The 5G Standard

3GPP TDocs (written contributions) at meeting

Meeting: S3-37 - 2005-02-21 to 2005-02-25, Sophia Antipolis

meeting id: S3-37 (click id for more info on this meeting)

Click on the Tdoc to open its file.

TDoc Title Source Remarks
S3‑050001 - - -
S3‑050002 - - -
S3‑050003 - - -
S3‑050004 - - -
S3‑050005 - - -
S3‑050006 Key derivation function: character encoding - -
S3‑050007 - - -
S3‑050008 - - -
S3‑050009 - - -
S3‑050010 - - -
S3‑050011 Aligning comments in National-HI3-ASN1parameters with comments in National-HI2-ASN1parameters - -
S3‑050012 - - -
S3‑050013 Correct specification of addresses used in TCAP-Handshake - -
S3‑050014 Wu Reference Point Description - -
S3‑050015 Replacing PDGW with PDG - -
S3‑050016 Security visibility and configurability descriptions - -
S3‑050017 WLAN Link Layer Security Descriptions - -
S3‑050018 - - -
S3‑050019 - - -
S3‑050020 - - -
S3‑050021 Security capability negotiation in GBA - -
S3‑050022 Clarification on EAP-AKA(SIM) description in 3GPP IP access authentication and authorization - -
S3‑050023 - - -
S3‑050024 - - -
S3‑050025 Addition of TCAP-Handshake for MO-ForwardSM - -
S3‑050026 - - -
S3‑050027 - - -
S3‑050028 - - -
S3‑050029 - - -
S3‑050030 - - -
S3‑050031 - - -
S3‑050032 Threat of users accessing each other in link layer and corresponding security requirements of user traffic segregation - -
S3‑050033 - - -
S3‑050034 Storing SP payload after MSK message is verified - -
S3‑050035 - - -
S3‑050036 - - -
S3‑050037 - - -
S3‑050038 Clarifing the status that can’t be changed in the security requirement of WLAN-UE split - -
S3‑050039 WLAN AN providing protection against IP address spoofing - -
S3‑050040 - - -
S3‑050041 Clarification on the handling of simultaneous sessions - -
S3‑050042 Clarification to TS 33.222 - -
S3‑050043 - - -
S3‑050044 Addition of reference to early IMS security TR - -
S3‑050045 - - -
S3‑050046 - - -
S3‑050047 ME based MBMS key derivation for ME based MBMS key management - -
S3‑050048 - - -
S3‑050049 On the derivation of the GBA keys for MBMS - -
S3‑050050 - - -
S3‑050051 Improving the robustness of the TCAP handshake mechanism - -
S3‑050052 Removal of editors' notes - -
S3‑050053 - - -
S3‑050054 - - -
S3‑050055 - - -
S3‑050056 GBA User Security Settings (GUSS) transfer optimisation - -
S3‑050057 Keeping PSK TLS in 3GPP Rel-6 - -
S3‑050058 - - -
S3‑050059 - - -
S3‑050060 - - -
S3‑050061 - - -
S3‑050062 - - -
S3‑050063 - - -
S3‑050064 - - -
S3‑050065 - - -
S3‑050066 - - -
S3‑050067 Bootstrapping timestamp - -
S3‑050068 - - -
S3‑050069 Clarify the GBA requirements for https supporting applications at Ua reference point - -
S3‑050070 - - -
S3‑050071 - - -
S3‑050072 - - -
S3‑050073 Clarify MUK key synchronisation for MSK push procedure - -
S3‑050074 Add missing parts of CR33 (SA3#36) - -
S3‑050075 - - -
S3‑050076 Clarify Time Stamp verification in MSK Verification Message procedure - -
S3‑050077 Clarify the usage of the MUK in the BM-SC solicited pull procedure - -
S3‑050078 Annex D1: correction of the description of the GBA run - -
S3‑050079 - - -
S3‑050080 - - -
S3‑050081 - - -
S3‑050082 Usage of security policy payload - -
S3‑050083 - - -
S3‑050084 Clarification of MSK and MTK procedures - -
S3‑050085 Requesting specific MSK - -
S3‑050086 Storage of B-TID in GBA_U NAF Derivation procedure - -
S3‑050087 - - -
S3‑050088 MGV-F functionality related to MTK-ID upper limit - -
S3‑050089 Stop the usage of one MSK - -
S3‑050090 Alignment to SA4 terminology - -
S3‑050091 Introduction of BM-SC subfunctions - -
S3‑050092 Removing IDi from MTK message - -
S3‑050093 - - -
S3‑050094 - - -
S3‑050095 - - -
S3‑050096 - - -
S3‑050097 - - -
S3‑050098 - - -
S3‑050099 - - -
S3‑050100 - - -
S3‑050101 - - -
S3‑050102 - - -
S3‑050103 Clarify the GBA requirements for https supporting applications at Ua reference point - -
S3‑050104 MBMS download protection details - -
S3‑050105 Clarify MUK key synchronisation for MSK push procedure - -
S3‑050106 - - -
S3‑050107 - - -
S3‑050108 - - -
S3‑050109 - - -
S3‑050110 Removal of editors' notes - -
S3‑050111 - - -
