3GPP TDocs (written contributions) at meeting
Meeting: S3-84 - 2016-07-25 to 2016-07-29, Chennai
meeting id: S3-84 (click id for more info on this meeting)Click on the Tdoc to open its file.
TDoc | Title | Source | Remarks |
---|---|---|---|
S3‑160900 | Agenda | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160901 | Report from SA3#83 | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160902 | SA3 Work Plan | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160903 | Report from last SA meeting | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160904 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160905 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160906 | LS response on LS on confidentiality protection of an identity in a value of an XML attribute of an XML element of an XML document included in a SIP message. | C1-162978 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160907 | LS on identification of originating MCPTT ID in GMS | C1-163039 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160908 | LS on Protecting UE network capabilities from ‘bidding down attack | GSMA FSAG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160909 | LS on Solving Legacy Security Issues | GSMA FSAG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160910 | Liaison Statement on 5G Capabilities and Requirements | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160911 | Reply to: LS on Clarifications on RRC Resume Request | R2-164414 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160912 | LS to SA3 on LWIP counter | R2-164551 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160913 | LS on PDCP ciphering for high data rates in eLWA | R2-164557 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160914 | LS on eDRX paging timing calculation and security concern | R2-164582 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160915 | Response LS on Clarifications on RRC Resume Request | R3-161426 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160916 | LS on Support of EAP Re-authentication for WLAN Interworking | S2-162796 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160917 | LS on progress of FS_xMBMS study item | S4-160837 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160918 | Response LS on Progress on Security for LWIP | SP-160457 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160919 | LS on I-WLAN handling and specification withdrawal | SP-160508 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160920 | pCR to 33.863 - addition of recomendation section | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160921 | WID for normaitive work of BEST | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160922 | pCR to 33.863 - Editorial updates | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160923 | pCR to 33.863 - Addition of annex detailing suggested normaitive changes | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160924 | pCR to 33.899 - update of the Introduction section | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160925 | pCR to TR 33.899 - update of section 4.2 High level security requirements | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160926 | pCR to 33.899 - update of 5.1.2 Security assumptions (Architectural aspects of 5G security) | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160927 | pCR to 33.899 - Reword section 5.2.3.2.2 and 5.2.3.3 as per editors notes | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160928 | Discussion document on the progress of EASE ALGO work item. | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160929 | TCG progress report | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160930 | Removing Editor’s Note in 6.1.2.2 | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160931 | Removing Editor’s Note in 6.1.2.3 of TR 33.863 | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160932 | Removing Editor’s Note in 6.1.2.6 | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160933 | Removing Editor’s Note in 6.2.2.2 | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160934 | Correction of some implementation errors | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160935 | pCR to TS 33.117 on TC_CONFIDENTIAL_SYSTEM_INTERNAL_DATA | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160936 | pCR to TS 33.117 adding test case for "Protecting data and information in transfer" | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160937 | NESAS Pilot Release Documents | GSMA SECAG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160938 | Recording and discreet listening of private communications | Airbus Group SAS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160939 | Key issue #2.4: Device identifier authentication | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160940 | Key issue #5.1: Secure storage and processing of credentials and identities | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160941 | Key Issue #11.3: User control of security | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160942 | pCR to TS 33.117 adding test case for "Protecting data and information in transfer" | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160943 | pCR to TS 33.117 on TC_CONFIDENTIAL_SYSTEM_INTERNAL_DATA | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160944 | Key Issue #11.4: On demand security framework | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160945 | pCR to TR 33.899: Radio interface user plane integrity protection, Solution details | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160946 | pCR to TR 33.899: Authentication section introduction | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160947 | pCR to TR 33.899: Radio interface key exchange protocol | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160948 | pCR to TR 33.899: interception of radio interface keys sent between operator entities | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160949 | pCR to TR 33.899: UE action if network does not update session keys | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160950 | Key Issue #8.1: Security isolation of network slices | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160951 | Key issue #6.y: Authorization decoupled from Authentication | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160952 | pCR to TR 33.899: Proposal of key hierarchy for 5G security | NEC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160953 | pCR to TR 33.899: Proposal of solution for key issue of network slicing security | NEC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160954 | pCR adding the skeleton of TS 33.250 | China Mobile Com. Corporation, ZTE, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160955 | Correction of CR implementation omissions | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160956 | Split of key issue #7.1 on subscriber identifier privacy | Ericsson, Nokia, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160957 | Update of key issue #7.2 on refreshing of temporary subscriber identifier | Ericsson, Nokia, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160958 | New privacy key issue on concealing permanent or long-term subscriber identifier | Ericsson, Nokia, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160959 | New privacy key issue on concealing permanent or long-term device identifier | Ericsson, Nokia, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160960 | New privacy key issue on using effective temporary or short-term subscriber identifiers | Ericsson, Nokia, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160961 | New privacy key issue on transmitting permanent identifiers in secure interface | Ericsson, Nokia, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160962 | New privacy key issue on transmitting permanent subscriber identifiers only when needed | Ericsson, Nokia, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160963 | Deletion of key issue #7.1 on subscriber identifier privacy | Ericsson, Nokia, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160964 | An overview of NextGen security architecture | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160965 | Key hierarchy schems for network slicing | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160966 | Security for serving functions not in physical protected place | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160967 | Signing of Access Tokens | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160968 | Fix Identity Management interface | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160969 | Key Issue for inter-domain identity management operation | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160970 | Identity management for inter-domain operation | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160971 | New work item for Security Architecture for Mission Critical Services | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160972 | R-14 mission critical TS strategy | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160973 | SA3 response to LS S3-160907 (C1-162780) | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160974 | 3.1 Definitions - Device | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160975 | pCR to TR 33.899: Authentication of the user | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160976 | New privacy key issue on temporary device identifier | Nokia, Ericsson, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160977 | NSA Adding new security area on broadcast multicast | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160978 | NSA new security area on interworking and migration | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160979 | NSA - 5.3.3.3 - addressing ENs on bidding down attack and requirements reformulation | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160980 | V2X requirement on updating of crypto | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160981 | V2X Discussion on privacy requirements by regulation | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160982 | V2X Annex on privacy by regulation EU | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160983 | V2X Annex on privacy by regulation US | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160984 | NBIoT UP Solution CR | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160985 | Discussion paper on disabling PDCP ciphering | Nokia, Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160986 | draft_LS response on disabling PDCP ciphering | Nokia, Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160987 | Network Slice: EN in 5.8 intro and assumptions | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160988 | Network Slice: 5.8.3.1 key issue isolation of slices | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160989 | Network Slice: EN in 5.8.3.2 Slice differentiation | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160990 | Network slice: EN in 5.8.3.7 interslice communication | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160991 | Security aspects of Connectionless RAN-CN interface | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160992 | pCR to TR 33.899: Network public keys | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160993 | V2X privacy - a way forward | LG Electronics France | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160994 | Draft LS on V2X privacy clarification | LG Electronics France | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160995 | Enhancing the concealment of permanent or long-term subscriber identifier | Ericsson,Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160996 | Update of V2X attach id obfuscation | LG Electronics France | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160997 | Solution for Network Slicing Security | LG Electronics France | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160998 | Solution for NSA security context sharing | LG Electronics France | imported from 3GU |
S3‑160999 | Update of NSA security area #11 Security visibility and configurability | LG Electronics France | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161000 | Secure Mechanism to Achieve Remote Credential Provisioning for IoT devices | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161001 | Resolving Editor’s notes in Key Issue #2.1 Authentication framwork | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161002 | PCR of User Plane Security Protection | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG, Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161003 | Key Issue of Security for Service Provider Connection | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG, KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161004 | Remote Provisioning for IoT devices through a Companion UE | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Mobile, Deutsche Telekom AG, KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161005 | Security Context and Key Management | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161006 | Detailed Requirements for Security Mechanism Differentiation for Network Slices | Huawei, HiSilicon,Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161007 | Threats for Security Context Sharing | Huawei, HiSilicon,Deutsche Telekom AG, China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161008 | The Authentication & Authorization Scenarios of UE Accessing into Network Slicing | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161009 | The storage of security context | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161010 | Security context for connectionless mode | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161011 | pCR adding security assumptions in security area 5.4 | THALES | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161012 | Discussion paper for SCAS-PGW | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161013 | Removing Editor’s Note in 6.4.2.3 | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161014 | Discussion on the necessity to reinforce the radio air interface for the next generation system | THALES | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161015 | Moved EnSE functionality to Enterprise Server | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161016 | pCR to TS 33.250 - Adding an EN in section 5.3.3.1.2 on P-GW and traffic forwarding | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161017 | pCR adding key issue in security area 5.4 | THALES | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161018 | pCR to TR 33.899 New key issue - Secondary authentication by 3rd party service | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161019 | Discussion on the necessity to reinforce the radio air interface for the next generation system | THALES | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161020 | FS_NSA - Update to Key Issue #8.3 – Security on UE’s access to slices | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161021 | Key issue about data communication security between network entities | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161022 | Key issue about V2I broadcast communication security | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161023 | Security of UE to V2X Control Funtion interface | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161024 | Adding References and Definitions and Abbreviations | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161025 | Corrections to TR 33.885 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161026 | Adding Architecture section | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161027 | Data communication security between network entities | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161028 | Key issue about security of UE to V2X Control Funtion interface | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161029 | Security for V2X Broadcast Communication: Life Time of Credentials | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161030 | Security for V2X Broadcast Communication: Replay Protection | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161031 | Security for V2X Broadcast Communication: Introducing Temporary ID management Function for V2X Data Source Accountability | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161032 | A Method for IoT Service Layer Security Bootstrapping | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161033 | Service Layer Security Bootstrapping Mechanism for IoT Devices | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161034 | LS on "Next Generation" Security Requirements | S2-164263 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161035 | Corrections to 33.179 | HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Co. Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161036 | Clarification on floor control signalling protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161037 | LWA editorial corrections | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161038 | LS on Improvement to authentication procedure for supporting Emergency Service on WLAN | S2-164273 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161039 | Clarification in logging access to personal data | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161040 | Clarification in Authentication policy | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161041 | Clarification in Authentication policy | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161042 | Remove “shall” from the TR | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161043 | pCR to TR 33.899: Enhancing DH session key derivation | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161044 | pCR to TR 33.899: UEs with Asymmetric Keys | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161045 | I-WLAN feature withdrawal | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161046 | LS to SA1 on factory automation requirements | ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161047 | Additional Security Requirements on credential storage | ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161048 | Introduction to Diet-ESP | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161049 | 2G Security improvements | ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161050 | pCR to TS 33.117 Editorial correction to testcase "TC_ IP_MULTICAST_HANDLING" | Nokia Networks | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161051 | Enforce mutual authentication | ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161052 | pCR to TS 33.117 - Revision of the testcase "TC_GRATUITOUS_ARP_DISABLING | Nokia Networks | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161053 | pCR to TS 33.117 - Enhancing the testcase "TC_BVT_ROBUSTNESS AND FUZZ TESTING" | Nokia Networks | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161054 | Potential requirements for credential storage | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161055 | Clarifying which RFC is relevant for ECDSA | Nokia, Gemalto | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161056 | Adding Rel-13 Key Issues to 33.880 | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161057 | Discussion on adding Rel-13 key issues to 33.880 | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161058 | Scope for Mission Critical security study | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161059 | Update to study item for Study on Mission Critical Security Enhancements | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161060 | Mission Critical security study document template | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161061 | Clarifications to 33.179 | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161062 | Correcting GMK revokation in TS 33.179 | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161063 | pCR to TR 33.863, v1.1.1: Solution #10 (extends sol. 2): "AKA-based session key generation for application protocols" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161064 | LWIP - Correction of the UEs IP address | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161065 | Key Issue #2.1: Authentication framework | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161066 | MC_SEC 33.880 Study Template | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161067 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Architecture - modifying key issue titles" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161068 | Key Issue #8.2 - Security mechanism differentiation for different network slices | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161069 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Architecture - security features on AN-CN interfaces" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161070 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Architecture - security features on