorial modification in TS 33.545 CMCC CR Agreement Yes
YesKept open since other contributions changed the same clause 4.1.
 		revised No S3‑251697  
    S3‑251697 Rel-19_CR_Editorial modification in TS 33.545 CMCC CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251566
    S3‑251567 Rel-19_CR_Femto Term alignment in TS 33.545 CMCC CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251330 Update local UPF related aspects of the specification to align with SA2 Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251698  
    S3‑251698 Update local UPF related aspects of the specification to align with SA2 Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesRemoving changes in 4.1. Qualcomm: reword NOTE2 and don’t refer to Rel-19.
 		agreed No   S3‑251330
    S3‑251339 DP on security aspects of local UPF in NR Femto Nokia discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251453 Clarification to clause 4.1 Huawei, Hisilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251449 New clauses on security requirement and principles Huawei, Hisilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251787  
    S3‑251787 New clauses on security requirement and principles Huawei, Hisilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251449
    S3‑251328 Update NR Femto Gateway Functionality Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251699  
    S3‑251699 Update NR Femto Gateway Functionality Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251328
    S3‑251450 New clause under clause 4.2 on Femto GW function description Huawei, Hisilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251699  
    S3‑251500 Topology hiding correction ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251455 New clauses on security feature of CAG ID verification Huawei, Hisilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251699  
    S3‑251347 Femto clean up ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑251348 Topology hiding correction ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4.17 Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC — phase 3                      
4.18 Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) S3‑251217 pCR to ACME-SBA for external account binding NCSC, Cisco other Approval Yes
YesJohn Hopkins supported this contribution.
 		revised No S3‑251794  
    S3‑251794 pCR to ACME-SBA for external account binding NCSC, Cisco other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251217
    S3‑251392 YY1 introduction and YY21 NF instantiation Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251795  
    S3‑251795 YY1 introduction and YY21 NF instantiation Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251392
    S3‑251393 authorization for account creation Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesNokia preferred 217 to this contribution. NCSC didn’t agree with this contribution either. It refers to mechanisms that don’t exist. Ericsson and Cisco didn’t support this either. John Hopkins didn’t support this contribution.
 		merged No S3‑251794  
    S3‑251293 Address editor’s note for ACME certificate issuance Johns Hopkins University APL, Google, US National Security Agency other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251238 Align text Cisco Systems, US National Security Agency other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251294 ACME challenge types Google, Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency other Approval Yes
YesAT&T supported this contribution. Nokia and Ericsson also supported this.Cisco found the table useful. Huawei didn’t support this.
 		approved No    
    S3‑251390 dns-01 challenge Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesNCSC didn’t support this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251391 initial trust challenge Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesNo current work in IETF to define this challenge. No expert in IANA will assign anything based on this work. We don’t agree with this. Noikia didn’t agree with this contribution. John Hopkins: it reads a lot like pre-authentication. I don’t agree with this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251237 IANA considerations Cisco Systems, US National Security Agency other Approval Yes
YesHuawei: convert the editor's notes into NOTEs. Cisco: we need to capture somehow our request to IANA SA3 Chair: usually once we get the number from IANA we add it to the TS. This is not the way we do it in 3GPP. Keep the editor's note and once we get the info from IANA we address it. Cisco asked to keep it open to check with CT.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251287 Editorial changes for consistency within new Annex YY Cisco Systems, Johns Hopkins University APL other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251700  
    S3‑251700 Editorial changes for consistency within new Annex YY Cisco Systems, Johns Hopkins University APL other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251287
    S3‑251206 Living document for Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) Cisco Systems, Huawei draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251701  
    S3‑251701 Living document for Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) Cisco Systems,Huawei draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑251206
4.19 Security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 3 S3‑251410 Living document for security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251743  
    S3‑251743 Living document for security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 CATT draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑251410
    S3‑251341 A summary report from offline calls for Rel-19 WI on 5GSAT_Ph3_SEC Nokia discussion   Yes
YesQuestions whether informative text can be in normative annex: MCC replied yes, as long as there is something normative somewhere in the annex, otherwise informative text in a normative annex would be confusing. It was commented that the deployment model was informative, but if this was chosen the security would be mandatory, hence it should be included as a normative annex. It was agreed to have Split MME into informative annex.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251331 Update skeleton Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251745  
    S3‑251411 Skeleton for security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251745  
    S3‑251745 Skeleton for security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251411
    S3‑251351 Update general description of security for store and forward satellite operation ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251746  
    S3‑251412 General description for security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 CATT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251746  
    S3‑251746 General description for security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 CATT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251412
    S3‑251332 Security option on Split MME architecture (Informative) Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251744  
    S3‑251350 Security aspects of Split MME architecture ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251744  
    S3‑251413 Security aspects of Split MME architecture CATT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251744  
    S3‑251526 pCR on general description for split MME architecture Samsung, Interdigital other Approval Yes
YesXiaomi, Huawei against the editor's note on DoS attacks.
 		merged No S3‑251744  
    S3‑251561 Security aspects of Split MME architecture Philips International B.V. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes.
 		revised No S3‑251744  
    S3‑251744 Security aspects of Split MME architecture Philips International B.V. draftCR Approval No
YesSamsung strongly opted for adding an editor's note on (D)DOS attacks and requested a show of hands. Huawei wasn't in favour of the editor's note. It was proposed to reword the editor's note to "whether and how to address the (D)DOS attacks are FFS." Interdigital commented that this was deceptive. Philips: we don’t agree with the "whether": they proposed the wording :"addressing the (D)DOS attacks are FFS". Huawei disagreed with this wording, they preferred "whether and how". Xiaomi supported Huawei. T-Mobile proposed to note the document. Huawei: addressing the attacks would mean proposing a solution that could address (D)DOS. CATT replied that everything was FFS, it didn’t mean that. It was agreed to have a conference call on this. NTT-Docomo: FFS also means implementation specfiic solutions. It was asked to be minuted: "The editor's note doesn't preclude or include that SA3 will astandardise solutions against (D)DOS attacks."
