3GPP TDocs (written contributions) at meeting
Meeting: S3-95 - 2019-05-06 to 2019-05-10, Reno, Nevada
meeting id: S3-95 (click id for more info on this meeting)Click on the Tdoc to open its file.
| TDoc | Title | Source | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|
| S3‑191100 | Agenda | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191101 | Report from last SA3 meeting/s | MCC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191102 | SA3 Work Plan | MCC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191103 | Report from last SA meeting | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191104 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191105 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191106 | Discussion on possible privacy/confidentiality attacks in PLMN integrated NPN | InterDigital | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191107 | New KI for PLMN integrated NPN | InterDigital | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191108 | TCG progress report | InterDigital | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191109 | New Key Issue for TR 33.836 - privacy protection for unicast messages over PC5 | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191110 | New Key Issue for TR 33.836 - privacy protection for multicast messages over PC5 | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191111 | New Key Issue for TR 33.836 - security for eV2X unicast messages over PC5 | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191112 | New Key Issue for TR 33.836 - Security of the UE service authorization and revocation | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191113 | [MCPTT] 33179 R13. Clarification of the references to RFC 3711 | Airbus DS SLC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191114 | [MCSec] 33180 R14. Clarification of the references to RFC 3711 | Airbus DS SLC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191115 | [MCSec] 33180 R15. Clarification of the references to RFC 3711 | Airbus DS SLC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191116 | New Key Issue for TR 33.836 - Security of the UE service provisioning | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191117 | References | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191118 | Update to solution #4 | InterDigital Belgium. LLC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191119 | Reply LS on securing warning messages in ePWS | C1-191522 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191120 | Reply LS on securing warning messages in ePWS | S1-190503 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191121 | LS on Use of SUCI in NAS signalling | C1-191685 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191122 | LS on handling of non-zero ABBA value in Release 15 | C1-191686 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191123 | LS on SUPI formats for 5WWC | C1-192776 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191124 | LS on Multiple NAS connections and inter-system change from S1 mode to N1 mode in 5GMM-CONNECTED mode | C1-192804 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191125 | Reply LS on EAS-C&U support | C3-191167 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191126 | LS on usage of EPLMNs | S2-1904825 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191127 | Reply LS on Interim conclusions for SA2 study on Radio Capabilities Signalling Optimisations (FS_RACS) | C4-190346 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191128 | Reply LS on Verification of PLMN-ID in the SEPP | C4-190348 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191129 | Reply LS on GTP Recovery Counter & GSN node behaviour | C4-190485 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191130 | Reply LS on Nudr Sensitive Data Protection | C4-190534 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191131 | LS on Maximum HTTP payload size | C4-190609 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191132 | LS on Protected LI Parameters in N4 | S3i190254 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191133 | Reply LS on Protected LI Parameters in N4 | C4-191529 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191134 | Reply on LS on Protected LI Parameters in N4 | S3i190283 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191135 | LS on Handling of non-essential corrections (non-FASMO) CRs and non-backwards compatible CRs | CP-190218 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191136 | LS on the availability of and requesting feedback on the stable draft TR 103 582 from ETSI STF555 - "Study of use cases and communications involving IoT devices in emergency situations" | ETSI SC EMTEL | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191137 | GSMA DESS - Diameter IPX Network End-to-End Security Solution | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191138 | Reply LS on Authentication for UEs not Supporting NAS | S2-1904829 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191139 | Response to 3GPP SA2 liaison S2-1902902 on ‘LS on updating the status of 5WWC normative work’ | BBF | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191140 | Reply LS on EDT integrity protection | R2-1902439 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191141 | LS on RAN2 conclusion for NR positioning SI | R2-1902479 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191142 | LS on RAN2 conclusion for NR positioning SI | R3-191141 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191143 | Reply LS on Dual Connectivity | R2-1902677 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191144 | Reply LS on Enforcement of maximum supported data rate for integrity protection | R2-1902700 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191145 | LS on protection of PC5-RRC messages for sidelink unicast communication | R2-1905332 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191146 | Response LS on full data rate support for UP IP | R2-1905455 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191147 | LS on Security failure of NAS container in HO command | R2-1905460 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191148 | LS on broadcast assistance data delivery | R2-1905462 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191149 | LS to SA2 and SA5 on IAB impact to CN | R2-1905475 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191150 | Response LS on reporting all cell IDs in 5G | R3-191111 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191151 | Response LS on reporting all cell IDs in 5G | S2-1904819 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191152 | Response LS on reporting all Cell IDs in 5G | S3i190265 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191153 | Reply LS on UP Integrity Protection for Small Data in Early Data Transfer | R3-191116 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191154 | Reply LS on authentication of group of IoT devices | S1-190501 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191155 | Reply LS on Interception of voice services over new radio in a 5GS environment | S2-1902799 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191156 | Reply LS on Clarification of UE Trace support | S2-1902901 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191157 | LS on LI Impacts for LMR-LTE Interworking study | S3i190281 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191158 | Approval of Smart Secure Platform requirement specification | ETSI TC SCP | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191159 | LS/r on SG17 work item X.5Gsec-q: Security guidelines for applying quantum-safe algorithms in 5G systems | ITU-T SG17 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191160 | LS on SG17 new work item X.5Gsec-ecs: Security Framework for 5G Edge Computing Services | ITU-T SG17 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191161 | LS to request inputs on the Vehicular Multimedia technical report and to invite participation from relevant stakeholders | ITU-T Focus Group on Vehicular Multimedia (FG-VM) | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191162 | Reply LS on User Plane Security for 5GC Roaming | SP-190252 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191163 | Clarification of MSIN coding for the ECIES protection shemes | IDEMIA | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191164 | New KI for Public network integrated NPN | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191165 | [33.179] R13 XSD Corrections | Motorola Solutions UK | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191166 | [33.180] R14 XSD Corrections | Motorola Solutions UK | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191167 | [33.180] R15 XSD Corrections (mirror) | Motorola Solutions UK | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191168 | {33.179] R13 Remove IANA editor's notes | Motorola Solutions UK | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191169 | [33.180] R14 Remove IANA editor’s notes | Motorola Solutions UK | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191170 | [33.180] R15 Remove IANA editor’s notes (mirror) | Motorola Solutions UK | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191171 | [33.180] R16 Pre-established PCK | Motorola Solutions UK | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191172 | Interface and protocol stack clarifications and corrections to TS 33.163 | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191173 | Interface and protocol stack clarifications and corrections to TS 33.163 | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191174 | Making UE initiated key refresh optional in TS33.163 | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191175 | Corrections for Key Issue #27 Support of a UP gateway function on the N9 interface | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191176 | Solution to KI #26: NDS/IP on the inter-PLMN N9 interface | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191177 | Discussion document on roaming UP gateway | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191178 | Solution for KI #27: Roaming UP gateway | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191179 | Update of solution #17 – Efficient key derivation for e2e security | KPN | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191180 | Update of Solution #6 – Use of UE Configuration Update | KPN | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191181 | Addition of Network Product Class Description for AMF | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191182 | Addition of AMF-related Security Problem Descriptions | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191183 | On configurational error handling on N32 by the receiving SEPP | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191184 | Addition of SEPP requirement on configurational error handling | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191185 | Addition of missing SEPP requirement on JOSE-patch validation | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191186 | Testcase: Replacing confidential IEs with NULL in original N32-f message | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191187 | AKMA solution set analysis | KPN | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191188 | Proposal for editor's notes in FS_CIoT_sec_5G solution #15 | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191189 | Proposal for improvement FS_CIoT_sec_5G solution #15 | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191190 | New solution to key issue 5 in TR 33.814 (FS_eLCS_Sec): UE faking/altering location measurements | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191191 | Proposal for FS_UP_IP_Sec Key Issue #3 and 5: Zero-overhead user plane integrity protection on the link layer | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191192 | New KI for TR 33.807: Authentication of UE without NAS support and without 3GPP RAT behind a FN-RG or 5G-CRG with 5GC | CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191193 | New KI for TR 33.807: Authentication of UE without NAS support and without 3GPP RAT behind a FN-RG or 5G-CRG with 5GC | CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191194 | IAM Security | AT&T,Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191195 | Using symmetric algorithm with assistance of USIM and home network | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191196 | way forward against attack using authentication | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191197 | Structure RAND for authentication – HE part | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191198 | Structure RAND for authentication – ME part | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191199 | Structure RAND for authentication – ME part | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191200 | Handling of Sync failure for 5G AKA | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191201 | Modification on linkability issue1 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191202 | Conclusion on linkability issue | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191203 | KAUSF desynchronization problem and solutions | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191204 | KAUSF desynchronization problem and solutions – updated version after conf call on 25 Apr. | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191205 | Aligning the storage timing of KAUSF in 5G AKA with EAP-AKA' | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191206 | Synchronization of KAUSF between AUSF and UE | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191207 | Using Key Identifiers between AUSF and UE for UPU and SoR | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191208 | UDM triggered authentication | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191209 | KAUSF key setting in EAP AKA’ | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191210 | Discussion on AKMA overall conclusions | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191211 | Resolving Editor’s Notes and adding conclusion to solution #18 (Key Separation for AKMA AFs using counters) | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191212 | Resolving Editor’s Notes and adding conclusion to solution #20 (Key Identification when Implicit bootstrapping is used) | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191213 | Restoring lost figures in the latest draft update of AKMA TR at SA3 #94ah | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191214 | New Test Case: Error handling of malformed JSON object between two network products | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191215 | Evaluation and text for resolving editor’s note for solution #5 in TR 33.825 | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191216 | Initial Key Issues for TR 33.848 | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191217 | Scope for TR 33 848 | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191218 | Discussion on N9 security | Deutsche Telekom AG, NTT Docomo | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191219 | Solution to KI #26: NDS/IP on the inter-PLMN N9 interface | Juniper Networks, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191220 | subscriber privacy: ECIES test data | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191221 | Discussion on proposed response to incoming LS (S3-191138) on authentication of UEs not supporting NAS | Charter Communications, CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191222 | Virtualisation Background and Concepts | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191223 | Discussion on structure of TR 33.848: Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191224 | Key Issue: Establishment of trust domains for Network Functions | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191225 | Key Issue: Confidentiality of Sensitive Data | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191226 | Key Issue: Availability of Network Functions | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191227 | eNS Update to solution 1 Slice specific secondary authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191228 | Preliminary comparison of solutions | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191229 | New KI: Separation of CP and UP in NAS CP Optimization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191230 | Discussion paper on Re-authentication and UE context handling | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191231 | New KI: Updating UDM with UE deregistration status | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191232 | Nokia comments on LS R2-1905332 PC5-RRC message protection | Nokia, Nokia Shnghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191233 | Non-AKA based EAP methods with credentials stored and processed in UDM/ARPF | CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191234 | conclusion on KI#5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191235 | Resolve EN "signaling details of how the UE hands over to false base station | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191236 | Solution #6: Resolve EN Handover Attemp Failure Counter | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191237 | Solution#4: resolving EN network verification of the hashes of MIB/SIBs | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191238 | Solution#4: Resolving EN Impact on UE power consumption | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191239 | Solution #4: Details on the hash algorithm used for MIB/SIB hashes. | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191240 | Secuirty threat for RRCResumeRequest tampering. | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191241 | Solution for protecting RRCResumeRequest against tampering | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191242 | Address EN in solution #1 “The above text needs to be updated ….” | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191243 | Draft LS to RAN2 on UECapabilitiesEnquire after AS SMC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191244 | Discussion paper Security of Bulk IoT operations | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191245 | Study Item: Security of Bulk IoT operations | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191246 | draft reply LS to RAN2/RAN3 on EDT UP IP | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191247 | CR for removing EDT UP IP solution using PDCP PDU hashes. | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191248 | EDT UP IP for multiple PDCP PDUs | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191249 | update solution#4 with UP IP during EDT for multiple PDCP PDUs. | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191250 | F1-U security analysis for IAB architecture | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191251 | Enabling UE to detect FBS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191252 | Updating solution#7 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191253 | Clarification for F1-U protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191254 | Key Issues on F1-U security for IAB architecture | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191255 | F1-U security when UE UP is e2e PDCP protected | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191256 | Protecting IOT Devices Against False Base Station Attacks | Qihoo 360 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191257 | draft LS response to LS on Use of SUCI in NAS signalling | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191258 | Clarification on Subscription Identifier mechanism for De-registration. | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191259 | Solution for integrity protection of UL EDT data | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191260 | key issue for IAB Handover | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191261 | Input encoding for ECIES protection