S3‑050112 LS on protection of Rx and Gx interfaces S3 -
S3‑050113 - - -
S3‑050114 Alignment according to MIKEY related IETF work - -
S3‑050115 Clarify MUK key synchronisation for MSK push procedure - -
S3‑050116 Removal of editors' notes - -
S3‑050117 Correct the MSK verification message handling - -
S3‑050118 Storing SP payload after MSK message is verified - -
S3‑050119 - - -
S3‑050120 - - -
S3‑050121 Improving the robustness of the TCAP handshake mechanism - -
S3‑050122 Addition of TCAP-Handshake for MO-ForwardSM - -
S3‑050123 - - -
S3‑050124 Protection of MBMS Service Announcement sent over MBMS bearer - -
S3‑050125 MBMS download protection details - -
S3‑050126 Reply: Reply LS on Reception Acknowledgement for MBMS S3 -
S3‑050127 MGV-F functionality related to MTK-ID upper limit - -
S3‑050128 Stop the usage of one MSK - -
S3‑050129 Requesting specific MSK - -
S3‑050130 Clarification of HTTP procedures - -
S3‑050131 LS on ‘MBMS security functions, procedures and Architecture’ S3 -
S3‑050132 Using the term "MBMS User Service" instead of "multicast" - -
S3‑050133 Clarification of MSK and MTK procedures - -
S3‑050134 Introduction of BM-SC subfunctions - -
S3‑050135 Usage of security policy payload - -
S3‑050136 LS on MBMS work progress S3 -
S3‑050137 Introduction of missing abbreviation, Symbols and definitions - -
S3‑050138 - - -
S3‑050139 Addition of reference to early IMS security TR - -
S3‑050140 Key derivation function: character encoding - -
S3‑050142 - - -
S3‑050143 Bootstrapping timestamp - -
S3‑050144 Clarification to TS 33.222 - -
S3‑050145 Keeping PSK TLS in 3GPP Rel-6 - -
S3‑050146 Clarify the GBA requirements for https supporting applications at Ua reference point - -
S3‑050147 - - -
S3‑050148 Removal of editors' notes - -
S3‑050149 Fallback to full authentication - -
S3‑050150 Correct the “Application guidelines to use GAA” - -
S3‑050151 Clarification on the handling of simultaneous sessions - -
S3‑050152 - - -
S3‑050153 Reply LS on alignment of specifications between CN1 and SA3 with respect to fallback to full authentication S3 -
S3‑050154 MBMS download protection details - -
S3‑050155 Using OCSP to Check Validity of PDG Certificate in 3GPP IP Access - -
S3‑050156 Threat of users accessing each other in link layer and corresponding security requirements of user traffic segregation - -
S3‑050157 WLAN AN providing protection against IP address spoofing - -
S3‑050158 Clarification on EAP-AKA(SIM) description in 3GPP IP access authentication and authorization - -
S3‑050159 Clarifing the status that can’t be changed in the security requirement of WLAN-UE split - -
S3‑050160 Removal of editors' notes - -
S3‑050161 Replacing PDGW with PDG - -
S3‑050162 ME based MBMS key derivation for ME based MBMS key management - -
S3‑050163 MGV-F functionality related to MTK-ID upper limit - -
S3‑050164 Stop the usage of one MSK - -
S3‑050165 Reply LS on ‘Ciphering of access bursts on VGCS channel’ S3 -
S3‑050166 Storing SP payload after MSK message is verified - -
S3‑050167 - - -
S3‑050168 Key derivation function: character encoding - -
S3‑050169 - - -
S3‑050170 - - -
S3‑050171 Reply LS to ‘Status of OMA Mobile Broadcast Services’. S3 -
S3‑050172 - - -
S3‑050173 - - -
S3‑050174 LS on next steps for MAPsec S3 -
S3‑050175 Clarify the GBA requirements for https supporting applications at Ua reference point - -
S3‑050176 LS on HTTPS connection between an UICC and a network application function S3 -
S3‑050177 Using OCSP to Check Validity of PDG Certificate in 3GPP IP Access - -
S3‑050178 Threat of users accessing each other in link layer and corresponding security requirements of user traffic segregation - -
S3‑050179 Reply LS on Control of simultaneous accesses for WLAN 3GPP IP access S3 -
S3‑050180 WLAN AN providing protection against IP address spoofing - -
S3‑050181 Detecting the start of a WLAN Direct IP Access session based on Wa/Wd Accounting Messages - -
S3‑050182 Reply to Liaison Statement on MBMS User Service architecture S3 -
S3‑050183 - - -

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