 		approved No   S3‑251561
    S3‑251586 Proposed text for split MME clause of satellite store & forward Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251744  
    S3‑251622 Security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251744  
    S3‑251525 Discussion on DoS attacks for a split MME architecture Samsung discussion Endorsement Yes
YesQualcomm: DoS attacks are not sufficiently strong to make these changes. China Mobile supported this. Interdigital: the DoS attack validity was agreed in the study. We shouldn't renegotiate this conclusion. Xiaomi: based on SA2's work we need to update the conclusion, because SA2 didn’t specify the UE behaviour. Huawei: the solutions exhibit technical issues.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251235 (D)DOS attacks and remediation InterDigital, Philips International B.V., Samsung, Intel other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251296 (D)DOS remediation InterDigital Belgium. LLC other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251333 Security option on Full EPC architecture (Informative) Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251747  
    S3‑251349 Security aspects of Full EPC in each satellite ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251747  
    S3‑251414 Security aspects of Full EPC in each satellite CATT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251747  
    S3‑251527 Discussion on full EPC architecture Samsung discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251528 pCR on Security for S&F operation on Full EPC architecture Samsung other Approval Yes
YesHuawei: remove the editor's note. Thales supported this. KPN: we need more work in IOPS.We want to keep it.
 		revised No S3‑251747  
    S3‑251747 pCR on Security for S&F operation on Full EPC architecture Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251528
    S3‑251562 Security aspects of Full EPC onboard a satellite Philips International B.V. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251747  
    S3‑251587 Proposed text for full EPC clause of satellite store & forward Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251747  
    S3‑251756 Considerations for (D)DOS is satellite operation Interdigital discussion discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
4.20 UAS security enhancements Phase 3 S3‑251241 UAS baseline draftCR - Adding support for multiple USSs Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated, InterDigital draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251725  
    S3‑251725 UAS baseline draftCR - Adding support for multiple USSs Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated, InterDigital draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251241
    S3‑251247 Location tracking update for multi-USS support InterDigital France R&D, SAS other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251725  
    S3‑251394 Security aspects supporting multiple USSs Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251725  
    S3‑251395 USS changeover procedure Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251725  
    S3‑251396 UUAA supporting changeover procedure Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251725  
    S3‑251397 USS authorization Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251725  
4.21 Security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services S3‑251355 resolving EN in clause 6.X.a ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
YesXiamoi: the editor's note is still open.Dont delete it. To be addressed next meeting.
 		revised No S3‑251729  
    S3‑251729 resolving EN in clause 6.X.a ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251355
    S3‑251356 resolving EN in clause 6.X.b ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251730  
    S3‑251730 resolving EN in clause 6.X.b ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251356
    S3‑251520 Update to authorization for spatial localization services Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251730  
    S3‑251615 CAPIF-based authentication and authorization of spatial localization services Xiaomi Technology UK Limited other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251729  
    S3‑251616 SEAL-based authentication and authorization of spatial localization services Xiaomi Technology UK Limited other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251730  
    S3‑251352 Authentication and authorization for digital asset services when CAPIF is not used ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251732  
    S3‑251353 Authentication and authorization for digital asset services when CAPIF is used ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251731  
    S3‑251521 Authentication and authorization for digital asset services Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251732  
    S3‑251502 input to metaverse sec draftCR for solution on KI3 - CAPIF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251731  
    S3‑251731 input to metaverse sec draftCR for solution on KI3 - CAPIF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251502
    S3‑251503 input to metaverse sec draftCR for solution on KI3 - SEAL SEC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251732  
    S3‑251732 input to metaverse sec draftCR for solution on KI3 - SEAL SEC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251503
    S3‑251617 CAPIF-based authentication and authorization of DA services Xiaomi Technology UK Limited other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251731  
    S3‑251618 SEAL-based authentication and authorization of DA services Xiaomi Technology UK Limited other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251732  
    S3‑251504 input to metaverse sec draftCR for solution on KI4 - SEAL SEC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251735  
    S3‑251735 input to metaverse sec draftCR for solution on KI4 - SEAL SEC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251504
    S3‑251619 CAPIF-based authentication and authorization of avatar Xiaomi Technology UK Limited other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251733  
    S3‑251733 CAPIF-based authentication and authorization of avatar Xiaomi Technology UK Limited other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251619
    S3‑251620 SEAL-based authentication and authorization of avatar Xiaomi Technology UK Limited other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251734  
    S3‑251734 SEAL-based authentication and authorization of avatar Xiaomi Technology UK Limited other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251620
    S3‑251354 Privacy protection for user information exposure ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251736  
    S3‑251736 Privacy protection for user information exposure ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251354
    S3‑251519 Living document on Metaverse_Sec Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251737  
    S3‑251737 Living document on Metaverse_Sec Samsung draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑251519
4.22 Security aspects of CAPIF Phase3 S3‑251386 Authentication of ROF and CCF for CAPIF-8 reference point Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251711  
    S3‑251711 Authentication of ROF and CCF for CAPIF-8 reference point Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251386
    S3‑251212 Updates to resource owner authorization revocation Lenovo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251712  
    S3‑251460 baseline pCR against Draft CR for KI#1.2 on revocation China Telecom Corporation Ltd. , Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251712  
    S3‑251712 baseline pCR against Draft CR for KI#1.2 on revocation China Telecom Corporation Ltd. , Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251460
    S3‑251459 KI#1.2 pCR on top of the baseline pCR- revocation China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251712  
    S3‑251472 pCR against living Draft CR on revocation CATT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251712  
    S3‑251643 Addition to revocation Baseline pCR Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251712  
    S3‑251385 KI1.2 Living Draft CR on Resource Owner authentication and authorization information was S3-251112.docx Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Xiaomi draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251722  
    S3‑251722 Living CR on RO authorization Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Xiaomi draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑251385
    S3‑251213 Updates to Draft CR for KI1.2 on Resource Owner authorization Lenovo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251713  
    S3‑251324 Pseudo-CR on CAPIF-8 Security aspects of RO authorization CATT other Approval Yes
YesEricsson: already included.
