3GPP TDocs (written contributions) at meeting
Meeting: S3-37 - 2005-02-21 to 2005-02-25, Sophia Antipolis
meeting id: S3-37 (click id for more info on this meeting)Click on the Tdoc to open its file.
TDoc | Title | Source | Remarks |
---|---|---|---|
S3‑050001 | - | - | - |
S3‑050002 | - | - | - |
S3‑050003 | - | - | - |
S3‑050004 | - | - | - |
S3‑050005 | - | - | - |
S3‑050006 | Key derivation function: character encoding | - | - |
S3‑050007 | - | - | - |
S3‑050008 | - | - | - |
S3‑050009 | - | - | - |
S3‑050010 | - | - | - |
S3‑050011 | Aligning comments in National-HI3-ASN1parameters with comments in National-HI2-ASN1parameters | - | - |
S3‑050012 | - | - | - |
S3‑050013 | Correct specification of addresses used in TCAP-Handshake | - | - |
S3‑050014 | Wu Reference Point Description | - | - |
S3‑050015 | Replacing PDGW with PDG | - | - |
S3‑050016 | Security visibility and configurability descriptions | - | - |
S3‑050017 | WLAN Link Layer Security Descriptions | - | - |
S3‑050018 | - | - | - |
S3‑050019 | - | - | - |
S3‑050020 | - | - | - |
S3‑050021 | Security capability negotiation in GBA | - | - |
S3‑050022 | Clarification on EAP-AKA(SIM) description in 3GPP IP access authentication and authorization | - | - |
S3‑050023 | - | - | - |
S3‑050024 | - | - | - |
S3‑050025 | Addition of TCAP-Handshake for MO-ForwardSM | - | - |
S3‑050026 | - | - | - |
S3‑050027 | - | - | - |
S3‑050028 | - | - | - |
S3‑050029 | - | - | - |
S3‑050030 | - | - | - |
S3‑050031 | - | - | - |
S3‑050032 | Threat of users accessing each other in link layer and corresponding security requirements of user traffic segregation | - | - |
S3‑050033 | - | - | - |
S3‑050034 | Storing SP payload after MSK message is verified | - | - |
S3‑050035 | - | - | - |
S3‑050036 | - | - | - |
S3‑050037 | - | - | - |
S3‑050038 | Clarifing the status that can’t be changed in the security requirement of WLAN-UE split | - | - |
S3‑050039 | WLAN AN providing protection against IP address spoofing | - | - |
S3‑050040 | - | - | - |
S3‑050041 | Clarification on the handling of simultaneous sessions | - | - |
S3‑050042 | Clarification to TS 33.222 | - | - |
S3‑050043 | - | - | - |
S3‑050044 | Addition of reference to early IMS security TR | - | - |
S3‑050045 | - | - | - |
S3‑050046 | - | - | - |
S3‑050047 | ME based MBMS key derivation for ME based MBMS key management | - | - |
S3‑050048 | - | - | - |
S3‑050049 | On the derivation of the GBA keys for MBMS | - | - |
S3‑050050 | - | - | - |
S3‑050051 | Improving the robustness of the TCAP handshake mechanism | - | - |
S3‑050052 | Removal of editors' notes | - | - |
S3‑050053 | - | - | - |
S3‑050054 | - | - | - |
S3‑050055 | - | - | - |
S3‑050056 | GBA User Security Settings (GUSS) transfer optimisation | - | - |
S3‑050057 | Keeping PSK TLS in 3GPP Rel-6 | - | - |
S3‑050058 | - | - | - |
S3‑050059 | - | - | - |
S3‑050060 | - | - | - |
S3‑050061 | - | - | - |
S3‑050062 | - | - | - |
S3‑050063 | - | - | - |
S3‑050064 | - | - | - |
S3‑050065 | - | - | - |
S3‑050066 | - | - | - |
S3‑050067 | Bootstrapping timestamp | - | - |
S3‑050068 | - | - | - |
S3‑050069 | Clarify the GBA requirements for https supporting applications at Ua reference point | - | - |
