**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #102e *S3-210204***

**e-meeting, 18 - 29 January 2021** Revision of S3-20xxxx

**Source: Huawei, HiSilicon**

**Title: pCR – Sol#11: Address EN on revocation**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 5.7**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***Approve this contribution to add a solution in TR33.854***

# 2 References

[1]

# 3 Rationale

The contribution add in the revocation procedure in Soluton #11.

# 4 Detailed proposal

pCR

\*\*\* BEGINNING OF CHANGES \*\*\*

## 6.11 Solution #11: UAV and UAVC pairing authorization through bound IDs

### 6.11.1 Solution overview

This solution addresses the key issue #2: Pairing authorization for UAV and UAVC.

This solution assumes UAV and UAVC are equipped with SUPI and credentials from PLMN. The pairing authorization is performed after UAV or UAVC is authenticated by 3GPP systems through Primary authentication. It is performed when UAV is being authenticated/authorized, or after it has been authenticated/authorized by USS/UTM.

### 6.11.2 Solution details

### 6.11.2.1 UAV and UAVC pairing authorization

A general overview of the procedure involving UAV and UAVC paring authorization is shown in Figure below.



Figure 6.11.2.1-1: A general overview on UAV and UAVC pairing authorization

0. Provisioning:

a. UAV and UAVC: provisioned with UAV IDs and corresponding credentials, e.g. their private/public key pairs and certificates issued by UAS service providers/operators. Regarding pairing, there are two options considered: 1) provision is not required, it will be provisioned at USS/UTM 2) pairing is provisioned at both UAV and UAVC, e.g. indicated using certificates.

b. USS/UTM: provisioned with its private/public key pairs. The UAS service providers/operators have registered their public keys or their root CAs with USS/UTM so that USS/UTM can verify their issued certificates. Regarding pairing, similarly, there are two options: 1) pairing of UAV and UAVC has been provisioned and UAV-ID and UAVC-ID are bound together; 2) no pairing information provisioned.

NOTE 1: UAV and UAVC pairing shall not be determined by other parties than USS/UTM or UAS itself, e.g. between UAV and UAVC. The provisioning is out of scope of 3GPP.

1. Primary Authentication: UE1 (UAV) and UE2 (UAVC) are equipped with SUPI and 3GPP credentials and need to perform Primary Authentication as normal UEs before getting UAS services.

2. For UAS-type UE, UAS authentication is performed for UAV.

NOTE 2: UAV authentication is not addressed in this solution. This steps is to indicate pairing is for authenticated and authorized UAV.

3. USS/UTM authorize UAV and UAVC pairing

a. Case 1 (pairing information is provisioned at USS/UTM): based on bound UAV-ID and UAVC-ID to determine whether pairing request from UAV (with UAV-ID and GPSI) or UAVC (with UAVC-ID and GPSI) can be authorized.

b. Case 2 (UAV-ID and UAVC-ID are paired and bound): based on bound information sent from UAV or UAVC to determine whether pairing request from UAV (with UAV-ID and GPSI) or UAVC (with UAVC-ID and GPSI) can be authorized. USS/UTM may need to verify the certificates presented by UAV/UAVC.

NOTE 3: UAV (or UAVC) does not send GPSI to AMF. Instead, it sends UE ID (e.g. GUTI or SUCI) as a normal UE and AMF will convert the UE ID into GPSI.

Inform PLMN the authorization results with GPSI pair.

NOTE 4: step 3 and step 2 may be combined depending on scenarios.

Editor's note: What identities and credentials (if any) are exchanged with USS/UTM to enable the pairing authorization is FFS

4. UAVC communicates with UAV through UPF (UP).

### 6.11.2.2 Revocation

USS/UTM may trigger revocation of UAV and UAVC pairing at any time. The call flow is shown in the figure 6.11.2.2-1.



**Figure 6.1.2.2-1:** UASpairing **revocation procedure**

1. The USS/UTM sends the UAA revocation request to AMF through UFES to revoke the UAVC pairing for a UAV. The UAV and UAVC are dentified by their GPSI and UAS-ID respectively in the UAA revocation Request.

NOTE: UFES is an NF interfacing USS/UTM and it can locate AMF serving the UAV.

2. The AMF may inform UAV or UAVC with the UAA pairing revocation message.

3. The AMF responses USS that the UAV’s authentication and authorization is revocated.

### 6.11.3 Solution evaluation

TBC

\*\*\* END OF CHANGES \*\*\*