 		merged No S3‑251713  
    S3‑251387 Addition on authorization procedure Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Xiaomi other Approval Yes
YesChina Telecom: remvoe the NOTE.
 		revised No S3‑251713  
    S3‑251713 Addition on authorization procedure Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Xiaomi other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251387
    S3‑251388 Addition on revocation procedure Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251712  
    S3‑251417 KI#1.2 pCR on top of the baseline pCR- RO authorization China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251713  
    S3‑251389 Addition on finer granularity authorization Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251714  
    S3‑251478 Document against living Draft CR RO authorization Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251713  
    S3‑251231 KI1.3 Living Draft CR Finer level authorization was S3-251114 Huawei, Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251721  
    S3‑251721 Living CR on Finer Level authorization Nokia,Huawei draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑251231
    S3‑251232 Baseline pCR against Draft CR KI1.3 from pre-discussion - Finer level of authorization Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251714  
    S3‑251714 Baseline pCR against Draft CR KI1.3 from pre-discussion - Finer level of authorization Nokia other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251232
    S3‑251475 Document against living Draft CR of finer level authorization Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251714  
    S3‑251612 KI1.3 pCR on top of the Baseline pCR Xiaomi Technology Netherlands other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251714  
    S3‑251512 Baseline pCR against Draft CR KI2 from pre-discussion CAPIF interconnection Samsung, Xiaomi, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251715  
    S3‑251715 Baseline pCR against Draft CR KI2 from pre-discussion CAPIF interconnection Samsung, Xiaomi, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251512
    S3‑251211 Updates to Security procedure for CAPIF interconnection Lenovo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251715  
    S3‑251416 KI#2 pCR on top of the baseline pCR-interconnect China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251715  
    S3‑251477 Document against living Draft CR CAPIF interconnection Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251715  
    S3‑251513 Security procedures for CAPIF interconnection Samsung, China Telecom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251720  
    S3‑251720 Living CR on Interconnection Samsung, China Telecom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑251513
    S3‑251611 KI2 pCR on top of the Baseline pCR Xiaomi Technology Netherlands other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251715  
    S3‑251645 Addition to interconnect Baseline pCR Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251715  
    S3‑251610 KI3 Living Draft CR for authorizing API invoker on one UE accessing resources related to another UE Xiaomi Technology Netherlands draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251719  
    S3‑251719 Living CR on Cross UE authorization Xiaomi Technology Netherlands draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑251610
    S3‑251614 Baseline pCR against Draft CR for K3 on authorizing API invoker on one UE accessing resources related to another UE Xiaomi Technology Netherlands other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251716  
    S3‑251716 Baseline pCR against Draft CR for K3 on authorizing API invoker on one UE accessing resources related to another UE Xiaomi Technology Netherlands other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251614
    S3‑251480 Document against living Draft CR UE-hosted API invoker accessing network-hosted resources of another UE Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251716  
    S3‑251474 KI4 Living Draft CR CAPIF nested API Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251718  
    S3‑251718 Living CR on Nested API Ericsson draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑251474
    S3‑251483 Baseline document against living Draft CR CAPIF nested API Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251717  
    S3‑251717 Baseline document against living Draft CR CAPIF nested API Ericsson, Samsung, Xiaomi, Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251483
    S3‑251476 Document against living Draft CR CAPIF nested API Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251717  
    S3‑251514 pCR to Baseline pCR for CAPIF nested API authorization Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251717  
    S3‑251609 KI4 pCR on top of the Baseline pCR Xiaomi Technology Netherlands other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251717  
    S3‑251210 Onboarding API Invoker Residing in the UE Lenovo,Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251724  
    S3‑251724 Living CR on Onboarding Lenovo,Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251210
    S3‑251479 Document against living Draft CR API Invoker onboarding Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251724  
    S3‑251357 Correction of existing text in TS 33.122 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251325 PCR against draftCR on Authorization revocation through CAPIF-8 reference point CATT other   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑251723 Way forward for consolidated architecture for user consent management versus resource owner authorization in CAPIF SA6 WG Chair other Presentation Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251800 Living CR on Revocation China Telecom draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.23 Security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 S3‑251594 Living document for NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2: draftCR to TS 33.203, Signing and verification of third party user identity information in IMS Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251753  
    S3‑251753 Living document for NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2: draftCR to TS 33.203, Signing and verification of third party user identity information in IMS Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251594
    S3‑251595 Resolve Editor’s Notes about more content Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251596 Proposal for a living document for NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2: draftCR to TS 33.328, Security and privacy of IMS capability exposure Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251752  
    S3‑251752 Proposal for a living document for NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2: draftCR to TS 33.328, Security and privacy of IMS capability exposure Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251596
    S3‑251336 draftCR to TS 33.328, Security of IMS DC capability exposure Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251752  
    S3‑251538 Add description of security and privacy aspects of IMS DC capability exposure CMCC other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251752  
4.24 Security aspects of Core Network Enhanced Support for AIML S3‑251539 Living document for AIML_CN_SEC CMCC draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251754  
    S3‑251279 Update on X.11.2 Security for data collection for the LMF-based AI/ML positioning vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251755  
    S3‑251755 Update on X.11.2 Security for data collection for the LMF-based AI/ML positioning vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251279
    S3‑251754 Living document for AIML_CN_SEC CMCC draftCR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑251539
    S3‑251600 Consent enforcement Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251755  
    S3‑251498 AIML CR - Security for data collection for the LMF-based AI/ML positioning Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251280 Update on X.12.2.1 Authorization when NWDAF or internal AF is acting as the VFL server vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251757  
    S3‑251326 PCR on Authorization of candidate VFL participants for VFL CATT other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251757  