schemes | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191262 | Addition of AMF/SMF requirement on security logging | Deutsche Telekom AG, NTT Docomo | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191263 | Modification to key issue#1 | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191264 | Modification to Key issue#4 | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191265 | Integrity protection between SgNB and UE in NGEN-DC | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191266 | Solution for Key issue #5 | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191267 | Certificate based solution for 5GFBS | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191268 | ID based solution for 5GFBS | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191269 | Modification for AnnexA | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191270 | Conclusion for key issue 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191271 | Conclusion for key issue 2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191272 | Conclusion for key issue 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191273 | Conclusion for key issue 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191274 | Evaluation for solution 5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191275 | Evaluation for solution 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191276 | Security solutions summary | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191277 | Deleting the EN of solution 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191278 | Adding more clarification text of solution 7 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191279 | Deleting EN of solution 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191280 | Evaluation for solution 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191281 | Reference part | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191282 | Way forward of FS_5G_URLLC security study | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191283 | Adding the key issue details and threats for KI #1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191284 | Delete the EN of Introduction | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191285 | Abbreviations | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191286 | Delete the EN of solution 5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191287 | Evaluation for solution 6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191288 | WID on security of URLLC | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191289 | Discussion on security of 5G eMBMS enhancement | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191290 | Evaluation for solution 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191291 | Security aspects on enhancement of support for Edge Computing in 5GC | China Unicom, CAICT, China Telecom | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191292 | New SID: Study on security aspects of enhancement of support for Edge Computing in 5GC | China Unicom, CAICT, China Telecom, ZTE | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191293 | Key derivation during SRVCC from 5G to UTRAN CS | China Unicom,CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191294 | Emergency call in SRVCC from NR to UTRAN | China Unicom, CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191295 | Overview of TR33.856 | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191296 | Content of clause 3 for TR33.856 | China Unicom, CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191297 | Key issue for encryption of broadcast assistance data in eLCS | CAICT, China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191298 | Key issue for encryption of broadcast assistance data in eLCS | CAICT, China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191299 | Addition of SEPP requirement on N32 error handling | Deutsche Telekom AG, NTT Docomo | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191300 | Discussion about RAN2 LS on protection of PC5-RRC messages for sidelink unicast communication | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191301 | Reply LS on protection of PC5-RRC messages for sidelink unicast communication | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191302 | Clause 4 Security Aspects of Advanced V2X services | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191303 | New key issue on AS layer signalling protection for unicast mode over PC5 | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191304 | New key issue on security and privacy of groupcast over PC5 for V2X communication | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191305 | Discussion on LS on Use of SUCI in NAS signalling | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191306 | Modification on Use of SUCI in NAS signalling | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191307 | LS on Use of SUCI in NAS signalling | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191308 | Deprecation of TLS 1.1 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191309 | Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191310 | References to several obsoleted RFCs | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191311 | TLS OCSP stapling | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191312 | References to several obsoleted RFCs | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191313 | Various corrections to security protocols and cryptography | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191314 | Token-based authorization for NRF's management and discovery services | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191315 | Slice information for token-based authorization | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191316 | Name for N32 application layer security | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191317 | New Solution: Transport security for the interfaces between W-5GAN and 5GC | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191318 | New Key Issue: SUCI-to-SUPI mapping for the FN-RG | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191319 | New Solution: SUCI-to-SUPI mapping for the FN-RG | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191320 | Using STRIDE methodology for NPCD, SPD, assets and threats | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191321 | Corrections on IP packet forwarding | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191322 | Update to solution #3 on NSaaS security features | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191323 | Conclusion to KI #3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191324 | A solution to NSSAI protection at AS transmission | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191325 | Discussion paper on KI#6 on NSSAI in RRC | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191326 | Solution to KI #4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191327 | Conclusion to KI #4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191328 | Removing ENs for solution #2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191329 | Add Evaluation to Solution #2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191330 | Conclusion to KI #1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191331 | Discussions on Key Issue AMF key separation | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191332 | Overview on solutions to AMF key separation | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191333 | pCR on AMF key separation solutions^^solution 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191334 | pCR on AMF key separation solutions^^solution 2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191335 | pCR on AMF key separation solutions^^solution 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191336 | A key issue on forward secracy | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191337 | A solution to forward secracy | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191338 | Solution for efficient authentication for access between NPN and PLMN | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191339 | Discussion on Architecture of PLMN integrated NPN | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191340 | New Key Issue-Security of identifiers in group communication | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191341 | New Key Issue-cross-RAT PC5 control authorization indication | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191342 | New Key Issue-Security visibility including human factors | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191343 | New Key Issue-Driving information privacy protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191344 | Identity based Signature against false base station on Key Issue #2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191345 | Protection of unicast message | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191346 | CR to TS33.501 - NAS SMC figure correction | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191347 | Way forward for evaluation for every solution | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191348 | Amendment to Key Issue# 2.1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191349 | pCR to TR33.814 - Key issue for security aspect of eLCS architecture enhancement | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191350 | LS reply to RAN WG2 LS on broadcast assistance data delivery | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191351 | pCR to TR33.814 - Key issue for confidentiality protection of broadcast assistance data | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191352 | pCR to TR33.814 - Key issue for distribution of assistance data ciphering key | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191353 | pCR to TR33.814 - Key issue for integrity protection of broadcast assistance data | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191354 | pCR to TR33.814 - Key issue for the security architecture