S3‑050070 | - | - | - |
S3‑050071 | - | - | - |
S3‑050072 | - | - | - |
S3‑050073 | Clarify MUK key synchronisation for MSK push procedure | - | - |
S3‑050074 | Add missing parts of CR33 (SA3#36) | - | - |
S3‑050075 | - | - | - |
S3‑050076 | Clarify Time Stamp verification in MSK Verification Message procedure | - | - |
S3‑050077 | Clarify the usage of the MUK in the BM-SC solicited pull procedure | - | - |
S3‑050078 | Annex D1: correction of the description of the GBA run | - | - |
S3‑050079 | - | - | - |
S3‑050080 | - | - | - |
S3‑050081 | - | - | - |
S3‑050082 | Usage of security policy payload | - | - |
S3‑050083 | - | - | - |
S3‑050084 | Clarification of MSK and MTK procedures | - | - |
S3‑050085 | Requesting specific MSK | - | - |
S3‑050086 | Storage of B-TID in GBA_U NAF Derivation procedure | - | - |
S3‑050087 | - | - | - |
S3‑050088 | MGV-F functionality related to MTK-ID upper limit | - | - |
S3‑050089 | Stop the usage of one MSK | - | - |
S3‑050090 | Alignment to SA4 terminology | - | - |
S3‑050091 | Introduction of BM-SC subfunctions | - | - |
S3‑050092 | Removing IDi from MTK message | - | - |
S3‑050093 | - | - | - |
S3‑050094 | - | - | - |
S3‑050095 | - | - | - |
S3‑050096 | - | - | - |
S3‑050097 | - | - | - |
S3‑050098 | - | - | - |
S3‑050099 | - | - | - |
S3‑050100 | - | - | - |
S3‑050101 | - | - | - |
S3‑050102 | - | - | - |
S3‑050103 | Clarify the GBA requirements for https supporting applications at Ua reference point | - | - |
S3‑050104 | MBMS download protection details | - | - |
S3‑050105 | Clarify MUK key synchronisation for MSK push procedure | - | - |
S3‑050106 | - | - | - |
S3‑050107 | - | - | - |
S3‑050108 | - | - | - |
S3‑050109 | - | - | - |
S3‑050110 | Removal of editors' notes | - | - |
S3‑050111 | - | - | - |
S3‑050112 | LS on protection of Rx and Gx interfaces | S3 | - |
S3‑050113 | - | - | - |
S3‑050114 | Alignment according to MIKEY related IETF work | - | - |
S3‑050115 | Clarify MUK key synchronisation for MSK push procedure | - | - |
S3‑050116 | Removal of editors' notes | - | - |
S3‑050117 | Correct the MSK verification message handling | - | - |
S3‑050118 | Storing SP payload after MSK message is verified | - | - |
S3‑050119 | - | - | - |
S3‑050120 | - | - | - |
S3‑050121 | Improving the robustness of the TCAP handshake mechanism | - | - |
S3‑050122 | Addition of TCAP-Handshake for MO-ForwardSM | - | - |
S3‑050123 | - | - | - |
S3‑050124 | Protection of MBMS Service Announcement sent over MBMS bearer | - | - |
S3‑050125 | MBMS download protection details | - | - |
S3‑050126 | Reply: Reply LS on Reception Acknowledgement for MBMS | S3 | - |
S3‑050127 | MGV-F functionality related to MTK-ID upper limit | - | - |
S3‑050128 | Stop the usage of one MSK | - | - |
S3‑050129 | Requesting specific MSK | - | - |
S3‑050130 | Clarification of HTTP procedures | - | - |
S3‑050131 | LS on ‘MBMS security functions, procedures and Architecture’ | S3 | - |
S3‑050132 | Using the term "MBMS User Service" instead of "multicast" | - | - |
S3‑050133 | Clarification of MSK and MTK procedures | - | - |
S3‑050134 | Introduction of BM-SC subfunctions | - | - |
S3‑050135 | Usage of security policy payload | - | - |