    S3‑251437 Resolve the EN for Internal AF as VFL server Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251757  
    S3‑251757 Resolve the EN for Internal AF as VFL server Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251437
    S3‑251560 Clarify VFL authorization when internal AF is involved Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251757  
    S3‑251281 Update on X.12.2.2 Authorization when external AF is acting as the VFL server vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251758  
    S3‑251758 Update on X.12.2.2 Authorization when external AF is acting as the VFL server vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251281
    S3‑251282 Update on X.12.3 NEF security requirement vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251759  
    S3‑251436 NEF security requirements updates based on TR conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251759  
    S3‑251759 NEF security requirements updates based on TR conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251436
    S3‑251428 Update NEF requirement for VFL Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesVivo, Ericsson,Nokia were against this contribution.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251283 Editorial on AIML_SEC skeleton vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251358 Editorial updates to the living document for AIML_CN_SEC ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251760  
    S3‑251760 Editorial updates to the living document for AIML_CN_SEC ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251358
    S3‑251542 editorial changes for living doc CMCC other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251761  
    S3‑251761 editorial changes for living doc CMCC other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251542
    S3‑251762 Security aspects of Core Network Enhanced Support for AIML CMCC CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4.25 Security for PLMN hosting a NPN S3‑251439 Policy enforcement based on TR conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251738  
    S3‑251738 Policy enforcement based on TR conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251439
    S3‑251515 Access policy enforcement Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251738  
    S3‑251550 Access policy enforcement Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251738  
    S3‑251541 Adding a reference to the new informative Annex for the Security of PLMN hosting a NPN Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251739  
    S3‑251739 Adding a reference to the new informative Annex for the Security of PLMN hosting a NPN Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251541
    S3‑251359 Add terms and abbreviation to living CR ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251360 Clarification on none CP function are deployed ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251740  
    S3‑251322 Clarification to CP functions deployed in the PNI-NPN operational domain China Telecom Corporation Ltd.,ZTE other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251740  
    S3‑251740 Clarification to CP functions deployed in the PNI-NPN operational domain China Telecom Corporation Ltd.,ZTE other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251322
    S3‑251361 Living CR for PLMNNPN ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251741  
    S3‑251741 Living CR for PLMNNPN ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑251361
4.26 Security Aspects of Ambient IoT Services in 5G S3‑251236 draft skeleton for TS 33.369 OPPO draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251234 AIOT Scope Proposal InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE, Thales: there are missing points from the WID.
 		merged No S3‑251702  
    S3‑251377 Add scope for AIO Intel pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251702  
    S3‑251370 Update the scope in TS 33.369 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251702  
    S3‑251568 Adding scope for AIoT OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251702  
    S3‑251702 Adding scope for AIoT OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251568
    S3‑251244 AIOT Abbreviations Proposal InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251703  
    S3‑251275 Abbreviations for AIoT vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251703  
    S3‑251463 Add Terms and Abbreviations Sony pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251703  
    S3‑251554 Pseudo-CR-Update clause 3 of TS 33.369 CMCC pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251703  
    S3‑251603 Add terms and abbreviations LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251703  
    S3‑251703 Add terms and abbreviations LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251603
    S3‑251248 General security principles proposal InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251704  
    S3‑251604 Add architecture reference in clause 4 LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251704  
    S3‑251555 Pseudo-CR-Update clause 4.1 of TS 33.369 CMCC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251704  
    S3‑251704 Pseudo-CR-Update clause 4.1 of TS 33.369 CMCC pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑251555
    S3‑251276 Security requirements on the AIOT device vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: security policies can change from one country to another (e.g. NEA0 is requested for emergency calls), so we may be demanding the implementation of algorithms overriding the policy of the network in a country. NTT-Docomo: NEA0 is not an integrity protection algorithm, we are asking the network to implement 4 algorithms instead of 1. OPPO: the operator asks the vendor to implement a particular algorithm in the AIoT device.ORANGE didn’t agree, it was the case of AiOT devices implementing a particular algorithm and the vendor making the operator to implement that particular algorithm.ORANGE didn’t agree with the devices telling the network what to implement.
 		merged No S3‑251705  
    S3‑251316 AIoT Device Secure Storage Ericsson, Thales pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: what is a tampered resistant secure hardware component? How can we agree on this if we don’t know what it is? Thales: this is not new, it’s coming from 5G specifications. The tampered resistant part can also be software.
 		merged No S3‑251705  
    S3‑251363 Update the clause 4.2.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251705  
    S3‑251378 Security requirements on AIoT device Intel Sweden AB pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251705  
    S3‑251405 pCR to TS33.369 Requirements on the device CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251705  
    S3‑251424 security requirements on device Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251705  
    S3‑251705 security requirements on device Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE and Thales objected this contribution. This is based on the fact that the AIoT device is different from power consumption aspects. We learnt that this is not the case. The specifications in RAN don't contain any limitation on the power. Huawei suggested to add an editor's note addressing Thales' concerns, and they pointed out that this was a merge that had been worked on the whole week. Last minute objections didn’t help for progress. Thales replied that a similar situation happened with the LS on power consumption for RAN1 and reiterated their objection. OPPO commented that there was no new information here, it was known from day 1. ORANGE commented that whether treating AiOT devices differently from any other IoT device was the issue here. Do we need a different resolution given this statement? Huawei commented that any open issue could be addressed with an editor's note. Thales: finalise the TR and postpone the discussion to next meeting. AT&T: confidentiality protection FFS should be added. ORANGE: remove requirements and just write the editor's note on the power budget. Huawei asked who was objecting to address their concerns offline: Thales. ORANGE (reason: power budget concerns and on changing security of 5G UE for AioT devices).