of eLCS | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191355 | pCR to TR33.814 - Solution of ciphering algorithms | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191356 | pCR to TR33.814 - Solution of provisioning keys for broadcast assistance data protection | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191357 | Subscriber privacy: ECIES test data for Profile A | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191358 | pCR to TR33.814 - The solution for the distribution of broadcast assistance data deciphering key | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191359 | pCR to TR33.814 - The analysis of security architecture of eLCS | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191360 | pCR to TR33.813 - Key issue for deeper UP protection termination | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191361 | pCR to TR33.813 - Key issue for UP key separation | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191362 | pCR to TR33.813 - Solution for UP key separation | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191363 | Address EN in key issue 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191364 | Reply LS on RAN2 conclusion for NR positioning | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191365 | Delete EN in solution12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191366 | Add evalution in solution12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191367 | Corrections on the s-Kgnb derivation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191368 | Address EN and update in key issue 5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191369 | A solution to prevent from providing faked/altered location estimate | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191370 | update in solution 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191371 | Add introduction part | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191372 | Add content to clause 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191373 | Delete Editor's Note in KI#4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191374 | Add requirement and delete EN for KI#13 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191375 | Delete one Editor’s Note in solution3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191376 | Delete EN for solution 5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191377 | Add conclusion on KI#3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191378 | Add Conclusion on KI#4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191379 | Add detials on handling UP security in RRC inactive scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191380 | Completing TS 33.511 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191381 | Adding gNB critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191382 | security procedures of 5G SRVCC to UTRAN | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191383 | mitigate the linkability attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191384 | a skeleton of security aspects of 5G SRVCC to UTRAN | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191385 | KI_security for setting up multicast | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191386 | Resovle Editor's notes in Solution for Key freshness in AKMA | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191387 | Clarification for Initial NAS Message Protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191388 | Resolve ENs on Solution to Mitigate DDoS Attack based on RAN | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191389 | Solution to Mitigate DDoS Attack based on RAN Caused by Massive Misbehaving Frequent CIoT Ues | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191390 | Solution to Mitigate DDoS Attack on AMF caused by Massive Misbehaving Infrequent CIoT Ues | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191391 | Solution for Protection of RRCReject Message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191392 | Solution for Protection of NAS Reject Message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191393 | Add New Security Threat and Requirement for Key Issue #1 for Protection of NAS Reject Message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191394 | CR to TS33501-RRC Reestablishment security handling when N2 Handover fails | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191395 | Discussion on Key handling on UE for Reestablishment Procedure in case of N2 handover failure | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191396 | Security Assurance Requirements and Test Case on TEID Uniqueness for SMF | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191397 | Discussion on the security test of NRF authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191398 | Way forward on the security test of NRF authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191399 | Security Assurance Requirement and Test for NRF authorization on the NF discovery | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191400 | Removing the EN on AMF log | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191401 | Test case on UE security capability invalid or unacceptable | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191402 | New solution for linkability attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191403 | Key issue on authorization for delegated "Subscribe-Notify" interaction scenarios | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191404 | New solution for delegated "Subscribe-Notify" interaction authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191405 | Discussions on security of mobile edge computing | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191406 | New SID: Study on Security Aspects of enhancement of support for Edge Computing in 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191407 | Clarification on securing the procedure of idle mobility from 5GS to EPS over N26 interface | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191408 | New KI: AKMA push | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191409 | Subscriber privacy: test data for Profile A of SUCI computation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191410 | New KI: KAUSF storing at UE side | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191411 | Registration failure in registration procedure with AMF reallocation caused by slicing | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191412 | Solving registration failure in initial registration procedure with AMF reallocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191413 | Solving registration failure in initial registration procedure with AMF reallocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191414 | Clarification on the SUCI compuation | Huawei, Hisilicon, Gemalto, IDEMIA | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191415 | New KI: Access token sharing between NFs | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191416 | New solution for service access authorization within a NF Set | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191417 | Discussion on removing the authentication result in the UDM | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191418 | Removing the authentication result in the UDM | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191419 | NAS recovery with the soure AMF in handover failure | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191420 | Missing UDR description in alignment with 29.505 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191421 | Adding Nudr service | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191422 | Unified EAP authentication framework | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191423 | Conclusion on EAP authentication framework | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191424 | Solutions and conclusion for SNPN service access via PLMN and vice versa | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191425 | Solution and Conclusion on 5GLAN authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191426 | Solution on SMF handling the UP security policy for a 5GLAN Group | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191427 | Solution and conclusion for TSC | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191428 | Key issue on PNiNPN authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191429 | Solution and evaluation for PNiNPN authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191430 | Summary of security aspects covered in this study | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191431 | Security for non-public networks | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191432 | NPN references in existing text | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191433 | Discussion WID 5GS Vertical_LAN_SEC | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191434 | WID proposal for 5GS Vertical_LAN_SEC | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191435 | CIoT: Definitions and Abbreviations | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191436 | CIoT: Evaluation to Solution #4 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191437 | CIoT: Update to Solution #4 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191438 | CIoT: Conclusion to KI#2 and KI#3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191439 | Solution to protect user ID over the air interface | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191440 | Correction of ShortResumeMAC-I calculation for EDT | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191441 | LS on integrity protection for EDT | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191442 | Discussion on RAN2 conclusion for NR positioning SI | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191443 | LS on security and privacy aspects of NR positioning | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191444 | Discussion on missing AMF/SEAF behaviour | Ericsson, CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191445 | Missing AMF/SEAF behaviour | Ericsson, CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191446 | Rectifying incorrect limitation for horiz/vert key derivation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191447 | UP policy handling in case of unauthenticated emergency calls | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191448 | Remove EN in clause 10.2.2.2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191449 | Verification failure of NAS container | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191450 | Security algorithm change by SN | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191451 | Verification failure of NAS MAC in NAS container at 4G to 5G HO | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191452 | Handling of 5G security contexts with multiple NAS connections at 4G to 5G HO | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191453 | Missing privacy parameters | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191454 | New solution (SERSI - SERving network controlled SI signatures) - builds on Solution#7 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191455 | Conclusion on KI#3'S second requirement (reactive action) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191456 | IAB - terminology | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191457 | IAB - security architecture diagram key issue | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191458 | A new KI for the authentication framework for the UE | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191459 | A new KI for the authentication framework for an IAB node acting as a MT | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191460 | A new KI for activating communication security in IAB node | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191461 | A solution for mutual authentication between a UE and a 3GPP network supporting the IAB architecture | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191462 | Discussion on security aspects of EPLMN in LS from S2 (S3-191126) | Vodafone GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191463 | Living Document: General SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191464 | Resolving the ENs in solution #5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191465 | SMF Test Case: TEID Uniqueness | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191466 | New Annex for the SEPP in TR 33.926 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191467 | Updates to SEPP Test Cases | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191468 | New Annex for the NRF in TR 33.926 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191469 | Error handling for PLMN ID mismatch at SEPP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191470 | Update to Solution#4 Enhance privacy control in LCS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191471 | Solution 2 Evaluation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191472 | Solution 3 Evaluation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191473 | Co-existence of LTKUP and PFS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191474 | URLLC: Resolving EN in solution #8 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191475 | URLLC: Evaluation to solution #8 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191476 | URLLC: Recommendation for KI#3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191477 | Solution #7 evaluation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191478 | Conclusion to KI#1 and KI#2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191479 | Restore figures in Solution 3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191480 | New KI: Leakage of long-term key | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191481 | New solution: EAP-AKA´ PFS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191482 | pCR to TR33.935 - Addition of Diffie - Helman Key agreements section | Vodafone GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191483 | CR to 33.501 6.6.4 UP integrity mechanisms - UE to gNB ntegrity protection check failure reporting | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191484 | Discussion paper on Service access authorization for Indirect communication with delegated discovery (Model D) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191485 | eSBA: Solution to KI #22 - Service access authorization for Indirect Communication with delegated discovery (Model D) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191486 | Evaluation of Solution #1 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191487 | New Test Case: Error handling of malformed JSON object between two network products | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191488 | Mitigation against the authentication relay attack with different PLMNs | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191489 | Removal of Editor’s Notes of Solution #5 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191490 | eSBA: Solution to KI#22 - Service access authorization for Indirect Communication without delegated discovery (Model C) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191491 | IAB - security architecture diagram solution | Ericsson-LG Co., LTD | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191492 | Removing the authentication result in the UDM | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191493 | Proposed evaluation details for solution #5 in TR 33.819 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191494 | Proposed conclusion details for key issue #5.1 in TR 33.819 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191495 | Proposed evaluation details for solution #4 in TR 33.819 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191496 | Proposed conclusion details for key issue #1.1 in TR 33.819 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191497 | Motivation and comments on a draft CR for non-public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191498 | Security for non-public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191499 | Proposed solution for protecting the S-NSSAI for transmission at the AS layer | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191500 | Key derivation for SRVCC from 5G to UTRAN CS | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191501 | Correction to the handling of security context in the multi-NAS scenario | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191502 | Description of issue of clashing ngKSIs with multi-NAS security | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191503 | Clashing ngKSI for different security contexts in multi-NAS scenarios | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191504 | Response LS on handling of non-zero ABBA value in Release 15 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191505 | Response LS on Multiple NAS connections and inter-system change from S1 mode to N1 mode in 5GMM-CONNECTED mode | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191506 | Missing implementation of S3-190797: Conclusion on KI #8 for Study on the security for URLLC | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191507 | Evaluation of solution #5: Security for redundant data transmission | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191508 | Shared key based MIB/SIB protection | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191509 | Security requirement for KI #7 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191510 | Resolving EN in Solution 9 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191511 | Resolving EN in Solution 10 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191512 | Clarification for the NAS MAC failure case in N2 HO | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191513 | Clarification for the NAS MAC failure case in interworking | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191514 | Draft CR to 38300 for IAB | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191515 | Draft CR to 38401 for IAB | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191516 | Status on RAN WI NR_IAB | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191517 | F1 interface security for IAB | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191518 | Commonalities between IAB and Wireline Fronthaul for CU/DU | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191519 | Solution for F1 interface security for IAB | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191520 | Broadcast of Location Assistance Data for NR | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191521 | eSBA: Solution to KI #21: Protection of SeCoP interfaces | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191522 | Discussion of SBA authorization selection | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191523 | eSBA: Solution to KI #23: NF to NF authentication and authorization in Indirect communications model | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191524 | Proposal of SBA authorization revision | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191525 | eSBA: Solution to KI #27 - UP Gateway function for protection of inter-PLMN N9 interface | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,Juniper | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191526 | Scope of a SECAM SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products | China Mobile, CAICT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191527 | Providing some evaluation for solution #2 in TR 33.815 | Qualcomm Incorporated, Sprint, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191528 | Proposed conclusion for establishing the RLOS call | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191529 | Adding MACS as an input parameter to the calculation of AK* to provide freshness | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191530 | Scope of SECAM evaluation for 3GPP virtualized network products | China