CN-CN interfaces" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161071 | New privacy key issue on protection of network slice identifier | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161072 | pCR to 33.885 - New Key Issue on Detectability of Malicious behaviour | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161073 | pCR to add a solution 'back-off timer' for key issue 5.2.3.7 | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161074 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Authentication framework - key issue" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161075 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Authentication framework - requirements" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161076 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Authentication framework - solution A - candidate methods" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161077 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Authentication framework - solution A - transport considerations" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161078 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Authentication framework - solution A - efficiency considerations" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161079 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Authentication framework - solution A - general information flow" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161080 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Authentication framework - solution A - alternatives" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161081 | EAP Encapsulation Protocol | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161082 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Authentication framework - solution A - initial evaluation" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161083 | Key issue Security requirements on gNB | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161084 | New solution to security area #2: EAP authentication framework | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161085 | Key issue Security aspects of dual connectivity | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161086 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Replacing solution 2.2 with reference to solution 3.1" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161087 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Evaluation of Solution #3.1: Including a key exchange..." | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161088 | Remaining open issues in EASE: problem descriptions and solution proposals | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161089 | Verification of authenticity of the cell | Samsung R&D Institute UK | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161090 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Network Authorization" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161091 | Interconnection Security Key Issue | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161092 | Corrections to EASE | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161093 | Interconnection Security - Circles of Trust | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161094 | Correcting a requirement for Vehicle UE Privacy (V2X) | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161095 | Hiding the subscriber IMSI from the serving network for V2X | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161096 | Reattach procedure for Vehicle UE Identity Privacy | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161097 | Vehicle UE privacy based on data traversing the network | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161098 | Baseline architecture for V2X | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161099 | Legitimacy of V2X messages on key issue for data source accountability | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161100 | pCR on allowing non-radio interface keys to be refreshed in the existing key issue on Refreshing radio interface keys | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161101 | pCR solution to Key # 1.2 on the need a security anchor | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161102 | Adding requirements to the Key Issue # 5.1 and a new key issue on storage of device credentials | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161103 | pCR on a proposed solution for IMSI privacy | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161104 | pCR on New key issue on on-demand AS integrity protection in NextGen systems | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161105 | Solution for Key issue #2.4: Device identifier authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161106 | Finalising Key issue #3.5: Unnecessary dependence of keys between security layers | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161107 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Security visibility and configurability" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161108 | Secure delivery of IOV-values to the MS in enhanced GPRS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161109 | Availability of the control plane in Next Gen | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161110 | Installing PMK at the WLAN AP using EAP | Blackberry, Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161111 | WID on Security Assurance Specification for eNB | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161112 | Protecting against the modification of Attach/TAU Request attacks | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161113 | pCR to 33.899 - Resolution of EN in 5.3.3.2.3 | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161114 | pCR revise the details of key issue# 8.1 | China Mobile Com. Corporation, China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161115 | pCR : merge the requirements of key issue #8.1 | China Mobile Com. Corporation, China Unicom, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161116 | Removing Editor’s Note in 5.2.6.2.3 | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161117 | pCR adding the definition of security anchor in the section 3.1 | China Mobile Com. Corporation, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161118 | proposed/draft reply LS on eDRX security | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161119 | handling editor's notes in 33.916 | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161120 | handling editor's notes in 33.116 | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161121 | handling editor's notes in 33.117 | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161122 | pCR to 33.117 to 5.2.3.4.3.3 introducing password blacklists | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161123 | pCR adding the potential security requirements into the section 5.2.3.7 | China Mobile Com. Corporation, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161124 | PDN GW Security Issues | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161125 | pCR choice of authentication methods | China Mobile Com. Corporation, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161126 | Resolution of the editor’s notes under the introductory text for security area #8 on network slicing | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161127 | pCR complete the section 5.2.3.6 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161128 | Clarification and resolution of the editor’s notes in key issue of UE service authorization under the security area for network slicing | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161129 | Discussion on the trust model in Next Generation systems in relation to the network slicing security area | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161130 | pCR scope of TS 33.250 | China Mobile Com. Corporation, ZTE, Telecom Italia, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161131 | LS on "Next Generation" Security Requirements | S2-164280 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161132 | Solution for authorization and accountability in V2X systems | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161133 | Protecting against the modification of Attach/TAU Request attacks | TELECOM ITALIA S.p.A., ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161134 | pCR adding the test case of protecting data and information in transfer into the section 5.2.3.2.4 of TS 33.116 | China Mobile Com. Corporation, ZTE, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161135 | pCR to TR 33.899: Security Implications of Low Latency | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161136 | Solution for communication security with V2X network entities | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161137 | High level description of V2XLTE architecture | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161138 | New GPRS algorithms – status update | ETSI SAGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161139 | Solution for Key Issue #7.3.3 on spatial replay | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161140 | Key hierarchy schems for network slicing | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161141 | A Method for IoT Service Layer Security Bootstrapping | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161142 | Service Layer Security Bootstrapping Mechanism for IoT Devices | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161143 | Clarification on floor control signalling protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161144 | The storage of security context | Huawei; HiSilicon; China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161145 | Handling editor's notes in 33.916 related to figures | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161146 | New WID on Support of EAP Re-Authentication Protocol for WLAN Interworking | ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161147 | Nokia comments on S3-161118 Reply on eDRX security | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161148 | Comment contribution to S3-161055 "Clarifying which RFC is relevant for ECDSA" | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161149 | Comments on S3-161055 "Clarifying which RFC is relevant for ECDSA" | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161150 | pCR adding the definition of security anchor in the section 3.1 | China Mobile Com. Corporation, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161151 | LS Reply to S3-160907 (C1-163039) | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161152 | New WID on Support of EAP Re-Authentication Protocol for WLAN Interworking | ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161153 | Reply LS on eDRX security | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161154 | Reply to: Liaison Statement on 5G Capabilities and Requirements | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161155 | Adding Architecture section | Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson, Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161156 | Adding References and Definitions and Abbreviations | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161157 | Corrections to TR 33.885 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161158 | Update of V2X attach id obfuscation | LG Electronics France | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161159 | LS to SA1 on factory automation requirements | ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161160 | Additional Security Requirements on credential storage | ORANGE, Telecom Italia, Gemalto, Deutsche Telekom, Oberthur, Giesecke&Devrient | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161161 | 2G Security improvements | ORANGE, Telecom Italia, Gemalto, Oberthur, Giesecke&Devrient, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161162 | Enforce mutual authentication | ORANGE, Telecom Italia, Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, Gemalto, Oberthur, Giesecke&Devrient, TeliaSonera, Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161163 | Hiding the subscriber IMSI from the serving network for V2X | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161164 | Reattach procedure for Vehicle UE Identity Privacy | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161165 | Vehicle UE privacy based on data traversing the network | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161166 | Key issue about data communication security between network entities | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161167 | Key issue about V2I broadcast communication security | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161168 | Security for V2X Broadcast Communication: Life Time of Credentials | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161169 | Security for V2X Broadcast Communication: Introducing Temporary ID management Function for V2X Data Source Accountability | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161170 | Adding Rel-13 Key Issues to 33.880 | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161171 | Discussion of GMK revocation issue | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161172 | V2X requirement on updating of crypto | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161173 | Legitimacy of V2X messages on key issue for data source accountability | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161174 | Solution for authorization and accountability in V2X systems | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161175 | Key issue about security of UE to V2X Control Funtion interface | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161176 | Security of UE to V2X Control Funtion interface | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161177 | pCR to 33.885 - New Key Issue on Detectability of Malicious behaviour | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161178 | New draft TR 33.885 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161179 | Secure delivery of IOV-values to the MS in enhanced GPRS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161180 | Corrections to EASE | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161181 | Exception sheet EASE-ALGO_SA3 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161182 | Reply to: LS on "Next Generation" Security Requirements | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161183 | Definitions for FS_NSA | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161184 | pCR to 33.899 - update of the Introduction section | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161185 | pCR to TR 33.899 - update of section 4.2 High level security requirements | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161186 | NSA Adding new security area on broadcast multicast | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161187 | Clause 4.1 details | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161188 | NSA new security area on interworking and migration | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161189 | Security aspects of Connectionless RAN-CN interface | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161190 | pCR adding the definition of security anchor in the section 3.1 | China Mobile Com. Corporation, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161191 | pCR solution to Key # 1.2 on the need a security anchor | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161192 | pCR to TR 33.899: Proposal of key hierarchy for 5G security | NEC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161193 | Security for serving functions not in physical protected place | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161194 | pCR to TR 33.899: Security Implications of Low Latency | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161195 | Signing of Access Tokens | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161196 | New work item for Security Architecture for Mission Critical Services | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161197 | PCR of User Plane Security Protection | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG, Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161198 | pCR to TR 33.899: Authentication section introduction | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161199 | pCR adding the potential security requirements into the section 5.2.3.7 | China Mobile Com. Corporation, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161200 | pCR to add a solution 'back-off timer' for key issue 5.2.3.7 | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161201 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Authentication framework - requirements" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161202 | Key issue #2.4: Device identifier authentication | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161203 | Key Issue of Security for Service Provider Connection | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG, KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161204 | pCR to TR 33.899 New key issue - Secondary authentication by 3rd party service | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161205 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Authentication framework - solution A - transport considerations" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161206 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Authentication framework - solution A - efficiency considerations" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161207 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Authentication framework - solution A - general information flow" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161208 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Authentication framework - solution A - alternatives" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161209 | New solution to security area #2: EAP authentication framework | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161210 | EAP Encapsulation Protocol | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161211 | Solution for Key issue #2.4: Device identifier authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161212 | Network Slice: EN in 5.8 intro and assumptions | Nokia,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161213 | pCR revise the details of key issue# 8.1 | China Mobile Com. Corporation, China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161214 | Discussion on the trust model in Next Generation systems in relation to the network slicing security area | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161215 | Network Slice: EN in 5.8.3.2 Slice differentiation | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161216 | Reply to: LS on Protecting UE network capabilities from ‘bidding down attack | Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161217 | Protecting against the modification of Attach/TAU Request attacks | Qualcomm Incorporated,Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161218 | Key Issue for inter-domain identity management operation | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161219 | Identity management for inter-domain operation | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161220 | LWA editorial corrections | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161221 | Clarification in logging access to personal data | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161222 | Installing PMK at the WLAN AP using EAP | Blackberry, Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161223 | Reply to: LS on PDCP ciphering for high data rates in eLWA | Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161224 | LS on enhancing legacy GSM security | Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161225 | Reply to: LS response on LS on confidentiality protection of an identity in a value of an XML attribute of an XML element of an XML document included in a SIP message. | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161226 | LS Reply to S3-160907 (C1-163039) | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161227 | Fix Identity Management interface | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161228 | Clarification on floor control signalling protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161229 | Corrections to 33.179 | HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Co. Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161230 | Clarification on the requirement of recording and discrete listening | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161231 | handling editor's notes in 33.116 | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161232 | New draft TS 33.116 | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161233 | pCR adding the test case of protecting data and information in transfer into the section 5.2.3.2.4 of TS 33.116 | China Mobile Com. Corporation, ZTE, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161234 | Cover sheet TS 33.116 | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161235 | new draft TS 33.117 | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161236 | pCR to TS 33.117 on TC_CONFIDENTIAL_SYSTEM_INTERNAL_DATA | Deutsche Telekom AG,NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161237 | pCR to TS 33.117 adding test case for "Protecting data and information in transfer" | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161238 | pCR to 33.117 to 5.2.3.4.3.3 introducing password blacklists | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161239 | Clarification in Authentication policy | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161240 | Removing Editor’s Note in 5.2.6.2.3 | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161241 | Cover sheet TS 33.117 | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161242 | pCR adding the skeleton of TS 33.250 | China Mobile Com. Corporation, ZTE, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161243 | TS 33.250 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161244 | Remove “shall” from the TR | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161245 | WID on Security Assurance Specification for eNB | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161246 | new draft TR 33.916 | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161247 | Cover sheet TR 33.916 | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161248 | Solution for Key Issue #7.3.3 on spatial replay | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161249 | new draft TR 33.880 | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161250 | Removing Editor’s Note in 6.1.2.2 | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161251 | new draft TR 33.863 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161252 | pCR to TR 33.863, v1.1.1: Solution #10 (extends sol. 2): "AKA-based session key generation for application protocols" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161253 | A Method for IoT Service Layer Security Bootstrapping | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161254 | Service Layer Security Bootstrapping Mechanism for IoT Devices | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161255 | pCR to 33.863 - addition of recomendation section | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161256 | WID for normaitive work of BEST | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161257 | Verification of authenticity of the cell | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161258 | Detailed Requirements for Security Mechanism Differentiation for Network Slices | Huawei, HiSilicon,Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161259 | pCR to TR 33.899: UEs with Asymmetric Keys | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161260 | pCR to TR 33.899: Authentication of the user | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161261 | Clarification and resolution of the editor’s notes in key issue of UE service authorization under the security area for network slicing | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161262 | The Authentication & Authorization Scenarios of UE Accessing into Network Slicing | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161263 | Editor's notes on definitions | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161264 | Network slice: EN in 5.8.3.7 interslice communication | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161265 | pCR to TR 33.899: Proposal of solution for key issue of network slicing security | NEC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161266 | Solution for Network Slicing Security | LG Electronics France | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161267 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Replacing solution 2.2 with reference to solution 3.1" | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161268 | pCR to TR 33.899: Radio interface key exchange protocol | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161269 | pCR to TR 33.899 v0.3.0 "Evaluation of Solution #3.1: Including a key exchange..." | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161270 | pCR to TR 33.899: interception of radio interface keys sent between operator entities | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161271 | pCR to TR 33.899: UE action if network does not update session keys | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161272 | pCR to 33.899 - Resolution of EN in 5.3.3.2.3 | TNO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161273 | pCR on allowing non-radio interface keys to be refreshed in the existing key issue on Refreshing radio interface keys | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161274 | Threats for Security Context Sharing | Huawei, HiSilicon,Deutsche Telekom AG, China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161275 | Finalising Key issue #3.5: Unnecessary dependence of keys between security layers | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161276 | The storage of security context | Huawei; HiSilicon; China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161277 | Security context for connectionless mode | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161278 | Security Context and Key Management | Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161279 | Key issue Security requirements on gNB | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161280 | Key issue Security aspects of dual connectivity | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161281 | pCR on New key issue on on-demand AS integrity protection in NextGen systems | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161282 | pCR to TR 33.899: Network public keys | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161283 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161284 | pCR to 33.863 - Addition of annex detailing suggested normaitive changes | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161285 | New privacy key issue on concealing permanent or long-term subscriber identifier | Ericsson, Nokia, Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161286 | Cover sheet 33.863 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161287 | New privacy key issue on protection of network slice identifier | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161288 | Enhancing the concealment of permanent or long-term subscriber identifier | Ericsson,Telecom Italia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161289 | pCR on a proposed solution for IMSI privacy | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161290 | New draft R 33.899 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑161291 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
page generated from database: 2024-04-22 07:58:53