 		noted No   S3‑251424
    S3‑251490 AIoT TS - Security Requirements for AIoT devices Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251705  
    S3‑251563 Security requirements on the AIoT device Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251705  
    S3‑251569 Content to 4.2.1 requirement on the device OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251705  
    S3‑251625 Security requirements on the AIoT device Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251705  
    S3‑251277 Security requirements on the AIOTF vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251781  
    S3‑251781 Security requirements on the AIOTF vivo pCR Approval No
YesORANGE: we need to support all the algorithms here, there should be no editor's note anymore. We shouldn't do something different in the network and the device.
 		noted No   S3‑251277
    S3‑251364 Update the clause 4.2.2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251781  
    S3‑251379 Security requirements on AIOTF Intel Sweden AB pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251781  
    S3‑251425 security requirements on AIOTF Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251781  
    S3‑251564 Security requirements on the AIOTF Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251781  
    S3‑251571 Content to 4.2.2 requirement on the AIOTF OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251781  
    S3‑251626 Security requirements on the AIoTF Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251781  
    S3‑251278 Security requirements on the ADM vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251784  
    S3‑251365 Update the clause 4.2.3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251784  
    S3‑251398 Security requirements on ADM Intel Sweden AB pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251784  
    S3‑251426 security requirements on ADM Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251784  
    S3‑251565 Security requirements on the ADM Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251784  
    S3‑251573 Content to 4.2.3 requirement on the ADM OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251784  
    S3‑251627 Security requirements on the ADM Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251784  
    S3‑251784 Security requirements on the ADM Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251627
    S3‑251362 Add a clause about requirement on AIoT Reader ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251557 Pseudo-CR-Update clause 5.1 of TS 33.369 CMCC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251240 AIoT Authentication for Inventory Only KPN pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251559 Pseudo-CR-Update clause 5.4 of TS 33.369 CMCC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251366 Update the clause 5.2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251406 pCR to TS33.369 AIoT Device authentication procedure CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251420 Authentication procedure in AIoT service Huawei, HiSilicon,Vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251628 Authentication procedure for AIoT service Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251464 AIoT Authentication and Privacy Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251580 AIoT Authentication Procedure for Command OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251581 AIoT authentication procedure for Inventory OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251367 Update the clause 5.3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251407 pCR to TS33.369 AIoT Device communication security procedure CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251421 Protection of AIoT data in command message Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251466 Protection of information during AIoT service communication Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251470 Procedure for data protection Sony pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251579 PCR on Protection of information during AIoT service communication OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251629 Protection of information during AIoT service communication Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251368 Update the clause 5.4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251408 pCR to TS33.369 AIoT Device privacy protection CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251471 Protection of AIoT device identifier privacy Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251577 Content to 5.4 Protection of AIoT device identifier privacy OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251369 Update the clause 5.5 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251422 Security protection between AIoT network elements Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251578 Content to 5.5 protection between AIOT network elements OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251607 Permanent Disable Procedure OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251706 Draft TS 33.369 OPPO draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.27 Protection of XRM Media related information S3‑251266 Use of AES in GCM mode for the protection of MRI information when using connect-UDP Forwarded Mode. Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251556 Resolving Editor's notes Ericsson CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251489 Removal of EN for protecting XRM Media related information in UDP Option Lenovo CR Approval Yes
YesNokia: second paragraph is implementation specific.Huawei had also concerns with the second paragraph and preferred to delete the figure.
 		revised No S3‑251801  
    S3‑251801 Removal of EN for protecting XRM Media related information in UDP Option Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251489
    S3‑251254 New organization of subclauses under clause 18 Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251742  
    S3‑251742 New organization of subclauses under clause 18 Nokia CR - Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑251254
4.28 Specification of example algorithm for alternative f5* (f5**) function S3‑251485 Fixing a reference Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
5 Rel-19 Studies                      
5.1 Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security                      
5.2 Study on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services phase 2 S3‑251224 Reply to LS on IMS support for AF authorization and IMS avatar communication S2-2502434 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑251337 Reply LS on authorization and authentication in Avatar communication Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251530 Discussion on impersonation in avatar communication Samsung discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251531 pCR on KI#2 update Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia suppported adding the requirement. They supported trying to find a solution before the end of the study. The threat could be added to the next Release.
 		revised No S3‑251749  
    S3‑251749 pCR on KI#2 update Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251531
    S3‑251532 pCR on KI#2 conclusion update Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: threat exists, but it's a bit late to find a solution at this point of the study. T-Mobile: add the word "avatar" since this looks too generic.
 		revised No S3‑251748  
    S3‑251748 pCR on KI#2 conclusion update Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251532
    S3‑251529 pCR on resolving EN in KI#2 conclusion based on Reply LS from SA2 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251750  
    S3‑251334 Update conclusion of KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251750  
    S3‑251506 update conclusion for KI2 on avatar communication security Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251750  
    S3‑251750 update conclusion for KI2 on avatar communication security Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251506
    S3‑251597 Conclusion update for KI#2: Security of IMS based Avatar Communication Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251750  
    S3‑251335 Update conclusion of KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251751  
    S3‑251751 Update conclusion of KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251335
    S3‑251505 update conclusion for KI3 on Security and privacy aspects of IMS DC capability exposure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251751  
    S3‑251598 Conclusion update for KI#3: Security and privacy aspects of IMS DC capability exposure Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251751  
    S3‑251707 Draft TR 33.790 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.3 Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN                      
5.4 Study of ACME for Automated Certificate Management in SBA                      
5.5 Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256-bits                      
5.6 Study on mitigations against bidding down attacks                      
5.7 Study on security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 2                      
5.8 Study on security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication                      
5.9 Study on security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G S3‑251491 AIoT TR - General Conclusion Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251763  
    S3‑251763 AIoT TR - General Conclusion Apple pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251491
    S3‑251590 Proposed addition to general conclusion related to credential storage Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: don’t push things into the SNPN. My RAN colleague commented that SNPN is more to the high end of the spectrum. Simulations are on 900Mhz, and this is not used anywhere for SNPN. Lets concentrate on the operator's side, this is not where the SNPN would normally be. Ericsson: send an LS to RAN asking for the applicability of the spectrum for SNPN.