Mobile, CAICT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191531 | Scope of SECAM Accreditation for 3GPP virtualized network products | China Mobile, CAICT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191532 | eSBA: NF Consumer authentication for based on signed API Request | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191533 | Adding roles in SECAM for 3GPP virtualized network products into clause 4.6 | China Mobile, CAICT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191534 | AKMA: Implicit bootstrapping using NEF as the AKMA Anchor Function | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191535 | Adding contents into clause 4 | China Mobile, CAICT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191536 | IAB Architecture | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191537 | Work Plan for moving forward AKMA | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191538 | Key Issue on IAB Node authentication and authorization | Samsung R&D Institute India | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191539 | Solution for IAB Node authentication and authorization | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191540 | Discussion on AKMA overall evaluation methodology | China Mobile, ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191541 | pCR to 33.815 on authentication of network | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191542 | Discussion on Action Item 94/1 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191543 | Solution for integrity protection of UP signalling messages | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191544 | pCR of clause 7- evaluation and conclusion | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191545 | pCR of clause 7- evaluation and conclusion | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191546 | pCR of clause 7- evaluation and conclusion | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191547 | Security Requirements for CAPIF-3e/4e/5e reference points | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191548 | Individual Evaluations of solution #7- #12 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191549 | Clarification to Initial NAS message protection | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191550 | Clarification to Solution#1 of PARLOS | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191551 | Alignment of the term Non-Standalone NPN | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191552 | Editor’s note for KI #1.1 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191553 | Resolution of Editor’s note on privacy impact in Solution #3 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191554 | Editorial Changes to TR 33.835 v0.4.0 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191555 | Resolution of Editor’s note on entities protected in Solution #3 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191556 | Evaluation to Solution #3 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191557 | Individual Evaluation of solution #6 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191558 | Individual Evaluation of solution #6 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191559 | Mitigation against linkability attack | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191560 | Removing the EN on AMF log | NTT DOCOMO, Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191561 | Meeting minutes of AKMA conference calls | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191562 | Addition of AMF/SMF requirement on security logging | Deutsche Telekom AG, NTT Docomo | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191563 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 1 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191564 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 2 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191565 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 3 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191566 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 4 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191567 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 5 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191568 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 6 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191569 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 7 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191570 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 8 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191571 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 9 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191572 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 10 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191573 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 11 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191574 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 12 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191575 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 13 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191576 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 14 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191577 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 15 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191578 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 16 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191579 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 17 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191580 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 18 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191581 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 19 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191582 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 20 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191583 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 21 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191584 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 22 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191585 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 23 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191586 | Residential use case for 5G Core with fixed broadband access | CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191587 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 24 | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191588 | User Plane Security for 5GC Roaming (re: S3-191016) | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191589 | Discussion on removing the authentication result in the UDM | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191590 | Secure LI Data Access Living Document | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191591 | Comments on S3-191301, Draft Reply LS on protection of PC5-RRC messages for sidelink unicast communication | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191592 | Comment on contribution S3-191553 | InterDigital Belgium. LLC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191593 | Providing some evaluation for solution #2 in TR 33.815 | Qualcomm Incorporated, Sprint, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Verizon UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191594 | Proposed conclusion for establishing the RLOS call | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Verizon UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191595 | Proposed conclusion for establishing the RLOS call | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Verizon UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191596 | New KI for PLMN integrated NPN | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191597 | New KI for Public network integrated NPN | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191598 | Report from SA3#94 | MCC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191599 | Reply to: LS on usage of EPLMNs | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191600 | Reply to: LS on broadcast assistance data delivery | Intel | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191601 | Reply to: Reply LS on authentication of group of IoT devices | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191602 | pCR to TR33.814 - Key issue for integrity protection of broadcast assistance data | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191603 | Aligning the storage timing of KAUSF in 5G AKA with EAP-AKA' | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191604 | Rectifying incorrect limitation for horiz/vert key derivation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191605 | Corrections on the s-Kgnb derivation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191606 | Clarification on securing the procedure of idle mobility from 5GS to EPS over N26 interface | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191607 | Clarification for the NAS MAC failure case in N2 HO | Qualcomm Incorporated,Huawei,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191608 | Reply to: LS on Security failure of NAS container in HO command | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191609 | Add detials on handling UP security in RRC inactive scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191610 | Response LS on Multiple NAS connections and inter-system change from S1 mode to N1 mode in 5GMM-CONNECTED mode | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191611 | Clarification for Initial NAS Message Protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191612 | UP policy handling in case of unauthenticated emergency calls | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191613 | Response LS on handling of non-zero ABBA value in Release 15 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191614 | Clarification for the NAS MAC failure case in interworking | Qualcomm