**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #101-e *draft\_S3-210112-r3***

**e-meeting, 18 – 29 January 2021** *Revision of S3-210112*

**Source: Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell**

**Title: KI on UE data collection protection**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 5.16**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***New KI to eNA study TR33.866 on UE data collection protection at NF/NWDAF***

# 2 References

[1] 3GPP TR 23.700-91: “Study on enablers for network automation for the 5G System (5GS); Phase 2”

# 3 Rationale

In [1], Key Issue #8 "UE data as an input for analytics generation" addresses whether and how to enhance the 5GS to support collection and utilisation of data provided by the UE in NWDAF in order to provide input information to generate analytics information (to be consumed by other NFs). This key issue addresses the security of data collection from the UE.

-r1 merging in S3-210113 (threats and requirements)

-r2 taking into account comment about different types of data collection and work split user consent and eNA study:

NWDAF collecting information about the UEs (e.g., UE mobility events, UE registration failures ) from the 5G NFs (e.g., AMF, 5G RAN etc) 🡪 coverd by this KI, or AF collecting data from the UE 🡪 taken out of this KI completely. Reference to [1], KI#8 is therefore removed.

-r3 adding in details: Potential solutions for this key issue shall not impact the UE

# 4 Detailed proposal

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* START OF CHANGES

### 5.1.X Key Issue #1.X: UE data collection protection at NF/NWDAF

#### 5.1.X.1 Key issue details

UEs register to 5GS and request services, e.g. the initial registration request to AMF. For fulfilling the service, but also for analytics purposes, 5GS NFs will collect data about the UE being served, e.g. AMF needs to maintain a mapping between SUPI and 5G-GUTI and for accounting the time window for the service used. UE related data, processed by one NF, may also need to be transferred to another NF to fulfil a service request or for analytics purposes. UE can also provide privacy sensitive data such as positioning information, user profiling info, etc to NFs, which may be transferred to NWDAF.

This KI is about NF/NWDAF collecting information about the UEs (e.g., UE mobility events, UE registration failures ) from the 5G NFs (e.g., AMF, 5G RAN etc) and determines the threats and requirements for protection of UE data collected by core NFs.

Potential solutions for this key issue shall not impact the UE.

#### 5.1.X.2 Security threats

If the communication between UE and network is not confidentiality protected, then sensitive information about UEs may be leaked to unauthorized entities.

If the integrity of the data collected from UE is not protected, the analytics may not be accurate.

Replay attacks may lead to usage of same UE data more than once, and therefore, it may cause wrong analytic results.

UE data stored in a NF or transferred between different NFs may be altered by a malicious entity. The attacker may provide false or modified information to other NFs or an analytics function such as NWDAF. For instance, the malicious entity can modify the UE information statistics or logs sent to the NWDAF.

In case of the network is not authenticated by the UE, the UE may send UE data to an unauthorized entity, which may lead to leakage of sensitive data of the UE.

If an unauthenticated UE is sending the data, it may send erroneous data to NF/NWDAF, it can compromise the efficiency, performance and output of analytics algorithms implemented in the analytics functions. If the NF/NWDAF which is receiving UE data is not properly authenticated and authorized, the sender may transfer the UE data to an unauthorized NF or analytics function.

NOTE: The following threats are kept here for completeness, but will be handled in the user consent study FS\_UC3S: (a) A NF can collect privacy sensitive information about UEs such as location information, environment information, user profile information, which UE is not informed about. This is compromising the UE's privacy. (b) If NF collects UE data without taking into consideration the user consent, the UE is not in control of its own data and loses its right of data protection.

#### 5.1.X.3 Potential security requirements

1. UE and network shall mutually authenticate each other.

2. The communication between UE and network shall be confidentiality protected.

3. The data collected from UE shall be integrity protected.

4. Data transferred from UE to NFs and from NFs to the analytics function shall be protected against replay attacks.

5. Authorization of NFs and analytics functions to receive, send, or transfer UE data shall be guaranteed.

NOTE: The following requirements are kept here for completeness but will be handled in the user consent study FS\_UC3S. (a)It is be possible to process user consent depending on the regulatory and regional demands. (b) It is be possible to respect user privacy depending on the regulatory and regional demands.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* END OF CHANGES