 		revised No S3‑251764  
    S3‑251764 Proposed addition to general conclusion related to credential storage Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑251590
    S3‑251270 Discussion on network assigend Temp ID solution and Computed Temp ID solution vivo discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251271 Update conclusion for privacy in AIoT vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251797  
    S3‑251605 Further Conclusion to KI3 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251797  
    S3‑251374 Update the conclusion for KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251797  
    S3‑251418 additional conclusion on KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251797  
    S3‑251797 additional conclusion on KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia, Lenovo, Qualcomm,Thales (wrong assumption on the capacity of the device in solution 2) objected. NTT-Docomo: let's do a conference call to progress on this, Lenovo: network solution is not a good solution. We didn’t discuss fully option 2. Thales: we should have the two solutions on the table to be discussed. ORANGE: editor's note on solution FFS.
 		approved No   S3‑251418
    S3‑251462 KI#3, Update Conclusions Sony pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251797  
    S3‑251570 Update the Conclusion for KI #4 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251373 Conclusion for KI#8 and KI#9 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with the security measures being out of scope.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251492 AIoT TR - Clean up on the KI#3 Apple pCR   Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: just remove the editor's note.OPPO supported the contribution.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251582 Update AIOT KI#3 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251639 Update of KI#3 NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
YesVivo: security requirement not needed, already covered in existing text. Qualcomm didn’t agree with the contribution. Interdigital: additional requirement is redundant. Ericsson supported this contribution.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251493 AIoT TR - Clean up on the KI#4 Apple pCR   Yes
YesAT&T, ORANGE: this note should be in the conclusions clause.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251574 Update the KI #4 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesATA&T, Nokia, Huawei supported this contribution.
 		approved No    
    S3‑251549 Refinement of EN in KI#5 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251606 TR clean up OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesAT&T: it seems that we are changing the acronym AIoT. The power-enabled part does not appear in SA2 specifications.It was commented that SA1 had this term.
 		revised No S3‑251766  
    S3‑251766 TR clean up OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251606
    S3‑251423 removing the editor's note in solution 4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251371 update sol#6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251272 Remove EN for Sol#10 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251404 pCR to TR33.713 update solutions for removing ENs CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251588 Updates on solution 15 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251624 Remove Editor’s Notes in solution 16 of TR 33.713 Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251572 Update Solution #17 in TR 33.713 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251340 Clean up on 33.713 clause 6.19.2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251533 pCR on resolving EN on solution #22 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251534 pCR on evaluation update on solution #22 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251535 pCR on converting EN into NOTE in solution #22 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251584 Update AIOT sol#24 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251372 resolving ENs in sol#25 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251314 Addressing EN in AIoT Solution #29 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251575 Remove ENs in Solution #32 and #33 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251589 Addressing ENs in solution 34 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251548 Resolution of EN in solution 35 concerning device constrains Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251641 Pseudo-CR on Update AIOT sol#37 Guangdong OPPO Mobile Telecom. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251536 pCR on resolving EN on solution #38 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251537 pCR on evaluation update on solution #38 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251461 Pseudo-CR on resolution of ENs in solution #39 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251273 Remove EN for Sol#40 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251274 Remove EN for Sol#41 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251239 Resolving ENs in Solution #42 of TR 33.713 KPN pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251315 Addressing EN in AIoT Solution #43 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251543 proposal to resovle EN in solution #44 CMCC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251544 Pseudo-CR-Evaluation for Sol#45 in TR 33.713 CMCC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251545 Pseudo-CR-Resolve EN of sequence number of figure in Sol#45 in TR 33.713 CMCC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251546 Pseudo-CR-Resolve ENs in Sol#45 of TR 33.713 CMCC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251215 AIOT Privacy Protection through Zero Knowledge Proof TCL draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251321 Pseudo-CR on Update AIOT sol#37 Xidian University pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑251708 Draft TR 33.713 OPPO draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑251765 Questions of AIoT temporary ID discussion Huawei discussion discussion Yes
YesEricsson: Option 1 is good for uplink and Option 2 is useful for downlink. The Chair asked for a show of hands: - Option 1 support: Huawei. OPPO,Interdigital, Vivo,Thales,ORANGE, Deutsche Telekom, China Mobile, KPN,Verizon, NTT-Docomo, T-Mobile - Option 1 non support: Nokia, Qualcomm,Lenovo,Ericsson, CATT, ZTE, AT&T 12 companies vs 7 on option 1. AT&T: we don’t have enough information, so we voted no. The Chair commented: Option 2 study will continue.
 		noted No    
5.10 Study on security aspects of Usage of User Identities                      
5.11 Study on UAS security enhancement                      
5.12 Study on security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3                      
5.13 Study on security aspects of AIML enhancements                      
5.14 Study on EdgeComputing                      
5.15 Study on security aspects for Multi-Access                      
5.16 Study on 5GS enhancements for Energy Saving                      
5.17 Study on security aspects of 5G NR Femto                      
5.18 Study on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services S3‑251375 Update conclusion for KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with NOTE3. Xiaomi didn’t agree with the conversion of the editor's note to a note.
 		merged No S3‑251726  
    S3‑251501 update conclusion for KI2 Privacy of user sensitive information Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251726  
    S3‑251726 update conclusion for KI2 Privacy of user sensitive information Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251501
    S3‑251516 TR 33.721 cleanup Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251728  
    S3‑251728 TR 33.721 cleanup Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251516
    S3‑251517 pCR to add abbreviations Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251518 Presentation of Report to TSG SA: TR 33.721, Version 0.7.0 Samsung TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251727  
    S3‑251727 Presentation of Report to TSG SA: TR 33.721, Version 0.7.0 Samsung TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251518
    S3‑251709 Draft TR 33.721 Samsung draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.19 Study on security aspects of CAPIF Phase 3                      
5.20 Study on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory S3‑251251 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory for EAP-TLS KDDI Corporation (TTC) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251767  
    S3‑251767 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory for EAP-TLS KDDI Corporation (TTC) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251251
    S3‑251252 Technical Details on the ECIES Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251768  
    S3‑251768 Technical Details on the ECIES Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251252
    S3‑251253 Technical Details on the PKI Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T pCR Approval Yes
YesAlex (GSMA) remove mention of LI. The reference is wrong. Alex commented that LI quantum aspects would be complex to tackle.