S3‑050136 | LS on MBMS work progress | S3 | - |
S3‑050137 | Introduction of missing abbreviation, Symbols and definitions | - | - |
S3‑050138 | - | - | - |
S3‑050139 | Addition of reference to early IMS security TR | - | - |
S3‑050140 | Key derivation function: character encoding | - | - |
S3‑050142 | - | - | - |
S3‑050143 | Bootstrapping timestamp | - | - |
S3‑050144 | Clarification to TS 33.222 | - | - |
S3‑050145 | Keeping PSK TLS in 3GPP Rel-6 | - | - |
S3‑050146 | Clarify the GBA requirements for https supporting applications at Ua reference point | - | - |
S3‑050147 | - | - | - |
S3‑050148 | Removal of editors' notes | - | - |
S3‑050149 | Fallback to full authentication | - | - |
S3‑050150 | Correct the “Application guidelines to use GAA” | - | - |
S3‑050151 | Clarification on the handling of simultaneous sessions | - | - |
S3‑050152 | - | - | - |
S3‑050153 | Reply LS on alignment of specifications between CN1 and SA3 with respect to fallback to full authentication | S3 | - |
S3‑050154 | MBMS download protection details | - | - |
S3‑050155 | Using OCSP to Check Validity of PDG Certificate in 3GPP IP Access | - | - |
S3‑050156 | Threat of users accessing each other in link layer and corresponding security requirements of user traffic segregation | - | - |
S3‑050157 | WLAN AN providing protection against IP address spoofing | - | - |
S3‑050158 | Clarification on EAP-AKA(SIM) description in 3GPP IP access authentication and authorization | - | - |
S3‑050159 | Clarifing the status that can’t be changed in the security requirement of WLAN-UE split | - | - |
S3‑050160 | Removal of editors' notes | - | - |
S3‑050161 | Replacing PDGW with PDG | - | - |
S3‑050162 | ME based MBMS key derivation for ME based MBMS key management | - | - |
S3‑050163 | MGV-F functionality related to MTK-ID upper limit | - | - |
S3‑050164 | Stop the usage of one MSK | - | - |
S3‑050165 | Reply LS on ‘Ciphering of access bursts on VGCS channel’ | S3 | - |
S3‑050166 | Storing SP payload after MSK message is verified | - | - |
S3‑050167 | - | - | - |
S3‑050168 | Key derivation function: character encoding | - | - |
S3‑050169 | - | - | - |
S3‑050170 | - | - | - |
S3‑050171 | Reply LS to ‘Status of OMA Mobile Broadcast Services’. | S3 | - |
S3‑050172 | - | - | - |
S3‑050173 | - | - | - |
S3‑050174 | LS on next steps for MAPsec | S3 | - |
S3‑050175 | Clarify the GBA requirements for https supporting applications at Ua reference point | - | - |
S3‑050176 | LS on HTTPS connection between an UICC and a network application function | S3 | - |
S3‑050177 | Using OCSP to Check Validity of PDG Certificate in 3GPP IP Access | - | - |
S3‑050178 | Threat of users accessing each other in link layer and corresponding security requirements of user traffic segregation | - | - |
S3‑050179 | Reply LS on Control of simultaneous accesses for WLAN 3GPP IP access | S3 | - |
S3‑050180 | WLAN AN providing protection against IP address spoofing | - | - |
S3‑050181 | Detecting the start of a WLAN Direct IP Access session based on Wa/Wd Accounting Messages | - | - |
S3‑050182 | Reply to Liaison Statement on MBMS User Service architecture | S3 | - |
S3‑050183 | - | - | - |
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