Incorporated,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191615 | Reply to: Reply LS on Verification of PLMN-ID in the SEPP | Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191616 | Addition of missing SEPP requirement on JOSE-patch validation | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191617 | Name clarification for N32 security | Ericsson,NCSC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191618 | LS on clarification for N32 security | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191619 | Token-based authorization for NRF's management and discovery services | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191620 | Protection of unicast message | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191621 | Slice information for token-based authorization | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191622 | Reply LS on protection of PC5-RRC messages for sidelink unicast communication | InterDigital Germany GmbH,LG | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191623 | Way forward in CVD and research | CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191624 | Essential clarification of MSIN coding for the ECIES protection shemes | IDEMIA,Gemalto, Qualcomm,Ericsson,Huawei,HiSilicon,Intel | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191625 | Clarification on the SUCI compuation | Huawei, Hisilicon, Gemalto, IDEMIA | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191626 | subscriber privacy: ECIES test data | Gemalto, IDEMIA, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191627 | Missing privacy parameters | Ericsson,Gemalto,IDEMIA | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191628 | LS on support of non-3GPP only UE and support for PEI in IMEI format | S2-1904836 | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191629 | Reply to: Reply LS on Nudr Sensitive Data Protection | Hewlett Packard Enterprise | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191630 | Adding gNB critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191631 | Living Document: General SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191632 | Corrections on IP packet forwarding | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191633 | Correction of ShortResumeMAC-I calculation for EDT | Ericsson,Huawei | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191634 | Reply LS to RAN2/RAN3 on EDT UP IP | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191635 | Interface and protocol stack clarifications and corrections to TS 33.163 | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191636 | Interface and protocol stack clarifications and corrections to TS 33.163 | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191637 | Making UE initiated key refresh optional in TS33.163 | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191638 | Deprecation of TLS 1.1 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191639 | New SID: Study on security aspects of enhancement of support for Edge Computing in 5GC | China Unicom, CAICT, China Telecom, ZTE,Huawei | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191640 | Adapting maximum HTTP payload size to CT4 specification | Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191641 | [MCPTT] 33179 R13. Clarification of the references to RFC 3711 | Airbus DS SLC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191642 | [MCSec] 33180 R14. Clarification of the references to RFC 3711 | Airbus DS SLC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191643 | [MCSec] 33180 R15. Clarification of the references to RFC 3711 | Airbus DS SLC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191644 | {33.179] R13 Remove IANA editor's notes | Motorola Solutions UK | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191645 | [33.180] R14 Remove IANA editor’s notes | Motorola Solutions UK | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191646 | [33.180] R15 Remove IANA editor’s notes (mirror) | Motorola Solutions UK | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191647 | [33.180] R16 Establishment of PCK for MCData | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191648 | skeleton of security aspects of 5G SRVCC to UTRAN | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191649 | Security procedures of 5G SRVCC to UTRAN | Huawei,China Unicom,CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191650 | Test case on UE security capability invalid or unacceptable | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191651 | Removing the EN on AMF log | NTT DOCOMO, Deutsche Telekom,Huawei | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191652 | Draft TS 33.512 | Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191653 | Addition of Network Product Class Description for AMF | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191654 | Addition of AMF-related Security Problem Descriptions | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191655 | Security Assurance Requirements and Test Case on TEID Uniqueness for SMF | Huawei, Hisilicon,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191656 | Draft TS 33.515 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191657 | Testcase: Replacing confidential IEs with NULL in original N32-f message | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191658 | Draft TS 33.517 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191659 | New Annex for the SEPP in TR 33.926 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191660 | Updates to SEPP Test Cases | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191661 | eSBA: Solution to KI #27 - UP Gateway function for protection of inter-PLMN N9 interface | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191662 | Way forward on the security test of NRF authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191663 | Security Assurance Requirement and Test for NRF authorization on the NF discovery | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191664 | New Annex for the NRF in TR 33.926 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191665 | Draft TS 33.518 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191666 | Discussion document on roaming UP gateway | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191667 | Draft TR 33.855 | Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191668 | Solution to KI #26: NDS/IP on the inter-PLMN N9 interface | Juniper Networks, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191669 | Key issue of signalling between SEPP and IPX provider | Deutsche telekom | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191670 | New Key Issue for TR 33.836 - privacy protection for multicast messages over PC5 | InterDigital Germany GmbH,LG | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191671 | eSBA: Solution to KI #22 - Service access authorization for Indirect Communication with delegated discovery (Model D) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191672 | eSBA: Solution to KI #23: NF to NF authentication and authorization in Indirect communications model | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191673 | Key issue on authorization for delegated "Subscribe-Notify" interaction scenarios | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191674 | New solution for service access authorization within a NF Set | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191675 | eSBA: NF Consumer authentication for based on signed API Request | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191676 | CIoT: Definitions and Abbreviations | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191677 | Draft TR 33.861 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191678 | update solution#4 with UP IP during EDT for multiple PDCP PDUs. | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191679 | CIoT: Update to Solution #4 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191680 | Update of Solution #6 – Use of UE Configuration Update | KPN | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191681 | Updating solution#7 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191682 | Resolving EN in Solution 9 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191683 | Resolving EN in Solution 10 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191684 | Delete EN in solution12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191685 | Add evalution in solution12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191686 | Proposal for improvement FS_CIoT_sec_5G solution #15 | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191687 | Proposal for editor's notes in FS_CIoT_sec_5G solution #15 | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191688 | Resolve ENs on Solution to Mitigate DDoS Attack based on RAN | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191689 | Solution to Mitigate DDoS Attack on AMF caused by Massive Misbehaving Infrequent CIoT Ues | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191690 | New Key Issue: SUCI-to-SUPI mapping for the FN-RG | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191691 | Proposal for FS_UP_IP_Sec Key Issue #3 and 5: Zero-overhead user plane integrity protection on the link layer | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191692 | IAB - terminology | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191693 | Draft TR 33.824 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191694 | IAB Architecture | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191695 | IAB - security architecture diagram solution | Ericsson-LG Co., LTD | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191696 | A new KI for the authentication framework for the UE | Ericsson,Intel | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191697 | A new KI for the authentication framework for an IAB node acting as a MT | Ericsson,Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191698 | A new KI for activating communication security in IAB node | Ericsson,Intel | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191699 | Solution for IAB Node authentication and authorization | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191700 | F1 interface security for IAB | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191701 | New Test Case: Error handling of malformed JSON object between two network products | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191702 | New KI for TR 33.807: Authentication of UE without NAS support and without 3GPP RAT behind a FN-RG or 5G-CRG with 5GC | CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191703 | Discussion on proposed response to incoming LS (S3-191138) on authentication of UEs not supporting NAS | Charter Communications, CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191704 | Modification on Use of SUCI in NAS signalling | ZTE Corporation,Intel | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191705 | Security of RRC Reestablishment during N2 HO | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191706 | Add references | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191707 | Add content to clause 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191708 | Delete Editor's Note in KI#4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191709 | Add requirement and delete EN for KI#13 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191710 | Draft TR 33.807 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191711 | Add conclusion on KI#3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191712 | Evaluation of Solution #1 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191713 | Reply LS on Authentication for UEs not Supporting NAS | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191714 | Scope for TR 33 848 | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191715 | Virtualisation Background and Concepts | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191716 | Key Issue: Establishment of trust domains for Network Functions | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191717 | Key Issue: Confidentiality of Sensitive Data | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191718 | Key Issue: Availability of Network Functions | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191719 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 1 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191720 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 2 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191721 | Initial Key Issues for TR 33.848 | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191722 | Draft TR 33.848 | BT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191723 | Evaluation and text for resolving editor’s note for solution #5 in TR 33.825 | NEC Europe Ltd,Huawei | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191724 | Delete the EN of solution 5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191725 | WID on security of URLLC | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191726 | WID proposal for 5GS Vertical_LAN_SEC | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191727 | Clarification to Solution#1 of PARLOS | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191728 | Providing some evaluation for solution #2 in TR 33.815 | Qualcomm Incorporated, Sprint, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Verizon UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191729 | Draft TR 33.815 | Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191730 | eNS Update to solution 1 Slice specific secondary authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191731 | Draft TR 33.813 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191732 | Removing ENs for solution #2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191733 | Add Evaluation to Solution #2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191734 | Update to solution #4 | InterDigital Belgium. LLC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191735 | Solution to KI #4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191736 | A solution to NSSAI protection at AS transmission | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191737 | Proposed solution for protecting the S-NSSAI for transmission at the AS layer | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191738 | Solution to protect user ID over the air interface | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191739 | Preliminary comparison of solutions | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191740 | New Key Issue-Security of identifiers in group communication | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191741 | Completing TS 33.511 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191742 | URLLC: Resolving EN in solution #8 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191743 | Handling of UE radio network capabilities in 4G and 5G | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191744 | Clause 4 Security Aspects of Advanced V2X services | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191745 | Draft TR 33.836 | LG | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191746 | New Key Issue for TR 33.836 - privacy protection for unicast messages over PC5 | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191747 | New Key Issue for TR 33.836 - security for eV2X unicast messages over PC5 | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191748 | KI_security for setting up multicast | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191749 | New Key Issue for TR 33.836 - Security of the UE service authorization and revocation | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191750 | LS on security and privacy aspects of NR positioning | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191751 | Clarification on Subscription Identifier mechanism for De-registration. | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191752 | Reply to: LS on Use of SUCI in NAS signalling | Intel | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191753 | IANA assigned values for mission critical | Motorola | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191754 | Address EN and update in key issue 5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191755 | Draft TR 33.814 | CATT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191756 | Draft TR 33.825 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191757 | Deleting EN of solution 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191758 | Evaluation for solution 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191759 | Deleting the EN of solution 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191760 | Adding more clarification text of solution 7 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191761 | Evaluation for solution 6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191762 | URLLC: Evaluation to solution #8 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191763 | Security solutions summary | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191764 | Conclusion for key issue 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191765 | Conclusion for key issue 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191766 | Draft TR 33.819 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191767 | Solution and conclusion for TSC | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191768 | Resolution of Editor’s note on privacy impact in Solution #3 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191769 | New KI for PLMN integrated NPN | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191770 | New KI for Public network integrated NPN | InterDigital Germany GmbH | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191771 | Solutions and conclusion for SNPN service access via PLMN and vice versa | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191772 | update in solution 3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191773 | Evaluation to Solution #3 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191774 | Summary of security aspects covered in this study | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191775 | Draft TR 33.853 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191776 | Integrity protection between SgNB and UE in NGEN-DC | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191777 | Draft TR 33.848 | BT | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191778 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 5 | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191779 | Draft TR 33.809 | Apple | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191780 | Shared key based MIB/SIB protection | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191781 | Certificate based solution for 5GFBS | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191782 | ID based solution for 5GFBS | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191783 | Correction to the handling of security context in the multi-NAS scenario | Qualcomm Incorporated,Ericsson,Huawei | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191784 | Draft agenda SA3_95-BIS | WG Chair | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191785 | Draft TS 33.511 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191786 | Cover sheet TS 33.511 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191787 | Cover sheet TR 33.825 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191788 | Overview of TR33.856 | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191789 | Add New Security Threat and Requirement for Key Issue #1 for Protection of NAS Reject Message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191790 | Mitigation against the authentication relay attack with different PLMNs | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191791 | Cover sheet TR 33.819 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191792 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑191793 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
page generated from database: 2024-04-22 07:58:53