 		revised No S3‑251769  
    S3‑251769 Technical Details on the PKI Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251253
    S3‑251255 Technical Details on the OCSP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251770  
    S3‑251770 Technical Details on the OCSP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251255
    S3‑251256 Technical Details on the QUIC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251771  
    S3‑251771 Technical Details on the QUIC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251256
    S3‑251257 Technical Details on the COSE Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251772  
    S3‑251772 Technical Details on the COSE Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251257
    S3‑251258 Technical Details on SEPP-PRINS and SEPP-TLS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251773  
    S3‑251773 Technical Details on SEPP-PRINS and SEPP-TLS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑251258
    S3‑251295 Inventory contribution for MIKEY-SAKKE NIST pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251774  
    S3‑251774 Inventory contribution for MIKEY-SAKKE NIST pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251295
    S3‑251381 description for IKEv2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251775  
    S3‑251775 description for IKEv2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251381
    S3‑251382 description for PDCP Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251776  
    S3‑251776 description for PDCP Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251382
    S3‑251383 description for NAS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251777  
    S3‑251777 description for NAS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251383
    S3‑251487 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory for EAP-AKA’/EAP-5G Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: do we need to list all the algorithms like this? Qualcomm: this doesn’t follow the template. Thales: f5** also available for 128 bit MILENAGE.
 		revised No S3‑251778  
    S3‑251778 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory for EAP-AKA’/EAP-5G Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251487
    S3‑251522 pCR on Description of IPsec ESP protocol Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251585 Pseudo-CR on Technical Details on the KDF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Accenture pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251779  
    S3‑251779 Pseudo-CR on Technical Details on the KDF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Accenture pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251585
    S3‑251592 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory for JWE and JWS Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251488 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Table for EAP-AKA’/EAP-5G Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
YesNIST: we need to figure out how to organize all the details before going to a table.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251384 text for Tables and headers Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251780  
    S3‑251780 text for Tables and headers Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251384
    S3‑251523 pCR on Draft Skeleton of Table(s) Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251780  
    S3‑251710 Draft TR 33.938 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.21 TR corrrections (all studies) S3‑251403 CR to TR 33.700-29 for adding abbreviations CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251613 CR for TR 33.700-22 editorial update Xiaomi Technology Netherlands CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
6 New Study/Work item & Rel-20 planning proposals S3‑251207 Views and wayforward for Rel-20 planning Lenovo, Motorola Mobility discussion Endorsement Yes
YesORANGE: 50% split 5GA and 6G maybe not. In the beginning 5GA will need more time. The Chair commented that the 50% split was hard to plan because it depended on the agreed SIDs and WIDs. Lenovo: companies to bring the SIDs so we can decide on the topics.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251285 Discussion Paper on Principles of R20 Security Feature Organization vivo discussion Discussion Yes
YesORANGE: Single delegate companies will find it hard to follow many parallel sessions. The Chair replied that SA3 would stick to what has been done before with parallel sessions. Deutsche Telekom: in favour of having a single specification. Structure of all the topics is very important. 5GA still needs time, dedicate time to finish it before focusing on 6G. Number of documents will need to be watched. Huawei: difficult to plan anything without seeing the SIDs. Let's agree on the process first.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251458 View on 6G SA3 SIDs Nokia discussion Endorsement Yes
YesThe Chair proposed that a company to write down a list of topics to come out of this meeting. NTT-Docomo took the task to create a document for the current meeting. Huawei: focus on the process. How to organize the discussions.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251524 Discussion on SA3 6G timeline Samsung, ZTE discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251681  
    S3‑251681 Discussion on SA3 6G timeline Samsung, ZTE discussion Endorsement No
YesORANGE: better to decide on the content than rushing to start the SIDs.
 		noted No   S3‑251524
    S3‑251599 Directions for the Study on the Security for the 6G System Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
YesIntel aligned with this paper. On the timing they stated that it depended on SA2 architecture. They didn’t agree with having multiple SIDs/TRs. NTT-Docomo also agreed with the single TR but more than a single Rapporteur was needed due to the amount of work.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251640 discussion of 6G security domains NTT DOCOMO INC. discussion   Yes
YesOPPO agreed that a tie with SA1 was needed.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251250 Study of AEAD for 5G Advanced item KDDI Corporation (TTC) discussion Endorsement Yes
YesORANGE: we prefer to have the study item together with the discussion paper. Ericsson: we prefer to see this in 6G. Intel: the impact can be considerable, better do it in 6G. Huawei: we support this contribution.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251317 New WID on 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
YesThe Chair commented: 317 and 473 should be merged for the next meeting.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251468 Discussion on Transition to PQC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251473 New Study on Transition of 3GPP Cryptographic Algorithms to PQC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new Approval Yes
YesNCSC preferred to have a study approach as opposed to the work item proposed by Ericsson. Ericsson: most of the protocols are not in scope of 3GPP. AT&T: we preferred to see a Work Item before 6G, PQC ready before 6G timeline. Huawei: regular crypto profile work not needed with a WID, just a CR. Too early to work on migration to PQC. Vivo: the output is changes on TS, but this is a SID. Nokia replied that they wanted to move the agreed key issues directly to the normative work. NOTE from MCC: Study items cannot have impact on normative specifications. ORANGE: 5GA should be PQC resistant. We prefer to have a study first to see the impact on the architecture and possible selection of new algorithms. T-Mobile supported a study as soon as possible. The Chair recommended to have discussions before the next meeting and have something ready to bring to the June Plenary.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251208 Discussion on AIMLE Security enhancements Lenovo, Motorola Mobility SID new Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251209 SID on AIML Enablement Service Security Lenovo, Motorola Mobility SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251798  
    S3‑251798 SID on AIML Enablement Service Security Lenovo, Motorola Mobility SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑251209
    S3‑251284 New SID on Core Network Enhanced Support for Artificial Intelligence (AI) Machine Learning (ML) Phase 2 vivo, China Mobile SID new Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: too early, SA2 just started the work. AT&T: we need to figure out the TUs for Rel-20 before agreeing on this. ORANGE: Remove the WT1 paragraph.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251318 6G Study on Primary Authentication Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251376 Discussion on security aspect of AMF re-allocation ZTE Corporation discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251432 New SID on security aspects for MPQUIC Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: not convinced. If we don’t need mutual authentication why we still look at PSK?
 		noted No    
    S3‑251456 WID on SCAS for Rel-20 Huawei, Hisilicon, BSI, China Telecom, China Mobile, Keysight Technologies UK Ltd., Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Unicom, CATT, CAICT WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251785  
    S3‑251785 WID on SCAS for Rel-20 Huawei, Hisilicon, BSI, China Telecom, China Mobile, Keysight Technologies UK Ltd., Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Unicom, CATT, CAICT WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑251456
    S3‑251576 New WID on SCAS for Rel-20 Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251785  
    S3‑251558 New SID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Container-based Products Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new Approval Yes
YesHuawei: the study cannot impact TS. NTT-Docomo: number of TUs is not enough. BSI: we support this SID.MITRE supported this SID as well. Huawei asked to have this noted. They commented that there was no rush and 3GPP may not be the right place to do this task. Nokia commented that this had been submitted more than a year ago. The Chair proposed to escalate the decision to Plenary since this kept coming up in many meetings.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251457 Discussion paper on security of Sensing Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251445 New SID on security aspect of Sensing Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
YesOPPO: the study is not approved in SA2 yet.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251583 Security Consideration for Integrated Sensing and Communication OPPO discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251621 New SID on security aspects of Integrated Sensing and Communication Xiaomi Technology UK Limited SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251400 New SID on Security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 4 CATT, China Unicom SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑251465 New SID on Security Aspects for Evolved Residential Gateways Accessing to 5G Core Network China Unicom, Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251467 Discussion on Security Aspects for eRG accessing to 5G Core Network China Unicom, Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251469 LS to SA2 on architecture for eRG accessing to 5G core network China Unicom, Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesORANGE: don’t start architecture work from something that hasn’t been initiated in SA2. Nokia: wait for SA2 for progress. Ericsson: maybe we can trigger some work in SA2 on this
 		noted No    
    S3‑251484 Study of exposure security for 6G Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251214 Discussions on UE abnormal behaviour detection to improve security controls Lenovo, Motorola Mobility discussion Discussion Yes
YesApple, Interdigital: what’s to be standardised here?
 		noted No    
    S3‑251631 SID on UE abnormal behaviour detection to improve security controls Lenovo, Motorola Mobility SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251642 Discussion on SA6 study proposal on User Consent Nokia discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251402 New mini WID on Security Aspects of Indirect Network Sharing China Unicom WID new Approval Yes
YesRelated to the CR in 401 and the LS in 218. Huawei supported this, it could be done like LTM. The problem was known. Ericsson: I prefer a SID. The Chair replied that the TU budget would be challenging. Nokia: we have a Rel-20 network sharing proposal already, we don’t want two work items on network sharing. Ericsson replied that a merge would be possible.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251409 6G specification format modernization: towards Automation-Native Nokia discussion Information Yes
YesDT supported this. They stated that there was a 2 year old discussion on modernising tools in 3GPP. There are other partnership projects using new tools which have been very effective. Alex (SA3-LI) commented that SA3-LI achieved goal 2 for CRs with the use of FORGE. It does require a different way of working. NCSC commented that they used this quite often.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251205 Discussion on Enhancements to SA3 Working/Meeting Procedures OTD_US discussion Endorsement Yes
YesORANGE preferred only two parallel sessions. They liked the way LS were treated since they were written on behalf of the entire group. Doing it in parallel with another session would not be convenient. They doubted that the meeting agenda part would be achievable. Thales: plenary sessions are very important to have a general overview. More than two parallel sessions would be complicated.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251786 NWM discussion proposall on SA3 Rel-20 5GA and 6G planning WG Vice Chair (NTT-Docomo) discussion Endorsement Yes
YesORANGE: the last question doesn’t mean that a decision wil be taken, this is for internal discussions. The Chair commented that this was intended to have questions that could be replied by the companies in the NWM tool. NTT-Docomo woud be the moderator: collecting reponses and making a summary. This is only to have some input for the May meeting discussions, not a consolidated view.
 		endorsed No    
    S3‑251796 Rel-20 Planning and NWM Deutsche Telekom other Presentation Yes
YesThe Chair proposed to use NWM (New Working Methods) for the discussions on how to structure the 5GA and 6G work.MCC commented that a conference call could be set up as a training for SA3 on the use of the tool. Deutsche Telekom: focus on 5GA and dedicate more resources for 6G later. Lenovo: at least 50% of TUs for 5GA. Huawei: agree on 6G security areas in Fukuoka already? It seems a bit aggressive. There is no rush. NTT-Docomo: starting the discussion on 6G security areas, not conclude the discussions. The Chair clarified that SA plenary asked for a plan, at least some broad areas to be covered. ORANGE was sceptical about agreeing on a list of technical areas. Ericsson was in favour of starting the discussion and sort it out before proposing SIDs in August. DT: come up with concrete questions, how to progress, how companies can answer those questions, to get a complete picture. DT added some slides on how NWM could be used showing an example from SA2.
 		noted No    
7 CVD and research                      
8 Any Other Business S3‑251204 SA3 meeting calendar SA WG3 Chair other   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes